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Anglo-American research has long documented the positive impact of effective corporate 
governance mechanisms in improving corporate financial reporting quality. However, 
examination of this causality across different bank types (e.g. conventional and Islamic banks) 
is still lacking. This thesis investigates the role of different internal governance mechanisms 
(i.e. boards of directors and audit committees) in enhancing the financial reporting quality in 
conventional and Islamic banks. It utilises the Islamic banking model operating on an 
extended governance structure (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board) to gain new insights into the 
influence of bank institutional characteristics and additional monitoring mechanisms on 
managerial opportunism and on the information value of earnings. For a sample of listed 
conventional and Islamic banks from 16 countries, the results are twofold. First, the findings 
provide evidence that having a large and independent board of directors and audit committee 
is associated with reduced levels of earnings management for both conventional and Islamic 
banks. These findings demonstrate the absence of structural differences between the two bank 
types regarding the effectiveness of the traditional governance mechanisms in limiting 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour. Conditional on the bank type, the results show 
that the presence of an additional layer of governance through employing a large and 
financially qualified Shari’ah supervisory board, whose members serve on multiple boards, 
provides a significant deterrent against earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the 
findings provide evidence for the role of effective boards of directors and audit committees in 
enhancing the information value of earnings. The results show that large and independent 
boards and audit committees are associated with more persistent earnings, predictable cash 
flows, and reliable loan loss provisions that are highly associated with future loan charge-offs. 
The findings of this thesis provide valuable insights for a better understanding of the role of 
traditional and additional monitoring mechanisms in promoting financial reporting quality in 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The quality of corporate financial reporting and the practices of earnings management have 
been the subjects of extensive research, as factors having broad implications for various 
stakeholders. The number of accounting scandals that the twenty-first century has witnessed, 
such as Enron and WorldCom, has caused severe damage to investors’ confidence in financial 
reporting, and raised many concerns about the quality of financial reporting. In addition, the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009 drew attention to the importance of corporate governance 
and prompted much investigation into the way that banks are governed. 
Banks’ corporate governance and financial reporting quality are two questionable issues. The 
governance of banking institutions came under stricter scrutiny after the onset of the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, because bank governance was believed to have been a major contributory 
factor to the crisis (Isaksson and Kirkpatrick, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012). Although 
banks contribute to the economic and financial growth of communities, some banks exhibit 
great opacity and discretionary attitudes, such as aggressive earnings management and 
fraudulent financial reporting (i.e. the cases of Lehman Brothers, and Bear, Stearns and Co.).  
Bank governance is a unique monitoring system, due to the unique features possessed by 
banks, which make them distinct from other non-financial institutions, and these features 
influence the effectiveness of their governance mechanisms. Among these features are the 
complexity and opacity of banking activities, which lead to substantial informational 
asymmetries and therefore, both the internal governance systems and financial reporting 
issues in the banking industry are debatable. Another feature is related to the heavy 
regulations imposed by governments and other regulators on banking institutions. Strict 
government regulations are fundamental given the crucial role played by banks in societies. 
Banks intermediate funds from investors and depositors to borrowers in order to finance 
activities that actuate economic growth, and hence, their stability is central to a country’s 
general economic health (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015). 
In modern economies, corporate financial reports issued by firms around the world are a 
highly important matter. These reports are considered the key source of valuable information 
about the financial performance and position of firms. This information is significant to a 
wide range of users, such as managers, shareholders, investors, creditors, suppliers, regulators 
and other stakeholders. These users rely on financial reports to satisfy their need for 
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information that assists them in their decision-making process. According to the “Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting” issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), the purpose of financial reporting “is to provide financial information about the 
reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in 
making decisions relating to providing resources to the entity” (International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2018). In addition to satisfying the informational needs of decision makers 
(i.e. shareholders and creditors), financial reports are a tool to monitor and evaluate 
managerial performance. In other words, financial reporting helps shareholders in assessing 
the management’s discharge of its stewardship responsibility. The stewardship responsibility 
arises from the separation of ownership and management, where a manager acts as a steward 
to owners. With the assumption that managers are self-interested individuals, monitoring and 
performance evaluation tools are vital. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and 
Bushman and Smith (2001), financial reporting limits managerial self-interest behaviour and 
aligns managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests. 
Given the significant functions of financial reporting (i.e. its informativeness role and its 
stewardship role), financial report users need to receive high-quality financial reports. 
Reliable and trustworthy financial information is vital, as it boosts the efficiency of resource 
allocation (Bhattacharya et al., 2003), lowers the information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders (Biddle and Hilary, 2006), and mitigates the risks of moral hazards and 
adverse selection (Li, 2008).  
Prior literature has established a close link between financial reporting quality and corporate 
governance. Issues pertaining to corporate governance are linked with the expansion of the 
modern corporation, where the ownership and control of the corporation are separated. The 
separation of ownership and control implies that owners delegate their decision-making 
authority to controllers (i.e. managers) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Due to the different 
objectives of both owners and managers, the authority delegation results in implicit conflicts 
of interests between the two parties. Furthermore, under the agency relationship, the two 
parties (i.e. owners and managers) do not possess the same level of information about the 
firm, a situation that creates the problem of “information asymmetry” (Noreen, 1988; Arnold 
and De Lange, 2004; Chen and Liu, 2013). The problem of information asymmetry 
exacerbates the agency problem, as managers might manipulate the financial information they 




However, owners can, to some extent, protect their interests and control agency problems by 
establishing some devices to monitor and control managerial performance. The agency theory 
argues that managerial self-interest, opportunistic behaviour and other agency problems can 
be controlled for by setting up formal mechanisms of corporate governance. Such 
mechanisms are considered as the typical cures to agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Brennan, 2006; Dey, 2008; Chen et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, to govern the conflicts of interests between owners and managers and to ensure 
the effective management of resources, corporations need to establish a comprehensive 
system of governance that supports the continuous evaluation of managerial performance. 
Such systems promote transparency and corporate fairness, as it has been argued by Mallin 
(2001) that “corporate governance goes hand in hand with increased transparency and 
accountability” (Mallin, 2001, p. 77). 
 
1.2 Motivation and Rationale of the Thesis 
The importance of corporate governance systems stems from their role in enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of corporations. This is achieved by ensuring that firms’ 
resources are properly managed and controlled. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and 
the collapse of large and highly reputed financial institutions, such as Lehman Brothers and 
Bear, Stearns and Co., have intensified interest in the effectiveness and reliability of corporate 
governance systems in banking institutions. Hence, banking governance has become one of 
the most debated subjects. 
Corporate governance in the financial sector is unique relative to other sectors. Banks play a 
crucial role in societies, as they are responsible for intermediating funds between investors 
and borrowers. They are also responsible for supplying external finance to firms in other 
sectors, thus contributing to the economic growth at the general society level. Consequently, 
the stability of banking institutions is fundamental for a robust and healthy economy. 
The association between corporate governance effectiveness and financial reporting quality 
has long been established in the literature. However, prior studies often exclude financial 
institutions owing to their peculiar regulatory environment (Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Davidson 
et al., 2005; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006; Jo and Kim, 2007; Jiang et al., 2008; Marra et al., 
2011; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017). The complexity of banking transactions and the 
diversity of financial instruments lead to substantial information asymmetries and therefore, 
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both corporate governance mechanisms and related financial reporting issues in the banking 
sector are still questionable. 
Financial reporting quality issues in banking have mainly been addressed within the context 
of the conventional banking sector (Shrieves and Dahl, 2003; Shen and Chih, 2005; 
Anandarajan et al., 2007; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010; 2015); much less is known about the 
role of internal governance mechanisms in improving the financial reporting quality across 
alternative banking systems. Therefore, an ideal setting for such an investigation is the unique 
systems of governance in Islamic versus conventional banks. Under the growing emphasis 
placed by regulators on various systems of governance, examining the association between 
corporate governance effectiveness and financial reporting quality in such a unique research 
context (i.e. conventional and Islamic banks) is warranted.  
Research on governance and financial reporting quality within religious establishments (e.g. 
Islamic banks) has become prolific. A number of studies have found that Judeo-Christian 
religious norms affect corporate decision making (Hilary and Hui, 2009), the levels of 
perceived corruption (Mensah, 2014), financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al., 2012; 
McGuire et al., 2012) and earnings management (Callen et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 
2015). Within the Islamic research context, empirical evidence on the association between 
internal governance and financial reporting quality is limited. Although the concept of 
corporate governance came into spotlight after corporate failures in developed countries 
during the early 1990, the concept of corporate governance is rooted in the Islam fourteen 
hundred years ago, where it was presented by the Hisba system. It was initiated in Islam with 
the purpose of safeguarding the society from crime and corruption, ensuring public safety, and 
monitoring the market place to ensure compliance with Islamic law. The Hisba “seeks to 
protect people’s religion, honor, property, rights, safety, and public funds, utilities and 
interests. It does so by ensuring that the rules of Shari’ah govern the religious, financial, 
economic, and social activities” (Ginena and Hamid, 2015, p. 61). 
Prior Islamic banking studies have focused on examining the influence of the unique 
governance structure on corporate social responsibility disclosure (Farook et al., 2011; Abdul 
Rahman and Bukair, 2013), performance (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Almutairi and Quttainah, 
2017), and risk-taking (Mollah et al., 2017). However, there has been little empirical evidence 
on the impact of the unique governance system in Islamic banks on the quality of financial 
reporting (Quttainah et al., 2013). Given the significant role of corporate governance in 
enhancing efficiency, stability, and promoting economic development, and since Islamic 
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banks are gaining prominence, further study of the role of corporate and Shari’ah governance 
in financial reporting quality in Islamic banks is warrented. 
Finally, this thesis is also motivated by the noticeable fact that “Islamic banks did not 
announce substantial write-offs but have been rather resilient during the financial crisis” 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015, p. 418). Hence, it is valuable to investigate whether the difference 
in governance structures between Islamic banks and conventional banks affects their financial 
reporting quality. 
 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of various internal governance 
mechanisms in improving the quality of financial reporting in two different types of banks 
(i.e. conventional and Islamic). A comparative assessment of conventional and Islamic banks 
offers a unique setting in which to examine the possible effect of different institutional 
characteristics on enhancing the quality of financial reporting.  
In this thesis, the quality of banks’ financial reporting will be evaluated from two distinct 
perspectives; the opportunistic earnings management perspective and the information value 
perspective.  
To achieve the main research aim, the thesis sets out to answer the following two research 
questions: 
i) Do internal mechanisms of corporate governance constrain opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour in both conventional and Islamic banks? 
ii) Do internal mechanisms of corporate governance raise the information value of 
earnings reported by both conventional and Islamic banks?  
Although these two research questions are related to financial reporting quality, however, they 
will be separately addressed in this thesis. Chapter 4 will present the research hypotheses, 
methodology, and empirical results for the first research question, while chapter 5 will present 
the hypotheses, methodology, and results for the second research question. 
The whole thesis seeks to explicitly examine the joint effects of traditional and additional 
(non-traditional) internal governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality in the two 
bank types. 







 Financial Reporting Quality 
Measures: 
 
1. Opportunistic Earnings 
Management Perspective 





 Internal Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms: 
 
1. Board of Directors 
2. Audit Committee 
3. Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Research framework 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis 
This thesis investigates whether effective corporate governance mechanisms play a role in 
enhancing the financial reporting quality in banks. It assesses the quality of financial reporting 
from two different perspectives; opportunistic earnings management and information value, in 
two empirical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5).  
This thesis contributes to the comparative literature (conventional banks vis-à-vis Islamic 
banks) in several ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, the first empirical study is among 
the early attempts to directly identify how traditional and additional mechanisms of corporate 
governance affect earnings management behaviour within the banking industry. It provides 
cross-country evidence from different banking systems, and therefore its findings extend 
studies on banking governance (Cornett et al., 2009; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010; Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, 2012; John et al., 2016). It also extends the study of Quttainah et al. (2013), 
which examined earnings management behaviour in Islamic banks, but it failed to 
comparatively assess the role of different internal governance mechanisms in constraining 
opportunistic earnings management in conventional and Islamic banks. Second, the study 
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offers new insights into the recent literature (Elnahass et al., 2014; 2018; Abdelsalam et al., 
2016), which finds that Islamic banks are less likely to opportunistically manage their 
earnings relative to their conventional counterparts. While these studies theoretically attribute 
their findings to the possible effect of additional governance mechanisms (i.e. double-
governance) on lowering managerial opportunism in Islamic banks, I explicitly examine these 
claims through an identifiable set of measures for internal governance mechanisms. Finally, 
by presenting the Islamic banks as ethically oriented organisations, the findings shed light on 
the role of ethical norms and institutional factors in shaping financial reporting quality 
(Labelle et al., 2010; Anagnostopoulou, 2017; Jiang et al., 2018). 
The second empirical study extends the existing literature in a number of ways. First, the 
greater part of the banking literature examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial reporting quality examines this association from an opportunistic 
earnings management perspective (Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012; Quttainah et al., 2013; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2016). This study is among the early attempts to examine the association 
between corporate governance and financial reporting quality from an informational 
perspective. Second, it extends the study of Kanagaretnam et al. (2014a) by examining the 
role of different corporate governance mechanisms, as their study focuses on the effects of 
international legal and political institutions. 
The examination of financial reporting quality in conventional and Islamic banks offers some 
advantages. First, focusing on a single industry enhances the accuracy of the findings from the 
empirical analyses, and in turn results in a more reliable assessment of earnings quality. 
Second, the high levels of profitability in the banking sector until 2007 provided managers 
with opportunities and incentives to obtain personal benefits from manipulating earnings 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2014a). Third, comparing conventional banks with Islamic banks offers 
a unique setting, given the presence of additional governance mechanisms and the heightened 
commitment to the Islamic religious values and beliefs. According to the social norms theory, 
these religious beliefs are expected to shape corporate decisions, thus to play a role in 
enhancing financial reporting quality. 
The investigation in this thesis responds to prior calls for research to better understand the 
relevance of bank type and internal governance mechanisms for accounting opportunism and 





1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters. The current chapter has presented an overview of the 
research. It has also discussed the motivation and rationale of the thesis, outlined the main 
research aim and objectives, and has highlighted the expected contributions of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents the discussions on corporate governance by exploring two alternative 
perspectives; the conventional perspective and the Islamic perspective. The chapter begins by 
defining corporate governance from a conventional perspective and then develops the 
theoretical framework for the corporate governance model. This chapter also identifies the 
unique features of banking institutions and their implications for corporate governance 
structures. The second part of the chapter examines the concept of corporate governance from 
an Islamic perspective and describes the unique governance model in Islamic banks. 
Chapter 3 reviews and discusses the literature on the role of corporate governance in financial 
reporting quality. The first part of the chapter discusses the concept and definitions of 
financial reporting quality. It also reviews the literature assessing financial reporting quality. 
The second part reviews the literature that examines the role of corporate governance in 
financial reporting quality. 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the hypotheses development, research methodology, and the 
empirical results for the first and second research questions, respectively. In particular, 
Chapter 4 empirically investigates whether internal corporate governance constrains 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour in conventional and Islamic banks. Chapter 5 
investigates the role of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing the information value of 
earnings reported by conventional and Islamic banks. 
Finally, Chapter 6 draws the conclusion of this thesis. It presents a summary of the main 
findings. The chapter also discusses the implications of the research findings and offers some 
suggestions for future research. 
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The recent global financial crisis has brought increased attention to the importance of 
corporate governance, as it plays a fundamental role in determining the behaviour of 
corporations in achieving their goals. Managerial behaviour and the role of internal 
governance mechanisms in monitoring this behaviour has come under increased scrutiny. The 
corporate governance systems aim to improve the efficiency of business organisations and to 
enhance their public image. Consequently, effective corporate governance systems are key 
elements for sustainable economic growth. Indeed, corporate governance seems to be a 
crucial consideration for both developed and emerging economies. However, prior literature 
proposes that banks’ governance systems differ from that of non-financial institutions, due to 
the unique characteristics of banking institutions. Although financial markets have been 
observed to reward banks with effective and strong corporate governance, the recent financial 
crisis has affirmed the need for improved financial reporting quality and corporate governance 
in banks. 
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 resulted in a series of bank failures (such as 
Lehman Brothers and Bear, Stearns & Co.), especially within the conventional banking 
industry. As a result to this financial crisis, “world stock markets have fallen, large financial 
institutions have collapsed or been bought out, and governments in even the wealthiest 
nations have had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their financial systems” (Shah, 
2010). Several studies have demonstrated that Islamic banks had showed more stability and 
resilience during the crisis, relative to conventional banks (Green, 2010; Mollah and Zaman, 
2015; Pappas et al., 2017). Subsequent to the collapse of leading financial institutions, more 
attention has been focused on Islamic banking as an alternative mode of finance (Wilson, 
2010). The unique business model under which Islamic banks operate had been argued to 
contribute to such resilience and stability. The Shari’ah-compliant financial products offered 
by Islamic banks have a role in enhancing the stability of the banks because all of these 
products are asset-baked. Furthermore, because Islamic banks’ operations are based on the 
principles of Shari’ah, they are likely to advocate ethical banking, which emphasises fairness, 
just and interpersonal trust (Pappas et al., 2017). Such principles encourage truthfulness and 
prevent unethical, risky and opportunistic practices on management side.  
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Referring to the impact of the global financial crisis, there has been no empirical evidence for 
the impact of the crisis on the financial reporting quality within conventional and Islamic 
banking. The greater part of the literature has compared conventional and Islamic banks on 
the basis of risk and stability during the recent financial crisis. Among the comparative 
studies are Hasan and Dridi (2010), Abdulle and Kassim (2012), Beck et al. (2013), Saeed and 
Izzeldin (2016), and Pappas et al. (2017). For a sample of 120 conventional and Islamic banks 
from Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, Malaysia and Turkey, Hasan and 
Dridi (2010) illustrated that Islamic banks showed strong resilience during the global financial 
crisis. They claimed that the Islamic banks’ unique business model helped in limiting the 
adverse impact on profitability in 2008. Furthermore, Abdulle and Kassim (2012) provided 
evidence that Islamic banks were less exposed to liquidity risks during the financial crisis, due 
to the fact that they were holding more liquid assets relative to their conventional peers. A 
more recent comparative study by Hamdi et al. (2019) found that, during the period 2007-
2012, Islamic banks were more stable, profitable, and capitalised. Hence, they have performed 
better than conventional banks during the financial crisis. All of these comparative studies 
provide evidence for the resilience of the Islamic banking industry during the recent financial 
crisis. Supporting descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 2.  
The discussions above motivated research into differences between conventional banks and 
Islamic banks, and the implications of such differences on the governance, performance and 
financial reporting quality of the two banking sectors.  
Hence, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces some conceptual 
definitions of corporate governance. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework of 
corporate governance. Section 2.4 presents discussion of the concept of corporate governance 
in the banking sector. Section 2.5 explores the concept of corporate governance from an 
Islamic perspective. For the purpose of this exploration, Section 2.5 introduces a background 
on the Islamic economic system as the foundation for Islamic banks, reviews the basic 
principles of Islamic banks, and describes the unique corporate and Shari'ah governance 
model adopted by Islamic banks. Finally, Section 2.6 provides a brief summary of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Defining Corporate Governance 
Despite extensive research on corporate governance, there is a lack of consensus on its 
definition and concept (Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Du Plessis et al., 2010). This is due to 
the different perspectives from which corporate governance is observed. An early definition 
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of corporate governance is developed by Tricker in 1984, where corporate governance is 
defined as “the process by which corporate entities are governed; that is with the exercise of 
power over the direction of the enterprise and the acceptance of a duty to be accountable” 
(Tricker, 1984, p. 8). This definition focuses mainly on two aspects: supervision of entities 
and their accountability. Another definition is provided by Koh (1994), who describes 
corporate governance as “the process and structure used to direct and manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation with the objective of enhancing long-term value for 
shareholders and financial viability of the business” (Koh, 1994, p. 23). This definition clearly 
adopts a narrow shareholder perspective. On the other side, the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
offers one of the most common definitions, where corporate governance is viewed as the 
system by which firms are directed and controlled. The Cadbury Committee gives a quite 
neutral definition for the concept of corporate governance, as it emphasises the role of both, 
shareholders and boards of directors. It states that “boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the 
directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is 
in place” (Cadbury Committee, 1992, p. 15). Similarly, Turnbull (1997) views corporate 
governance as all the forces affecting the institutional functions in a corporation. Both 
definitions (i.e. the Cadbury Committee, 1992; Turnbull, 1997) consider corporate 
governance in the context of the board’s role and function. From a financial view, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997, p. 737) claimed that “corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investments”. In other words, their definition elaborates on assuring that investors get 
reasonable and fair returns on their investments. 
A broader definition considers that the objective of a good corporate governance system is to 
maximise firms’ beneficences to the overall economy, through all stakeholders (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2012). This definition is consistent with the broad definition developed by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where corporate 
governance is viewed as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined” (The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2004, p. 11). Following these definitions, corporate governance 
would encompass the relationships between the corporation and its shareholders, directors, 
creditors and employees, and other institutions. Although the definitions of corporate 
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governance vary between narrow and broad perspectives, Bouheni et al. (2016) conclude that 
corporate governance is defined as “a set of internal and external mechanisms working 
together to obtain an efficient and an optimal alignment of all parties’ interests, and getting a 
win-win relationship” (Bouheni et al., 2016, p. 7). 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework of Corporate Governance 
This section aims to develop a theoretical base for this thesis. A number of theories have been 
used in the literature to explain the role of corporate governance and to describe its practices. 
However, based on the main aim of this thesis, this section reviews and discusses five 
theories; agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, and social norms 
theory. 
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory, which was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, has been used by 
scholars in many fields, such as economics, accounting, finance, political science and 
organisational behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989; Clarke, 2004). The agency theory emerges from 
the separation of ownership and control, a situation that can be described “as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen and Mechling, 1976, p. 308). The popular use of the agency theory in the field 
of corporate governance is due to its clarity and simplicity. The agency theory breaks down 
the business entity into two parties, the owners (principals) and the managers (agents), where 
owners delegate management responsibility and authority to managers. This authority 
delegation results in a possible conflict of interest between the different parties involved. On 
one hand, a conflict may arise between shareholders and managers, which is referred to as 
agency cost of equity. On the other hand, a conflict may arise between debtholders and 
shareholders with managers, a conflict that is referred to as agency cost of debt (Abd-Elsalam, 
1999). The conflicts of interest under the agency contracts are due to the different objectives 
of the parties involved (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hill and Jones, 1992). In agency theory, 
owners (shareholders) expect agents to make decisions in the owners’ interests. On the other 
side, the agent does not necessarily act in the best interests of the owners. Under agency 
contracts, managers are assumed to be self-interested individuals, and hence, they are 
motivated to act in their own self-interest rather than shareholders’ interests. According to 
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Solomon (2007), shareholders’ principle objective is to maximise their own wealth while 
managers might intend to maximise their personal benefits. 
In addition to the conflict of interest in the agency relationship, the parties (principal and 
agents) do not have the same level of information about the company – as agents have more 
access to the company’s information, relative to the principals who are normally not involved 
in the business operations. This creates the problem of “information asymmetry” (Noreen, 
1988; Arnold and De Lange, 2004; Akhtaruddin and Hossain, 2008; Chen and Liu, 2013). 
The problem of information asymmetry implies that complete and full information about the 
business entity is not fairly available to all interested users. Hill and Jones (1992) proposed 
that the problem of information asymmetry aggravates the agency problem, as managers will 
be able to manipulate the information they disclose, and owners will not be able to monitor 
and control managers’ actions. 
To summarise the core problems arising from agency contract, Lubatkin et al. (2005) 
proposed a brief review of the agency theory’s principal-agent model. They argued that the 
agency theory is based on four assumptions. First, opportunism is the major threat, because 
agents (managers) are assumed to be opportunistic by nature, who act in their own interest. 
Second, the opportunistic behaviour of managers is driven by their desire to maximise their 
objectives. Third, corporations are characterised by information asymmetry. Finally, the 
theory’s views about enforced compliance and opportunism are not nationally bounded. This 























Figure 2.1 Agency Theory’s View of Principal-Agent Relationships 
Source: Lubatkin et al. (2005) 
 
 
The agency problems discussed above are even more complex in a regulated environment (i.e. 
banks and financial institutions). This is due to the peculiar nature of their functions 
(Ciancanelli and Gonzalez, 2000; Levine, 2004). Banks operate in highly regulated and 
administered markets and they are characterised by a capital structure that is highly geared. 
These unique characteristics create additional agency problems that involve market regulators 
in addition to the classical problems existing between owners and managers. More 
discussions will be presented later in Section 2.4. 
However, principals can, to some extent, protect their interests and mitigate these agency 
problems by establishing devices and mechanisms, and taking a number of actions to monitor 
and control management performance. These actions are intended to reduce the agency costs, 
and are grouped into three categories: monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kelly, 1983; Hoque, 2006). Monitoring costs are those related to 
observing the managerial behaviour and any action that limits opportunistic behaviour 
(Deegan, 2000; Wang, 2010). Bonding costs relate to all the procedures to align managers’ 
interests with shareholders’ interests (Denis, 2001; Boučková, 2015). Basic examples for such 
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procedures are the incentive contracts that intend to align agent’s interests with those of 
owners. These contracts can take a variety of forms, such as stock options or share ownership. 
All costs, other than monitoring and bonding costs, are referred to as residual costs (Wang, 
2010). Indeed, there is a general agreement in the literature that effective corporate 
governance mechanisms can reduce agency problems, as the role of these mechanisms 
involves monitoring and controlling the management in order to achieve the maximum benefit 
for all parties involved (La Porta et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2005; McKnight and Weir, 
2009; Filatotchev and Wright, 2011). It has been claimed by Hart (1995), that corporate 
governance will be worthless in the absence of agency problems. 
Denis (2001) suggests two main criteria for any corporate governance tool: the tool should 
have a role in reducing the conflicts of interest in the agency contract and it should have a 
significant impact on firm performance. According to the agency theory, the board of 
directors is considered the most influential internal governance mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). With respect to its role, the agency theory focuses on the role of the board to monitor 
managerial acts in order to protect the interests of owners. It also considers the fiduciary 
responsibilities of board members to ensure that managers act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Miller, 1993). 
From an Islamic banking perspective, although the agency theory has been used in Islamic 
banking literature, agency problems are more severe in Islamic banks, relative to conventional 
banks. This is due to the peculiarity of Islamic banks’ structure and operations. Firstly, as the 
Islamic banks’ operations should comply with the principles of Shari’ah, any departure from 
these principles creates additional agency problems (Mollah et al., 2017). According to 
Safieddine (2009, p. 144), “A large percentage of capital providers – shareholders and 
investors – to Islamic financial institutions are extremely concerned that their funds are 
invested in a Shari’ah-compliant manner”. Secondly, the equity-based contracts between the 
Islamic banks and their depositors (the Investment Account Holders (IAHs)) allow banks to 
share in profits with IAHs, but under these contracts, IAHs are not allowed to be involved in 
managing their funds. In other words, the Islamic banks have discretion over management and 
control of depositors’ funds, while IAHs have no voting rights in shareholders’ meetings 
(Darmadi, 2013). IAHs are viewed as “principals entrusting their resources to an agent, the 
financial institutions’ management – with the significant difference that, in their case, the 
agent is appointed by another principal, namely, the shareholder” (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006, 
p. 22). The complex contractual structures in Islamic banks might motivate managers to act 
opportunistically (i.e. put less effort in managing depositors’ funds, extract private benefits at 
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the expense of depositors) (See Section 2.5.2 for more discussions on the basic principles of 
Islamic banking). Finally, it has been argued by a number of researchers that existing 
international accounting rules and standards may not accurately reflect the actual performance 
of Islamic banks. 
In summary, the management in Islamic Banks is recognised as a double agent; to 
shareholders and to Investment Account Holders (Farag et al., 2018). That is to say, agency 
issues in Islamic banks do not solely emerge from the separation of owners and managers, but 
also from the separation of depositors’ cash flow and control rights (Safieddine, 2009). 
 
2.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The discussions of agency problems often focus on the relations between owners 
(shareholders) and managers. Under this model of corporate governance, owners have the 
control right and managers have a fiduciary responsibility to manage and protect owners’ 
interest. However, this approach has been criticised for being too narrow, and focusing on 
profit-maximisation as the firm’s objective (Christopher, 2010). 
When comparing the stakeholder theory with the agency theory, the former rejects the 
concept that shareholders’ profit-maximisation is the only objective of a firm. The stakeholder 
theory is based on the assumption that firms have responsibilities to a broad range of 
stakeholders than only to shareholders (Freeman, 1999). Under the stakeholder theory, the 
society expects beneficial behaviour from corporations in terms of their economic and social 
role. Accordingly, corporate managers are responsible for selecting activities and managing 
resources to attain benefits evenly for all stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). A 
stakeholder is defined as “any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1994, p. 46).  
Unlike the concept of the agency theory that “managers are working and serving for the 
shareholders, stakeholder theorists suggest that managers in organizations have a network of 
relationships to serve – this includes the suppliers, employees and business partners” 
(Bouheni et al., 2016, p. 21). 
The use of the stakeholder theory in explaining the association between corporate governance 
and financial reporting quality is justified by Hoque (2006) and Prior et al. (2008), who 
document that, in order for managers to improve their private interests, they may be motivated 
to manipulate earnings. However, both agency and stakeholder theory provide that, 
shareholders and other stakeholders can monitor managers via different corporate governance 
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mechanisms. Consistent with these views, Mattingly et al. (2009) provide evidence that good 
corporate governance, financial reporting quality, and low earnings management are 
associated with organisation’s stakeholder management.  
The foundations of the Islamic economic system imply that the stakeholder theory is more 
applicable to the Islamic framework, given the concept of equitably protecting the rights of all 
stakeholders (whether they hold equity or not). The main arguments that support stakeholder 
theory in the Islamic framework are based on the principle of property rights in Islam. 
Although the right of individual property is acknowledged in Islam, this right ought to be 
exercised with due care to preserve the interest of a large group of stakeholders (Bashir, 
1999). 
To distinguish between agency theory, which is believed to present a shareholder perspective, 
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Figure 2.2 Comparison between Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory 






2.3.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
Despite the dominance of the agency theory in the corporate governance literature, it has been 
criticised for focusing entirely on a single board function (i.e. monitoring) and overlooking 
another important function (i.e. provision of resources to the firm). 
According to resource dependence theorists, the provision of resources is another essential 
board function (Pfeffer, 1972; Boyd, 1990; Hillman et al., 2009). This function is reflected by 
the ability of the board members to bring resources to the corporation. The theoretical 
foundation of the resource provision function is based on the work of Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978, p. 163), where they express that “when an organization appoints an individual to a 
board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, will concern himself 
with its problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it”. The resource 
dependence theory highlights that boards of directors are responsible for providing resources 
to corporations, not just monitoring and evaluating managers (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Proponents of resource dependence theory claim that, in order for corporations to survive, 
they need resources from the external environment, as these corporations cannot be entirely 
reliant on themselves in operating capacity, and the resources are needed to add value to the 
corporation (Aldrich, 1999; Rao et al., 2007). The board members provide corporations with 
four basic benefits: (1) legitimacy, (2) advice and guidance, (3) advantageous access to 
external resources, and (4) linkages and networks with other organisations (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Hillman et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2013).  
The primary determinant of resource provision by boards is the board capital, which refers to 
the directors’ knowledge, skills, experience and reputation. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
asserted that board capital is positively associated with the benefits provided by corporate 
boards. Board capital has been related to the provision of legitimacy, as prestigious boards 
provide confirmation of the value of the firm to the rest of the world (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Furthermore, board capital (i.e. experience and skills) is relevant to the provision of 
advice and guidance. In addition, directors’ ties can help firms to obtain key resources at 
favourable terms (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). The board capital also encompasses 
social capital (relational capital), which refers to “the sum of actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed 
by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243). Finally, directors’ 
external ties provide channels of communication, which can play a substantial role in 
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disseminating information across firms and facilitating access to strategic opportunities 
(Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). 
Figure 2.3 below illustrates how the agency theory and the resource dependence theory are 
integrated to explain the relation between board of directors and the quality of financial 
reporting. The agency theory argues that the board of directors provides monitoring over 
financial reporting quality to ensure that the corporation provides high quality financial 
information to the users and to ensure the managerial opportunistic behaviour is constrained, 
while the resource dependence theory focuses in the resource provision function of the board, 
where board members provide essential resources to the corporation through their skills, 








Figure 2.3 Integrating the Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory to Explain 
the Relation between Board of Directors and Financial Reporting Quality 






2.3.4 Social Norms Theory 
Despite the dominance of the agency theory in explaining many aspects of the contracting 
environment, it has been criticised for its assumption that self-interest is the sole explanation 
of managerial behaviour, as this focuses mainly on extrinsic rewards, and ignores intrinsic 
rewards such as self-satisfaction and ethical conduct (Ferraro et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2007).  
Social norms
1
 are defined as “informal, mostly unwritten, rules that define acceptable, 
appropriate, and obligatory actions in a given group or society” (Cislaghi and Heise, 2018, p. 
2). Social norms may also refer to perceived social pressure on individuals either to do or not 
to do (Abduh et al., 2011). 
Prior studies have demonstrated that social norms influence managerial behaviour, as social 
norms represent the prevailing code of conduct and ethics that are jointly shared by a group of 
individuals. To illustrate, Bosse and Phillips (2016) argued that self-interested managers 
would attempt to maximise their own interests only as long as they are not violating what they 
perceive to be social norms of fairness and reciprocity. Hence, according to the social norms 
theory, corporate managers’ practices are influenced by their informal beliefs and values, in 
addition to the formal organisational governance arrangements. 
Religiosity, conceptualised as the extent of adherence to religious promulgations, represents a 
prime example of social norms. The social norms theory predicts that religious norms 
influence individuals’ behaviours and decision making (Dyreng et al., 2012). Islamic banks 
exemplify ethically and religiously oriented organisations, which are assumed to operate in 
compliance with Shari’ah rulings and with social norms
2
 underlying these rulings. The 
Islamic moral system stems from coherent guidelines that control all religious, social and 
economic affairs (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2002). Among the moral and ethical values stressed by 
Islamic principles are honesty, transparency, truthfulness and integrity (Ali and Al-Owaihan, 
2008), which are all expected to constrain managers from engaging in ethically questionable 
activities. 
 
                                                          
1
 A norm is defined as “a construct that has widespread usage because it helps describe and explain human 
behaviour” (Cialdini and Trost, 1998, p. 151). 
2
 Social norms in Islamic banks fulfil the religious obligations of trust (Amana), which requires managers to 
behave per the principles of justice (Adl), balance (Qist) and perfection (Ihsan) (Beekun and Badawi, 2005). 
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2.4 Corporate Governance in Banking 
The agency problems resulting from agency contracts that have been discussed in Section 
2.3.1 are even more complicated in banks. Banks operate in highly regulated environments, 
characterised with great opaqueness of transactions and activities. Accordingly, the notion of 
corporate governance in the banking sector exhibits its own attributes and characteristics. This 
is due to the banks’ unique features, which aggravate governance problems and may lessen 
the effectiveness of traditional governance structures. The first unique feature of banks is that 
they are highly leveraged (Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Levine, 2004; Laeven, 2013). Relative 
to non-financial firms, the primary providers of capital to financial firms are depositors and 
other debtholders (John et al., 2016). According to Gornall and Strebulaev (2018), the average 
leverage of U.S. banks has been between 87% and 95% over the last 80 years. These high 
leverage ratios imply that agency costs are likely to be higher in banks, relative to non-
financial institutions. This is due to the fact that banks are exposed to a higher degree of the 
moral hazard problem, when compared to non-financial institutions (John et al., 2016). 
Because depositors are the major capital providers, their interests may deviate from 
shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, the high leverage provides incentives for managers to 
invest in risky projects, as debtholders bear more of the excessive risk (John and Senbet, 
1998). Another unique feature of banks relates to the number of stakeholders. Banks are 
characterised by large number of stakeholders relative to non-financial firms. 
The third unique bank characteristic that contributes to the importance of governance in banks 
is the complexity and opacity of their activities, which in turn increases the level of 
informational asymmetries (Morgan, 2002; Becht et al., 2012). Greater information 
asymmetry in banks arises from the ability of banks to hide valuable information about loan 
quality and structure, making it difficult to monitor their activities, which in turn threatens the 
traditional corporate governance mechanisms (Furfine, 2001; Caprio and Levine, 2002; 
Levine, 2004). Beside the problem of information asymmetry between owners and managers, 
Ciancanelli and Gonzalez (2000) claimed that there are three more forms of information 
asymmetry in banks: (1) among depositors, the bank and the regulator; (2) among borrowers, 
managers, and the regulator; and (3) among owners, managers and the regulator. Finally, 
banks are subject to intense liquidity problems due to the mismatch between their assets and 
liabilities (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Bai et al., 2018). 
These unique bank features indicate the need for more effective and distinct corporate 
governance measures for banks, in order to control for the high agency costs. From this view, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) illustrates that corporate governance, 
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from a banking industry viewpoint, “involves the manner in which the business and affairs of 
banks are governed by their boards of directors and senior management” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2006, p. 4). This implies that corporate governance affects the way 
banks set their objectives, their operations and their day-to-day business, the way they meet 
their obligations, and the way in which they protect the interests of their depositors. Due to 
the special nature of the banking institutions, banking governance plays a special role. 
Accordingly, Adams and Mehran (2003) and Macey and O’Hara (2003) conclude that 
governance structures are industry specific, given the systematic differences they found 
between the governance of banks and manufacturing institutions.  
To summarise the difference between banking governance and corporate governance, Caprio 
and Levine (2002) highlight two features of financial institutions that affect corporate 
governance. The first feature relates to the greater information asymmetries in banks, which 
makes it difficult for owners to monitor management and easier for managers to maximise 
their personal benefits. The second feature relates to the heavy regulations imposed on banks, 
which hinder natural corporate governance mechanisms. 
With regard to corporate governance mechanisms, they can be categorised into two groups: 
mechanisms that are internal to firms and those external to them (Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Gillan, 2006). From a broad perspective, internal governance mechanisms are grouped 
into five categories: (1) board of directors (including its role, structure and incentives), (2) 
managerial incentives, (3) ownership structure, (4) bylaw and charter provisions, and (5) 
internal control systems. This categorisation positions the board of directors at the apex of the 
internal governance system, charged with the responsibility of approving primary business 
strategies and ensuring that top managers act in the best interests of shareholders (Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). In discharging their responsibility of 
managing and supervising banks’ business affairs, boards of directors owe fiduciary duties to 
the banks and their shareholders. The complex nature of banking institutions implies that the 
duties and obligations of bank directors are more extensive in comparison to those of other 
directors. According to Macey and O’Hara (2003), boards of directors are not only required to 
make careful and prudent decisions to ensure the safety and soundness of the banks, but they 
are also required to provide careful oversight of banks’ operations. Board monitoring is a 
function of its structure and composition (i.e. board sub-committees), as most critical board 
decisions originate at the committee level (Kesner, 1988, Adams et al., 2015). Board sub-
committees are composed of board members and are responsible to the board. These sub-
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board committees that significantly affect firm activities: the audit, compensation, executive 
and nomination committees. 
Furthermore, the managerial incentives (i.e. compensation policies) that are chosen by the 
boards of directors can have a role in aligning shareholders’ interests with managers’ 
interests. Among these policies are the option-based compensations. Additionally, prior 
literature provided evidence for the role of capital structure of an entity (different classes of 
stock and debt) in mitigating potential agency costs (Gompers et al., 2004; Klock et al., 2005). 
For example, ownership concentration, managerial ownership and debt financing have all 
been discussed as ways of reducing agency costs (Short and Keasey, 1999; Beiner et al., 
2003; Singh and Davidson, 2003).  
With regard to the external governance mechanisms, Gillan (2006) classified the following as 
external mechanisms: government agencies, external regulatory authorities, capital markets, 
labour markets, external auditors, market analysts and the media. These mechanisms are vital 
in facilitating and supporting the accomplishment of corporate governance models. However, 
discussions of the role of external governance mechanisms are out of the scope of this thesis. 
Figure 2.4 below illustrates the classifications of the corporate governance mechanisms, 
according to Gillan (2006). 
 
Figure 2.4 Classifications of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Source: Gillan (2006) 
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2.5 Corporate Governance: An Islamic Perspective 
This section aims to explore the concept of corporate governance from an Islamic perspective, 
within the context of Islamic banks. For the purpose of this exploration, a background on the 
Islamic economic system will be presented. This is followed by a review of the basic 
principles of Islamic banks. Finally, the unique corporate and Shari'ah governance model 
adopted by Islamic banks will be described. 
 
2.5.1 Background on the Islamic Economic System 
Islam is a religion that is not designed only to shape and regulate the relation between the 
creator and the human beings. Islam is believed to be a way of life that intends to govern the 
lives of individuals in different ways (i.e. social, political, cultural and economic) (Iqbal and 
Tsubota, 2006). The economic pillar of the society has received great attention by Islam. 
Therefore, the influence of Islam made the Islamic economic system distinct from other 
economic systems, schools and theories (Al Janahi, 2010), that attempts to satisfy the needs of 
individuals and communities in accordance with the Islamic law. One of the features that 
distinguish the Islamic economic system from other systems is the dual control embedded in 
it. On one side, individuals mind their behaviour to avoid misconduct, and on the other side, 
state authorities monitor and control behaviour to ensure social and economic stability. The 
second feature differentiating the Islamic economic system is the balance between 
individuals’ interests and the public interest. This is achieved through fair allocation and 
disbursement of limited resources according to the rules of Shari'ah
3
. The Islamic economic 
system gives people the flexibility to enter into transactions, and it acknowledges the right to 
private ownership. In addition, this system promotes the production and trading of particular 
goods and services that support economic growth (Ginena and Hamid, 2015).  
Hence, a primary objective of the Islamic economic system is to promote just and honourable 
lives for people. According to Chapra (1985), the Islamic economic system ensures fairness 
and freedom, as Islam itself aims to promote economic fairness and social equality. 
Based on the aforementioned philosophical foundations, the Islamic economic system is 
defined as “the knowledge and application of injunctions and rules of the Shari'ah that prevent 
injustice in the acquisition and disposal of material resources in order to provide satisfaction 
to human beings and enable them to perform their obligations to Allah and to society” 
                                                          
3
 Shari'ah is defined as a set of laws, norms, values and ethics that govern the life of Muslims. It exists to protect 
the welfare of people by safeguarding their life, faith and wealth (Iqbal and Tsubota, 2006). 
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(Hasanuz Zaman, 1984, p. 50). This definition highlights two crucial concepts of the Islamic 
economic system: it is bound by Shari'ah and it aims at the well-being of people and society. 
Although this system considers social justice, it does not deter individuals from seeking gains 
and wealth; however, these actions should be bounded by the Shari’ah rules (Nor, 2012). 
With regard to the aspects mentioned above, the Islamic economic system is completely 
different from other economic systems (i.e. capitalism and socialism), as it is viewed as a way 
of approaching economics ethically. The ethical base provides the guidelines for governing all 
forms of economic activities. The Islamic ethics and morality are a basic reason for people to 
adhere to regulations even in the absence of authority (Ginena and Hamid, 2015). 
Understanding the basic characteristics of the Islamic economic system facilitates the 
understanding of Islamic banking, which is part of this system. The basic principles and 
characteristics of Islamic banks are presented next. 
 
2.5.2 Basic Principles of Islamic Banking 
The Islamic banking industry has demonstrated a rapid growth level, not only in Muslim 
countries, but also in other countries around the world. The financial assets of the Islamic 
finance industry amounted to $1.7 trillion in 2013, and were expected to reach $6.5 trillion by 
2020 (Ernst and Young, 2016). Islamic banking generally refers to the application of Islamic 
rules and principles to banking activities. Islamic banks are those that follow Islamic Shari’ah 
principles in their business transactions. According to Al Janahi (2010, p. 66), “Islamic banks 
are financial institutions that aim to collect deposits in society and then invest the money in 
order to make a profit for either their depositors or for their shareholders. Islamic banks are 
commercial companies that have an obligation to provide banking products and services that 
comply with Shari’ah law”. These banks operate on a banking model, which prohibits usury, 
excessive uncertainty and speculation, while encouraging risk and profit sharing between the 
bank and its depositors (Saif Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012). The primary objective of 
Islamic banks is to satisfy the financial needs of Muslims, who seek to avoid interest – 
whether paid or received – which is prohibited in Islam. 
The prohibition of interest (riba) represents the keystone of the Islamic banking system. 
However, it is not the sole distinguishing principle; there are other principles governing the 
Islamic banking system. These principles involve the prohibition of ambiguity (gharar) and 
gambling (maisir), trade-based activities, and the profit and loss sharing paradigm. 
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Riba is one of the main prohibited elements in Islamic finance. The meaning of the word riba 
in Arabic is increase, addition or growth. Although riba generally refers to interest, it has 
been argued that the concept has a wider definition than simply pertaining to interest. In the 
pre-Islam era, riba used to be a common practice. When borrowing money, the borrower had 
to pay a specific amount above the principle to the lender, as a payment for the use of money 
for a given period. Riba can also refer to any predetermined return in a financial activity 
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). According to Naughton and Naughton (2000), riba takes in all 
forms of exploitation and extreme charges in business dealings. The rationale behind the 
prohibition of riba is that it violates the concept of social justice, as it will result in an uneven 
allocation of risks and rewards (Ahmad and Hassan, 2007). According to Shari’ah principles, 
riba is harmful to the society because it allows individuals (creditors) to gain income without 
making any effort. 
Additionally, Islamic principles prohibit excessive uncertainty and ambiguity (gharar). 
Gharar refers to the uncertainty caused by deficiency in the clarity of values intended to be 
exchanged. It can be illustrated as the “sale of probable items whose existence or 
characteristics are not certain, due to the risky nature which makes the trade similar to 
gambling” (Khir et al., 2008, p. 57). Gharar may involves the sale of an item that is not 
currently at hand, or a sale transaction that involves uncertain hazards. Such transactions are 
highly risky and might lead to undesirable consequences. To ensure that a transaction is free 
from gharar, the commodity must be identified by all the contracting parties (Ayub, 2007). In 
addition to riba and gharar, gambling (maisir) is also prohibited in Islam. It refers to any 
form of business activity where wealth and gains are obtained merely by chance or 
speculation, whether or not it deprives the rights of another party (Ibrahim and Hameed, 
2009). 
Trade-based activities are employed to replace interest-based activities, which are prohibited 
in Islam. These activities include contracts of exchange, whether to exchange goods for 
money or exchange services for money. This implies that all transactions of Islamic banks are 
backed by real economic activities that include tangible assets or services. Trade-based 
activities in Islamic banks may include murabaha (mark-up), bai’mua’jjal (deferred payment 
sale), bai’salam (purchase with deferred delivery) and istisna’a (commissioned manufacture). 
Finally, the profit and loss sharing paradigm is a crucial distinguishing attribute of Islamic 
banks. Due to the prohibition of riba, depositors in Islamic banks are recognised as 
investment account holders (IAHs) who enter into contracts with the bank. Under these 
arrangements, both the provider of the capital and the entrepreneur jointly share the risks 
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through profit and loss: they both gain when returns are favourable and suffer when returns 
are poor (Ahmed, 2008). This model is expected to enhance social justice and reduce the 
inequitable distribution of wealth. The basic examples of contracts that are based on profit-
loss sharing are mudaraba and musharaka. Under mudaraba contracts, investors provide the 
capital to the entrepreneur, with the agreement to share profits at a predetermined ratio, while 
loses are completely borne by the investors (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). On the other side, 
under musharaka contracts, all profits and losses are shared among all investors according to 
an agreed-upon ratio (Belal et al., 2015). To distinguish between these two contracts 
(mudaraba and musharaka), Figure 2.5 below illustrates the differences between them. 
 
 Mudaraba Musharaka 
Investment From the investor “rab-el-mal” From all partners 
Partners 
- The investor has no right to 
participate in managing the 
investment 
- The loss is borne solely by the 
investor 
- The investor can contribute to the 
management of the investment 
- Losses are shared between the 
investor and the entrepreneur 
according to their investments 
Liabilities 
The responsibility of the investor is 
limited to the amount invested 
If musharaka is dissolved and 
liabilities exceed assets, the gap is 
supported by all partners 
Profits 
The property acquired by the 
entrepreneur is exclusively owned 
by the investor. The entrepreneur is 
entitled to share only the profit 
from the sale of the property  
Profits are shared by all partners 
according to their contributions 
Figure 2.5 Differences between Mudaraba and Musharaka Contracts in Islamic Banks 





2.5.3 Shari’ah Governance in Islamic Banks 
Recent corporate failures and the collapse of prestigious banks such as Lehman Brothers and 
Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. have increased focus on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
structures in banks, and have stressed the need to adopt strong governance mechanisms, 
which are vital in protecting stakeholders’ interests. This need extends from conventional 
banks to Islamic banks as well.  
The concept of corporate governance in Islamic banks does not vary much from that in 
conventional banks, as it refers to the system by which corporations are managed, directed 
and controlled in order to achieve corporate objectives. However, the corporate governance in 
an Islamic bank is likely to be perceived as being more complex than that in a conventional 
bank. In addition to ensuring that managers act in the best interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders, corporate governance systems in Islamic banks are also required to ensure that 
all transactions and activities are in compliance with Shari’ah (Archer et al., 1998). According 
to the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) (2006), corporate governance in an Islamic 
bank is defined as “a set of organisational arrangements whereby the actions of the 
management of an Institution offering only Islamic financial services (IIFS) are aligned as far 
as possible with the interests of its stakeholders” (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2006, p. 
27). The Islamic Financial Services Board extends the definition of corporate governance and 
emphasises the need to provide incentives for the board of directors and management to 
protect stakeholders’ interests, to promote effective monitoring, and to ensure compliance 
with Islamic Shari’ah principles. 
The above definition implies that the key outstanding feature distinguishing the governance 
system of Islamic banks from that of conventional banks is Shari'ah compliance. It is a 
primary point of attraction for investors and depositors, as they need assurance that Shari'ah 
compliance claims made by the Islamic banks are true. The assurance on Shari'ah compliance 
is achieved through the Shari'ah governance model, which is defined as “the overall system 
that manages the conformity of the activities of Islamic banks and financial institutions to the 
precepts of Shari'ah pertaining to transactions” (Ginena and Hamid, 2015, p. 80). A sound and 
well-functioning Shari'ah governance model is required to enhance the confidence and trust of 
stakeholders of Islamic banks.  
In an attempt to compare Islamic principles of corporate governance with conventional 
principles of corporate governance, Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) analysed the similarities and 
differences between the conventional corporate governance and the Islamic corporate 
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governance. In this attempt, Abu-Tapanjeh referred to the principles of corporate governance 
endorsed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2004. 
He concluded that Islamic perspectives of corporate governance are broader than conventional 
principles of corporate governance, given that all actions and obligations in Islamic 
institutions fall under the law of Islam, whereas the conventional corporate governance 
principles focus on six specific issues and obligations. These issues involve: ensuring the 
basis for an effective corporate governance framework, the right of shareholders, the equitable 
treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency and the responsibilities of the board (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Hence, Islamic 
institutions are subject to stricter scrutiny and monitoring relative to their conventional 
counterparts. In the same vein, Sheikh Obid and Naysary (2016) compared Islamic corporate 
governance principles with conventional corporate governance principles. Figure 2.6 below 
presents the comparison between the conventional principles with the Islamic principles. 
 
Issue Conventional Corporate Governance Islamic Corporate Governance 
(1) 
Focuses on economic performance of 
the firm 
Takes into account the spiritual needs 
and religious values 
(2) 
Managers have fiduciary duty toward 
shareholders 
Managers have fiduciary duty toward 
shareholders and Investment Account 
Holders (IAHs) 
(3) The equitable treatment of shareholders IAHs require more information  
(4) 
Responsibility to stakeholder whose 
rights are stipulated in law or agreement 
(employees and creditors) 
Accountable to welfare and well-being of 
wide range of stakeholders 
(5) 
Disclose financial and non-financial 
information in line with accounting 
standards 
In addition to financial and non-financial 
information, disclosure of Shari’ah 
pronouncements and resolutions 
(6) 
The roles and responsibilities of the 
board (competent and independent to 
effectively monitor the firm) 
In addition to the board, the Shari’ah 
board monitors the functions of the firm 
to ensure the Shari’ah compliance 
Figure 2.6 Comparison of Conventional Corporate Governance Principles with Islamic 
Principles 
Source: Sheikh Obid and Naysary (2016) 
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In order to comprehend the corporate governance framework in Islamic banks, it is crucial to 
examine the roles and duties of its key participants. According to Safieddine (2009), the key 
governance organs of Islamic banks are: board of directors, Shari’ah supervisory board, audit 
committee, compensation committee, nomination committee, internal control, internal audit, 
and external audit. The roles of these governance elements are very similar to those of 
conventional banks. The key difference lies in the existence of an additional layer of 
governance (i.e. the Shari’ah supervisory board), which could serve as an effective 
mechanism to monitor Islamic banks’ prioritisation of social norms. The importance of the 
role played by the Shari’ah supervisory board stems from the Islamic banks’ need for 
stakeholders’ trust and confidence, as this will affect their stability (Grais and Pellegrini, 
2006).  
The Shari’ah supervisory board is responsible for monitoring the Islamic banks’ activities and 
funding decisions. Its members (Shari’ah scholars) act as investigators in conducting 
independent audits, and issue a separate report as part of the bank’s financial statements. The 
aim is to certify that the bank’s operations are free of elements prohibited by Islamic 
principles (some copies of Shari’ah reports are presented in Appendix 1). Moreover, Shari’ah 
supervisory board members may also have to review additional information and reports, such 
as operational and financial reports and policies (Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013). This 
responsibility of the Shari’ah supervisory board is similar to that of the independent external 
audit. 
In an attempt to demonstrate the uniqueness of the governance model in Islamic banks, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2016) illustrated the interactions between the various parties (i.e. the board 
of directors and its sub-committees, the Shari’ah supervisory board, the management, the 
shareholders and creditors, and the depositors). They argued that the board of directors, acting 
as the first layer of governance, provides legal monitoring over managerial behaviour. While 
the Shari’ah supervisory board, acting as the second layer of governance, provides moral 
monitoring over management. They also claimed that the legal monitoring and the moral 




This chapter presented the discussions on corporate governance from two perspectives: the 
conventional perspective and the Islamic perspective. It began by providing conceptual 
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definitions for corporate governance and developed a theoretical framework for corporate 
governance. The theoretical framework integrates the agency theory, stakeholder theory, 
resource dependence theory, and social norms theory. Thus, the framework addressed the 
monitoring and controlling function of the board of directors, in addition to its function of 
providing resources to the firm. Then, the chapter briefly identified the unique characteristics 
of banking institutions and their implications for corporate governance systems. Moreover, 
some key corporate governance participants were identified. 
This chapter also explored the concept of corporate governance from an Islamic perspective 
by reviewing the basic principles of the Islamic economic system and the Islamic banking 
industry. The discussions demonstrated the unique features of the Islamic banking industry. 
Finally, the chapter described the unique extended governance model in Islamic banks by 
identifying the key participants, making a special reference to the extra layer of governance in 






















The previous chapter presented discussions on the concept of corporate governance from two 
alternative perspectives; the conventional and the Islamic. It developed the theoretical 
framework for the corporate governance models from both perspectives. It also described the 
unique extended governance model in Islamic banks. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the role of different corporate governance mechanisms in 
enhancing the financial reporting quality in conventional and Islamic banks. Based on this 
objective, this chapter aims to review and discuss the existing literature related to financial 
reporting quality and different corporate governance mechanisms that have a role in 
enhancing financial reporting quality. Hence, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 
discusses the concept and definitions of financial reporting quality. Section 3.3 reviews 
different measures used in the literature to assess the quality of financial reporting. Based on 
the objectives of this thesis, the quality of financial reporting is assessed from two alternative 
perspectives: the opportunistic earnings management perspective and the information 
perspective. Section 3.4 reviews prior studies concerning the role of different corporate 
governance mechanisms in enhancing financial reporting quality. Finally, section 3.5 presents 
a brief summary of the literature reviewed in this chapter. 
 
3.2 Financial Reporting Quality: Concept and Definition 
The series of accounting scandals witnessed by the twenty-first century has caused severe 
damage to investors' confidence in capital markets generally, and specifically in financial 
reporting. The collapse of large and highly reputed corporations in the United States, such as 
Enron and WorldCom, has raised serious concerns about the credibility of corporate financial 
reporting.  
Accounting information in general, and specifically earnings numbers, is of tremendous 
importance to the users of financial statements. This is because most financial statement users 
regard earnings as the ultimate financial performance measure. The importance of accounting 
information stems from its dual role: informativeness and stewardship (Narayanan and 
Davila, 1998; Lambert, 2001; Feltham et al., 2006; Drymiotes and Hemmer, 2013).  
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The informativeness role emerges as a response to the demand by users for information that 
helps them with their decision-making process. For example, investors need accounting 
information in order for them to predict future cash flows and assess risk from investments, 
whereas creditors use accounting information to assess the ability of firms to repay loans as 
they are due. 
In line with the agency theory explained in Chapter 2, the stewardship role stems from the 
separation of ownership and control, which puts the manager in the position of a steward to 
the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). According to the agency 
theory, managers act as self-interested individuals, and their interests may deviate from those 
of the owner. To regulate this contractual relationship, and to ensure that owners' interests are 
protected, there is a need to monitor and evaluate managerial performance. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) claim that financial reporting helps to ensure that managers act in the best 
interests of shareholders. 
To summarise the importance of the informativeness role and the stewardship role, Ronen and 
Yaari (2008, p. 22) state that “Earnings are summary information. As such, they have the 
added benefit of conveying valuable information without requiring shareholders to learn the 
firm's operation in detail, a process that would be costly and cumbersome, and might expose 
proprietary information to competitors.” 
In order for the financial statement users to make accurate decisions, they need to rely on 
high-quality accounting information. Despite the considerable amount of existing literature 
that discusses the measurements, determinants and consequences of accounting information 
quality (or simply, earnings quality), no single accepted definition of earnings quality exists. 
The definition varies depending on the perspective from which the quality is assessed 
(Goncharov, 2005). Consistent with this claim, Dechow et al. (2010, p. 344) define earnings 
quality as follows: “Higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a 
firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific 
decision-maker.” 
From a valuation perspective, Penman and Zhang (2002) consider earnings to be of good 
quality if they can serve as good indicators of future earnings. Their definition highlights the 
decision usefulness role of earnings. From an economic income perspective, Schipper and 
Vincent (2003) focused on Hicksian income and argued that earnings are of good quality if 
they faithfully represent Hicksian income. Furthermore, Francis et al. (2008) defined earnings 
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quality as the precision and accuracy of the accounting earnings derived from the firm’s 
financial reporting system. 
 
3.3 Assessing Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial reporting quality has been assessed in prior literature using various measures that 
can be classified into two groups: market based and accounting based. The market-based 
measures are computed using the association between market information and accounting 
data, which include value relevance, timeliness and conservatism. Accounting-based 
measures are primarily constructed using accounting data taken from financial statements, and 
these include earnings persistence, earnings predictability, earnings smoothing, loss avoidance 
and accruals quality (Francis et al., 2004). 
Based on the objectives of this thesis, the financial reporting quality will be assessed from the 
two different perspectives of opportunistic earnings management and information. Market-
based financial reporting quality measures are not within the scope of this thesis. The 
discussions will be organised as follows: Section 3.3.1 provides a general understanding of 
the concept of opportunistic earnings management, its definition, the incentives and 
motivations behind it, and some measures used in the literature to detect earnings 
management practices. Section 3.3.2 reviews and discusses the prior studies in the literature 
related to earnings management practices in Islamic banks. Section 3.3.3 presents discussions 
of financial reporting quality from the information perspective and reviews some measures 
used to assess the information value of earnings. Section 3.3.4 provides a summary of the 
empirical studies that have been reviewed. 
 
3.3.1 Earnings Management 
The various uses of accounting information are important to many financial statement users, 
as emphasised earlier. However, providing managers with discretionary power and flexibility 
to choose among various methods to report accounting earnings would make their choices 
questionable, as the different methods used would result in different periodic earnings 
(Christie and Zimmerman, 1994).  
Earnings management has been considered as one of the most ethically questionable issues 
and has attracted the attention of practitioners, academics, standard setters and regulators. 
Although there is no consensus in the literature on a single accepted definition of earnings 
management, Healy and Wahlen (1999) offered the most commonly accepted definition. 
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According to them, “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports, either to mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, 
p. 368). This definition has been widely used in the literature because it considers both the 
informativeness role of earnings (earnings management to mislead stakeholders) and the 
stewardship role of earnings (earnings management to influence contractual outcomes). 
In order to investigate what exactly motivates managers to engage in earnings management 
practices, the prior literature classified the motivations for earnings management into four 
categories: (1) capital market motivation, (2) contractual motivation, (3) behavioural 
motivation, and (4) political and regulatory motivation. 
The investors’ use of accounting information for valuation purposes can push managers to 
engage in earnings management practices by altering the firm’s reported earnings in order to 
influence its market valuation (Trueman and Titman, 1988; Chaney and Lewis, 1995; Bao and 
Bao, 2004; Chi and Gupta, 2009; Coulton et al., 2015). A number of studies investigate 
earnings management behaviour around specific stock transactions such as seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) (Teoh et al. 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Kim and Park, 2005; Yang et al., 
2016), initial public offerings (IPOs) (Friedlan, 1994; DuCharme et al., 2001; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008; Cormier et al., 2014), management buyouts (Perry and Williams, 1994; 
Chou et al., 2006; Mao and Renneboog, 2015) and mergers and acquisitions (Louis, 2004; 
Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). All of these studies provide evidence of earnings management 
practices around specific events to benefit from enhanced short-term stock performance. 
With regard to the contractual motivation, both debt contracts and management compensation 
contracts provide managers with incentives to engage in earnings management practices. In 
order to obtain debt financing at favourable rates, managers may have incentives to manage 
earnings to influence the perceptions of debt providers regarding the firm’s financial position. 
Several empirical studies provide evidence of income-increasing earnings management to 
facilitate the debt-granting process (Bharath et al., 2008; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 
2011; Li and Richie, 2016). To control the possible conflict of interests between managers 
and debt holders, formal debt contracts may indicate some covenants related to the firm’s 
accounting performance. To avoid debt covenant violations, managers may engage in income-
increasing earnings management. A considerable number of studies provide evidence of 
earnings management behaviour to avoid debt covenant violations, thus providing support for 
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the debt hypothesis (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Beatty and 
Weber, 2003). 
In addition to debt contracts, management compensation contracts can also create incentives 
for managers to opportunistically manage earnings. This highlights the fact that the separation 
of ownership and management results in conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders. According to the agency theory, compensation plans are used to align the 
interests of managers with the shareholders’ interests. However, such compensation contracts 
may motivate managers to use their discretion to manipulate earnings, especially when these 
contracts are closely tied to the firms’ financial performance. Healy (1985) provides one of 
the earliest pieces of evidences on earnings manipulation to increase managerial 
compensation. His results suggest that managers’ accrual policies are significantly related to 
the income-increasing incentives of their bonus contracts. This conclusion has been supported 
by a number of empirical studies (Leuz et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2009; Sun, 2014). 
Another stream of research investigates earnings management practices related to behavioural 
motivations such as job security concerns. A number of studies examine earnings 
management surrounding chief executive officer (CEO) changes. These studies anticipate that 
the incoming CEO is motivated to show a better performance than that of the former CEO 
because positive good performance affects the manager’s reputation and compensation level. 
A number of studies on earnings management surrounding CEO changes provide evidence of 
downwards earnings management during the transition year and upwards earnings 
management in the later periods (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; 
Geiger and North, 2006; Hazarika et al., 2012). 
Finally, the political environment and government regulations provide incentives for 
managers to engage in opportunistic earnings management in order to demonstrate their 
compliance with the regulations and to avoid negative regulatory actions. Early evidence on 
regulatory motivation to manage earnings is provided by Jones (1991). From a sample 
number of U.S. firms, she provides evidence of firms’ use of income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals during import relief investigations in order to benefit from government import 
protection. Earlier research has also documented that industry regulations provide incentives 
for managers to engage in earnings management (Key, 1997; Johnston and Rock, 2005; 
Godsell et al., 2017). 
The above discussions review prior literature related to different incentives and motivation 
behind opportunistic earnings management practices. Different measures have been used in 
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the literature to detect opportunistic earnings management. Among these measures, this thesis 
focuses on: loss avoidance, income-increasing discretionary accruals, and the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. Detailed discussions on these measures are presented in the first 
empirical study (Chapter 4).  
 
3.3.2 Earnings Management Practices in Islamic Banks 
The literature reviewed above reveals that managers of conventional banks tend to take 
advantage of their discretionary power in financial reporting to manage reported earnings. 
Within the Islamic banking context, previous research in earnings management has been 
inconclusive. 
Before reviewing studies that examine earnings management practices in Islamic banks, it 
should be noted that Islamic banks exemplify ethically and religiously oriented organisations, 
which are assumed to operate in compliance with Shari’ah rulings and with the moral codes 
underlying these rulings. The Islamic moral system stems from coherent guidelines that 
control all religious, social and economic affairs (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2002). Among the 
moral and ethical values that Islamic principles stress are honesty, transparency, truthfulness 
and integrity (Ali and Al-Owaihan, 2008), all of which are expected to constrain managers 
from engaging in ethically questionable activities such as earnings management.  
Consistent with the above arguments, some studies in the literature provide evidence that 
Islamic banks are less likely to manage their earnings relative to conventional banks. Taktak 
et al. (2010) examine income smoothing practices in a sample of 66 Islamic banks operating 
in 19 countries, for the period 2001 to 2006. They found that Islamic banks do not use loan 
loss provisions to manage or smooth their earnings. They claim that the fact that Islamic 
principles are against opportunism justifies the results of their study. They also argue that the 
dynamic provision policies adopted by Islamic banks result in stable earnings without 
managerial intervention. 
Similarly, Taktak (2011) investigated the nature of income smoothing practices in a sample of 
79 Islamic banks across 19 countries. She concludes that Islamic banks do not discretionarily 
smooth their earnings. She claims that smooth earnings in Islamic banks arise from stable 
financing and investment activities. 
39 
 
Hamdi and Zarai (2012) examined earnings management practices in a sample of 125 Islamic 
banking institutions across 27 countries. They find that earnings management phenomenon is 
not as obvious in Islamic banks as in non-Islamic banks. 
Furthermore, Quttainah et al. (2013) analysed a sample of 84 Islamic banks and 82 
conventional banks from 15 countries. They examined whether Islamic banks are less likely 
to manage their reported earnings than conventional banks. Using loss avoidance and 
discretionary loan loss provisions as measures for earnings management, they found that 
Islamic banks are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management relative to 
conventional banks. They also investigated whether and how the existence of an additional 
layer of governance (i.e. the Shari’ah supervisory board) within Islamic banks affect their 
earnings management behaviour. Their results show that several Shari’ah supervisory board 
factors, namely the presence and the number of members from the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, are associated with less earnings management. 
More recent work by Abdelsalam et al. (2016) and Elnahass et al. (2018) confirm earlier 
findings that Islamic banks are less likely to manage their earnings than conventional banks. 
Abdelsalam et al. (2016) conducted a comparative study, where they analysed Islamic 
banking institutions and compared them with their conventional counterparts. They provide 
evidence that Islamic banks adopt more conservative accounting policies relative to 
conventional banks. Regarding earnings management behaviour, they find that Islamic banks 
report small positive income less frequently, experience a relatively small difference between 
discretionary loan loss provisions and realised security gains and losses, and have less 
discretionary accruals. Their findings indicate that Islamic banks are less prone to earnings 
management than conventional banks. Focusing solely on loan loss provisions, Elnahass et al. 
(2018) reached a similar conclusion to that of Abdelsalam et al. (2016). Specifically, they find 
significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in 
conventional banks. However, they find that Islamic banks tend not to engage in either capital 
or earnings management through loan loss provisions. They argue that the strict governance 
and the constrained business model of Islamic banks may restrain aggressive earnings 
management.   
On the other hand, another stream of literature finds that Islamic banks tend to manage their 
earnings in a similar manner to conventional banks. From a sample of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia, Ismail and Be Lay (2002) provide significant evidence that loan loss provisions are 
used to manage capital and reported earnings. Similarly, Zoubi and Al-Khazali (2007) found 
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that loan loss provisions are used to smooth earnings in a sample of Islamic and conventional 
banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. 
Ben Othman and Mersni (2014) studied earnings management practices in a sample of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks in the Middle East region. They find that both Islamic banks 
and conventional banks use their discretion for earnings and capital management. Their 
findings reveal that Islamic banks, conventional banks with Islamic windows, and 
conventional banks behave similarly in terms of discretionary loan loss provisions. 
 
3.3.3 Financial Reporting Quality from an Information Perspective 
The conceptual framework for financial reporting developed by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) highlights the importance of the informativeness role of accounting 
information in general and earnings in particular. According to the conceptual framework, the 
objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information about the reporting entity to 
existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors. Those users rely on financial 
statements to help them assess the risks and prospects for future cash flow to the entity 
(International Financial Reporting Standards, 2018). The discussion on the informativeness 
role of accounting information is of key importance to standard setters, professionals, 
practitioners and other interested users. The informational role of earnings has influence on 
share prices, and hence on firm’s value, and on the attitude of various decision-makers 
(Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Bushman et al., 2006; Drymiotes and Hemmer, 2013; Basu et 
al., 2013; Milian, 2018). These claims strongly support the informativeness definition 
provided by Beaver (1968, p. 69), where he claimed that “a firm’s earnings report is said to 
have information content if it leads to a change in investors’ assessments of the probability 
distribution of future returns … and the change must be sufficiently large to induce a change 
in the decision-maker’s behavior”. The link between accounting information and decision-
makers’ behaviours had been defined in the literature as “economic consequences” (Zeff, 
1978), a concept that asserts that the choice of accounting methods influences firm’s value. A 
large body of literature has been published on the association between accounting earnings 
and stock price. However, this is out of the scope of this thesis. 
In order for financial statement users to make the most efficient decisions, they need to base 
those decisions on high-quality accounting information. In section 3.3.1, the quality of 
financial reporting has been assessed from an opportunistic earnings management perspective. 
Based on this perspective, earnings management practices reduce the quality of financial 
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reporting and the efficiency of capital markets, as investors receive inaccurate information 
about the real financial performance of entities. This situation could result in adverse selection 
problems and moral hazards (Chen et al., 2011), and it may adversely affect investors, 
suppliers, customers and local communities (Zahra et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Ariza et al., 2016). 
In this section, the quality of financial reporting is assessed from an information perspective. 
Under this perspective, the quality of financial reporting increases as managers disclose more 
accurate information, ensuring that the financial information precisely reflects the firm’s 
future earnings and cash flow. Prior literature has assessed the quality of earnings from an 
information perspective using different measures. This thesis focuses on earnings persistence 
and predictability of cash flow, and the relationship between loan loss provisions and future 
loan charge-offs. Detailed review of existing literature on these measures is provided in the 
second empirical study (Chapter 5). 
 
3.3.4 Summary of Empirical Studies Examining Earnings Quality in Banks 
The literature reviewed above reveals that several studies have analysed the quality of banks’ 
financial reporting in different research contexts. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the key 








Table 3.1 Summary of Key Studies Examining Financial Reporting Quality in Conventional Banks (in chronological order) 
Study Research Objective(s) Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables(s) Sample Main Findings 
Ma (1988) To determine whether U.S. 
banks utilise loan loss 
provisions as a device to 
smooth earnings. 
Operating income growth. Loan loss provision ratio, 
loan charge-offs, and 
problem loans. 
45 largest U.S. 
conventional 
banks for the 
period 1980-1984. 
U.S. conventional banks use 
loan loss provisions and 




To test income smoothing 
practices through loan loss 
provisions. 
Provision for loan losses. Operating income, current 
liabilities, loans, and loan-
loss experience. 
106 U.S. bank 
holding 
companies for the 
period 1976-1984. 
They provide evidence for 
income smoothing 
behaviour. They find that 
regional banks tend to 
engage in income smoothing 
more than money-centre 
banks. 
Wahlen (1994) To analyse banks’ loans 
disclosures and examine the 
impact of this information on 
banks’ stock prices. 
Market value of common 
equity. 
Nonperforming loans, loan 
loss provisions, loan charge-
offs, outstanding loans, and 
loan loss allowance. 
106 U.S. 
conventional 
banks over the 
period 1977-1988. 
Bank managers increase 
discretionary loan loss 
provisions when future cash 
flow prospects improve. 
Beatty et al. 
(1995) 
To investigate how banks alter 
the timing and magnitude of 
transactions and accruals to 
achieve primary capital, tax, 
and earnings goals. 
Loans charged off, loan 
loss provision, 
miscellaneous gains and 
losses, and pension 
settlement gains. 
Year-end primary capital, 
taxable income, year-end 
pretax earnings, and marginal 
tax rate. 
 
148 large U.S. 
banks over the 
period 1985-1989. 
They find that loan charge-
offs, loan loss provisions, 
and the decision to issue 
securities are used to manage 
capital ratios and earnings. 
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Study Research Objective(s) Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables(s) Sample Main Findings 
Beaver and 
Engel (1996) 
To examine the capital market 
pricing of discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components 
of loan losses allowance. 
Market value of common 
equity. 
Book value of common 
equity, allowance for loan 
losses, discretionary portion 
of the allowance account, 
and nonperforming assets. 
Largest publicly 
traded banks in 
the U.S. over the 
period 1977-1991. 
The capital market 
negatively prices the 
nondiscretionary component 
of the loan losses allowance, 
while the discretionary 
component is positively 
priced. 
Liu et al. (1997) To provide a refined analysis 
of the valuation implications 
of discretionary accruals. 
Market returns (from 
beginning of the quarter to 
one day after the earnings 
announcement date). 
Income before loan loss 
provisions and taxes, 
unexpected loan loss 
provision, unexpected loan 
write-offs, and unexpected 
change in nonperforming 
loans. 
A sample of U.S. 
banks for the 
period 1983-1991. 
They find that loan loss 
provisions are positively 
related to stock market 
reactions for “at risk” banks. 
While provisions are 
negatively related to stock 
market reactions for “not at 
risk banks” in the first, 
second, and third quarter. 
Kim and Kross 
(1998) 
To investigate whether 
changes in bank capital 
standards affect managerial 
accrual decisions. 
Loan loss provisions and 
loans write-offs. 
Gross loans, change in gross 
loans, nonperforming loans, 
change in nonperforming 
loans, return on assets, and 
bank size. 





They find that managers use 
loan loss provisions for 
earnings management and 
capital ratio management. 
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Study Research Objective(s) Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables(s) Sample Main Findings 
Beatty and 
Harris (1998) 
To examine the effects of 
earnings management, 
regulatory capital, tax, and 
total available securities gains 
on realised security gains and 
losses. 
Realised securities gains. Total assets, pre-tax income, 
tier 1 capital, and total 
reported unrealised securities 
gains. 
A size-matched 
sample of 297 
public and 553 
private bank year 
observations 
during 1991-1992. 
They find that public banks 
engage in earnings 
management through 
realisation of securities gains 
and losses more than private 
banks. 
Beatty et al. 
(2002) 
The study compares small 
changes in earnings for 
publicly and privately held 
bank holding companies to 
examine whether these 
changes are attributable to 
earnings management. 
A dummy variable for 
small increases in returns 
on assets, loan loss 
provisions, and realised 
security gains and losses. 
Bank type (public or private), 
total assets, change in cash 
flows, change in loans, and 
change in nonperforming 
loans. 
A sample of 707 
public banks and 
1,160 private 
banks during the 
period 1988-1998. 
They find that public banks 
use discretionary loan loss 
provisions and security gains 
and losses to avoid earnings 
declines. While private 
banks have lesser propensity 




To examine whether and how 
loan loss provisions are used 
for capital management, 
earnings management, and 
signalling. 
Loan loss provisions and 
future change in earnings 
before provisions and 
taxes. 
Change in loan losses, 
change in unemployment 
rates, tier 1 capital ratio, 
earnings before taxes and 
provisions, and total assets. 
490 convntional 
banks and 480 
saving banks 
observations from 
Spain during the 
period 1986-1995. 
The results indicate that loan 
loss provisions were not 
used as a tool for managing 
capital or signalling. 
However, banks adopt a 




Study Research Objective(s) Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables(s) Sample Main Findings 
Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2003) 
To examine the motivations 
behind bank managers' use of 
discretionary loan loss 
provisions to smooth income. 
Loan loss provisions. Nonperforming loans, 
change in nonperforming 
loans, realised security gains 
and losses, total loans, total 








They find that banks with 
good current performance 
and expected poor future 
performance tend to use loan 
loss provisions to reduce 
current income.  
Shrieves and 
Dahl (2003) 
To examine the discretionary 
accounting practices by banks 
during a period of financial 
duress. 
Change in total loans, 
securities gains and losses, 
provision for loan losses, 
and net dividends. 
Total assets, total loans, total 
liabilities, nondiscretionary 
earnings, regulatory capital, 
loan reserves, and bank type. 
A sample of 
Japanese banks 
during the period 
1989-1996. 
They find that Japanese 
banks utilise accounting 
discretion to manage 
earnings and regulatory 
capital. 
Yasuda et al. 
(2004) 
To examine the relationship 
between the discretionary 
accruals and the level of bank 
risk. 
The level of bank risk. Discretionary accruals, total 
assets, shares trading 
volume, and managerial 
ownership. 
48 regional banks 
in Japan over the 
period 1990-1999. 
They find that the bank risk 
is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. The 
findings indicate that 
investors misinterpret high 
earnings as favourable 




Study Research Objective(s) Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variables(s) Sample Main Findings 
Hazera (2005) To examine whether banks 
manage their earnings and 
capital by delaying recognition 
of loan losses. 
Income before loan loss 
provisions. 
Loan loss provision, loan 
loss reserves, past-due loans, 
and regulatory capital 
The largest three 
banks in Mexico 
from the final 
quarter of 1997 to 
the final quarter of 
2000. 
The results provide evidence 
that bank managers exploit 
the weaknesses in financial 
reporting standards to delay 
recognition of loan losses. 
Anandarajan et 
al. (2007) 
To examine whether banks use 
loan loss provisions for 
earnings management, capital 
management, and signalling. 
Loan loss provisions and 
earnings before taxes and 
provisions. 
Change in loan losses, 
change in gross domestic 
product, regulatory capital, 
total assets, and bank type,  
50 conventional 
banks in Australia 
during the period 
1991-2001. 
They find evidence that 
banks use loan loss 
provisions for capital and 
earnings management, but 
not for signalling. 
Pérez et al. 
(2008) 
To examine whether loan loss 
provisions are used to smooth 
income and to manage capital. 
Loan loss provisions. Nonperforming loans, total 
loans, GDP growth, capital 
ratio, income before 
provisions, and total assets. 
A sample of 
Spanish banks in 
the period 1986-
2002. 
The banks use loan loss 
provisions to manage 
earnings, but no evidence is 
found for capital 
management. 
Barth et al. 
(2017) 
To examine the use of realised 
security gains and losses to 
manage regulatory capital and 
earnings 
Realised security gains 
and losses. 
Net income before taxes, 
regulatory capital ratio, 
unrealised security gains and 
losses, and total assets. 
A sample of U.S. 
conventionl banks 
over the period 
1996-2011. 
Banks use security gains and 
losses to manage regulatory 





Table 3.2 Summary of Key Studies Examining Financial Reporting Quality in Islamic Banks (in chronological order) 





Sample Main Findings 
Ismail and Be 
Lay (2002) 
To develop a model for loan 
loss provision to determine 
the factors that influence the 
provision. 
Loan loss provisions. Gross loans, nonperforming 
loans, loans written-off, 
earnings before taxes and 
provision, and total capital. 
34 Islamic banks in 
Malaysia for the 
period 1997-1999. 
They find evidence for the 
use of loan loss provisions 




To investigate the factors 
affecting loan loss provisions. 
Loan loss provisions. Earnings before tax and loan 
loss provision, gross loan, 
debt to common equity, total 
assets, and bank type. 
134 banks in the 
GCC region for the 
period 2000-2003. 
Banks use loan loss 
provisions to smooth 
income, regardless of the 
type of the bank. 
Taktak et al. 
(2010) 
To examine income 
smoothing practices in 
Islamic banks. 
Loan loss provisions. Total loans, nonperforming 
loans, earnings before taxes 
and provisions, capital 
adequacy ratio, and total 
assets. 
66 Islamic banks 
from 19 countries 
over the period 
2001-2006. 
Islamic banks do not use 
loan loss provisions to 
manage or smooth their 
earnings. 
Taktak (2011) To investigate the nature of 
income smoothing practices 
by Islamic banks. 
Net income. Total revenue, non-interest 
revenue, and interest 
income. 
79 Islamic banks 
across 19 countries 
during 2001-2006. 
Islamic banks do not 
exercise their discretion to 
smooth their earnings. 
However, their smooth 
earnings originates from 









Sample Main Findings 
Hamdi and 
Zarai (2012) 
To investigate whether 
Islamic banks manage their 
reported earnings. 
Earnings scaled by total 
assets. 
Annual net distributable 
earnings changes. 
125 Islamic banks 
across 27 countries 
for the period 
2000-2009. 
Islamic banks manage 
earnings to avoid 
reporting losses and 
earnings deceases, but not 
as well as non-Islamic 
banks. Additionally, 
Islamic banks above the 
earnings threshold are 
found to be risk averters. 
Quttainah et al. 
(2013) 
To examine whether Islamic 
banks are less likely to 
manage earnings than non-
Islamic banks. 
Income before taxes and 
loan loss provisions. 
Bank type, Shari’ah 
supervisory board size, 
Shari’ah supervisory board 
interlock, total assets, 
nonperforming loans and 
total loans. 
84 Islamic banks 
and 80 non-Islamic 
banks from 15 
countries over the 
period 1993-2008. 
Islamic banks are less 
likely to engage in 
earnings management 
measured by loss 
avoidance and abnormal 




To examine earnings 
management practices in 
Islamic and conventional 
banks. 
Discretionary loan loss 
provisions. 
Earnings before taxes and 
provisions, capital adequacy 
ratio, total loans, total assets, 
and bank type. 
21 Islamic banks, 
18 conventional 
banks with Islamic 
windows, and 33 
conventional 
banks. 
Banks use discretionary 
loan loss provisions to 
manage earnings and 









Sample Main Findings 
Elnahass et al. 
(2018) 
To assess the impact of 
different banking business 
models on capital and 
earnings management 
practices. 
Loan loss provisions. Tier1 capital, earnings 
before taxes and provisions, 
nonperforming loans, total 
loans, listing status of the 
bank, leverage ratio, GDP 
growth rate, and bank type. 




Jordan and Qatar 
for the period 
2007-2013. 
The study provide 
evidence for capital and 
earnings management 
practices in conventional 
banks. However, Islamic 
banks tend not to use loan 
loss provisions in either 















The summary of the prior studies presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 reveals that the issues 
relating to financial reporting quality in banking have been discussed extensively within the 
conventional banking context. Investigation on the relevance of bank type and different 
institutional characteristics on the quality of financial reporting is still lacking. Accordingly, 
this thesis aims to address this gap in the literature by comparing financial reporting practices 
in conventional banks with that in Islamic banks, in addition to examining the role of different 
governance mechanisms in enhancing the quality of financial reporting. 
 
3.4 Different Governance Mechanisms and Financial Reporting Quality 
The earlier discussions presented in sections 3.2 and 3.3 defined and illustrated the concept 
and definitions of financial reporting quality and reviewed the different measures used in the 
literature to assess the quality of financial reporting. This section aims to review the literature 
related to corporate governance - one of the main factors that influence financial reporting 
practices and constrain managerial opportunistic behaviour. 
According to the agency theory, which has been presented in detail in Chapter 2, the 
importance of effective corporate governance systems stems from the growth of modern 
corporations and the separation of ownership and control in the current business environment. 
Despite the extensive research on corporate governance, there is a lack of consensus on its 
definition (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Recalling the discussions in Chapter 2, one of the 
most common definitions of corporate governance is offered by the Cadbury Committee 
(1992), where corporate governance is viewed as the system by which firms are directed and 
controlled. Similarly, Turnbull (1997) views corporate governance as all the forces affecting 
the institutional functions in a corporation. From a financial view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
p. 737) claim that “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments”. However, this 
definition focuses on the protection of shareholders and investors but overlooks the rights of 
other stakeholders. A more comprehensive definition of corporate governance is presented by 
the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2004, in its 
document, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. It illustrates that “Corporate 
governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined” (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004, p. 11). 
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The above definitions highlight the crucial role of corporate governance in controlling 
organisations and facilitating effective monitoring in order to enhance the confidence of 
investors in business organisations and in capital markets in general. Mallin (2001) also 
argues that “Corporate governance goes hand in hand with increased transparency and 
accountability” (Mallin, 2001, p. 77). 
In line with the agency theory, prior studies have established that agency problems, 
managerial self-serving, and opportunistic behaviour can all be limited by establishing formal 
mechanisms of corporate governance. The agency theory considers corporate governance 
mechanism(s) as one of the classical cures in controlling conflicts of interests between agents 
and principals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2004; Brennan, 2006; 
Dey, 2008; Chen et al., 2012). One strand of literature examines the impact of effective 
corporate governance structures on firms’ financial performance (Lehmann and Weigand, 
2000; Drobetz et al., 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Liu et al., 
2012; Rossi and Nerino, 2015). Another strand of literature argues that effective corporate 
governance enhances the quality of corporate financial reporting (Becker et al., 1998; Cohen 
et al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Siagian et al., 2013; Bonetti et al., 2016). 
Following the major accounting scandals and the collapse of highly reputed corporations at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, more attention has been directed to the role of 
different elements of corporate governance in controlling and monitoring managerial 
behaviour (Hart, 1995). Prior empirical research provides evidence for the impact of different 
corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality. Among these mechanisms 
are: the board of directors and its sub-committees, ownership structure, internal controls, 
internal and external audit functions (Goncharov, 2005).  
Since the aim of this thesis is to examine the role of three important corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e., the board of directors, the audit committee, and the Shari’ah supervisory 
board) in enhancing the financial reporting quality, the literature related to these three 
mechanisms will be reviewed below. 
 
3.4.1 The Board of Directors 
In the corporate form of organisations, shareholders delegate decision making and internal 
control authority to the board of directors (Grossman and Hart, 1980). This delegation gives 
the board the ultimate control over top management and makes it responsible for the overall 
supervision of the corporation to ensure that top managers act in the best interests of 
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shareholders. It is also responsible for approving primary business strategies (Beasley, 1996; 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; John et al., 2016). Hence, the board of directors is widely 
recognised as one of the most important internal governance mechanisms (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
The board of directors is also responsible for establishing necessary governance mechanisms 
that help with controlling agency conflicts, whether between owners and managers or between 
majority and minority shareholders (González and García-Meca, 2014). In order to reduce 
conflicts of interests arising from agency relationships, the board of directors has the 
responsibility to ensure that high-quality corporate financial information is available to all 
stakeholders (Beasley, 1996). 
Given the essential role of the board of directors in monitoring and controlling managerial 
behaviour and ensuring that shareholders’ interests are protected, numerous empirical studies 
have examined the role of the board of directors in enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting. However, the greater part of this literature either views the financial reporting 
quality from an opportunistic earnings management perspective or it excludes banks and 
financial institutions from examinations. 
Previous research has documented that effective governance through the board of directors 
results in better monitoring of managerial performance and better control over managerial 
discretionary decisions (Beasley, 1996). Thus, a considerable number of studies have 
investigated the role of the board of directors in enhancing financial reporting quality through 
curtailing opportunistic earnings management practices. Previous literature has established 
that the effectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring and controlling managerial 
opportunistic behaviour depends on its characteristics and attributes. Among these 
characteristics, prior research has focused on the size and the composition of the board of 
directors. 
The size of the board is a significant element in determining the board’s effectiveness in 
monitoring and controlling the firm. When examining the association between the board’s 
size and financial reporting quality, prior literature bases the discussions on either the agency 
theory or the resource dependence theory.  
On one hand, according to the agency theory, firms with larger boards tend to be less effective 
in monitoring managerial behaviour, due to coordination and communication problems that 
hinder the decision-making process (Jensen, 1993). Consistent with this view, several studies 
find that the size of the board negatively affects the financial reporting quality. On the other 
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hand, according to the resource dependence theory, a larger board is “a provider of resources, 
such as legitimacy, advice and counsel, and links to other organisations, etc.” (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003, p. 383). Therefore, a larger board results in enhanced skills, expertise, and the 
knowledge needed to exert effective monitoring over financial reporting in general, and 
earnings management practices in particular (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; John and Senbet, 1998; 
Dalton et al., 1999). In line with this view, a number of studies find that the size of the board 
is positively associated with the quality of financial reporting. Both strands of the literature 
are reviewed below. 
In a study examining the role of the board of directors in constraining earnings management, 
Xie et al. (2003) investigate the relationship between board size and earnings management for 
a sample of 110 U.S. firms for the years 1992, 1994, and 1996. They find evidence for a 
significant negative association between the board size and discretionary accruals. Their 
results indicate that larger boards are more effective in monitoring and controlling earnings 
management than smaller boards. 
Bradbury et al. (2006) investigate the association between the board of directors’ 
characteristics and accounting quality measured by abnormal accruals. For a sample of 
Malaysian and Singaporean firms (excluding financial firms), they find that the board size is 
negatively associated with abnormal working capital accruals. 
In addition, Kang and Kim (2012) examine whether the board of directors has a role in real 
activity-based earnings management in a sample of Korean non-financial firms. They find that 
large boards result in reduced levels of real earnings management.  
The above studies support the arguments of the resource dependence theory. They claim that 
as boards of directors become larger, they develop better governance capabilities over top 
management actions, and this results in reduced managerial opportunistic behaviour and 
higher financial reporting quality.  
On the other side, there exist a number of studies supporting the agency theory, which argue 
that large boards of directors tend to be less effective in monitoring management, due to the 
problem of coordination and communication. In line with this argument, Kao and Chin (2004) 
provide evidence for a positive association between board size and the extent of earnings 
management. They examine a sample of Taiwanese non-financial firms, and they find that the 




Ching et al. (2006) also examine the use of discretionary accruals around SEO 
announcements. For a sample of SEO firms in Hong Kong over the period 1993-2000, they 
find evidence for the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings prior to the SEO and 
they illustrate that SEO firms with large boards are more likely to engage in earnings 
management practices around SEOs. Hashim and Devi (2008) also find that the board size 
negatively affects the quality of earnings – as measured by accruals quality, in a sample of 
Malaysian non-financial firms.   
However, few previous studies on the relation between boards’ characteristics and financial 
reporting quality find that the size of the board is not related to earnings quality (Vafeas, 
2005; Jaggi et al., 2009; Iqbal and Strong, 2010; Gulzar and Wang, 2011). 
Another important element that determines the effectiveness of the board of directors in 
monitoring managerial behaviour and the financial reporting process is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (John and Senbet, 1998). Typically, the board of directors 
is composed of inside directors (executives) representing top company officers and outside 
(independent) directors appointed by the shareholders, and they are expected to act in their 
best interests.  
Although executive directors have valuable information about the firm’s operations and 
activities, the presence of independent directors enhances the effectiveness of the board’s 
governance role, as they are capable of exercising sovereign judgement to protect 
shareholders’ interests when an agency conflict is present (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Beasley, 1996; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). In addition, given the need to develop and 
maintain a reputation in the labour market, and since independent directors bring valuable 
expertise and potential networks that could benefit the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Linck et 
al., 2008; Pathan and Skully, 2010), boards dominated by independent directors are in a better 
position to monitor and control managers’ activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In line with these arguments, numerous studies in the literature provide evidence for a positive 
association between board independence and financial reporting quality. From a fraudulent 
financial reporting perspective, Beasley (1996) examines whether the inclusion of larger 
proportions of outside members on the board reduces the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud, and finds that non-fraudulent firms have boards with significantly higher percentages of 
outside members than those of fraudulent firms. Dechow et al. (1996) use a sample of firms 
subject to Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions between 1982 and 1992 
in order to investigate firms alleged to have violated the Generally Accepted Accounting 
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Principles (GAAP) to overstate their earnings and match businesses that did not. They find 
that firms manipulating earnings are more likely to have boards with a lower proportion of 
independent members. It is worth mentioning that the two studies (i.e. Beasley (1996) and 
Dechow et al. (1996)) emerged from the seminal paper by Feroz et al. (1991). In their study of 
the financial effects of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) accounting 
enforcement program, Feroz et al. (1991) emphasise that the SEC’s enforcement programme 
aims to maintain the credibility and integrity of the disclosure system and preventing the 
erosion of accounting principles. This is partially achieved through pursuing disclosure 
violations related to premature revenue recognition and delayed write-offs.  
Klein (2002) examines whether the characteristics of boards of directors and audit committees 
affect earnings management, as measured by the magnitude of abnormal accruals. For a 
sample of U.S. firms listed on the S&P 500 from 1991 to 1993, she finds that the magnitude 
of abnormal accruals is negatively associated with the proportion of outside directors on the 
board. However, her examination excludes banks and insurance companies, due to difficulty 
in defining accruals for financial institutions.  
Peasnell et al. (2005) examine whether earnings management practices depend on boards’ 
monitoring. As a proxy for earnings management, they use abnormal accruals estimated by 
the modified Jones model. For a sample of UK firms over the period from 1993 to 1996, they 
find that the proportion of outside members on the board is negatively related to the 
managers’ use of abnormal accruals to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Their findings 
suggest that the board’s independence improves the integrity and quality of financial 
reporting, as predicted by the agency theory. 
In an Australian context, Davidson et al. (2005) investigate the role of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms in constraining earnings management. Using discretionary accruals 
as a measure of earnings management, they provide evidence that earnings management is 
negatively associated with the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. However, 
their study excludes firms in the financial sector, due to their unique capital structures. 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) examine whether the board of directors’ composition 
affects the informational quality of earnings in a country characterised by poor financial and 
governance indicators – Greece. They measure the informational quality of accounting 
earnings by considering the relationship between earnings per share and stock prices, the 
relationship between earnings timeliness and earnings conservatism, and abnormal accruals. 
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They find that the proportion of independent directors on the board positively affects the 
informational quality of earnings.  
The empirical studies reviewed above have all focused on Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e., the 
U.S., the UK, and Australia). Relatively little research has been carried out in the Latin 
American context. One of these attempts is the study conducted by González and García-
Meca in 2014. For a sample of Latin American non-financial firms during the period from 
2006 to 2009, they analyse the relation between internal corporate governance mechanisms 
and earnings management. They find that board independence is negatively related to the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Another important aspect determining the independence of the board of directors is whether 
the positions of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman are separated. According to 
the agency theory, the board’s chairman should be independent of the entity’s affairs in order 
to ensure effective monitoring of managerial acts (Jensen, 1993; Blackburn, 1994). In 
addition, combining the decision-making process with the decision-control process 
exacerbates agency conflicts and leads to concentration of power (Pi and Timme, 1993; 
Beasley, 1996). Prior studies have demonstrated that CEO duality impedes effective 
monitoring and could be linked with higher managerial opportunism (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Klein, 2002).  
Persons (2006) investigates corporate governance characteristics that can influence the 
likelihood of non-financial reporting fraud. For a sample of U.S. firms with revelations of 
non-financial reporting fraud over the period from 1991 to 2000, she provides evidence that 
the likelihood of fraud is lower if the positions of the CEO and the board chairman are 
separated. 
 Lo et al. (2010) investigate the relation between corporate governance characteristics and 
earnings manipulations for a sample of Chinese non-financial firms. They find that CEO 
duality is positively related to earnings manipulations via transfer pricing decisions. Their 
results indicate that CEO duality leads to concentration of power, which limits the boards’ 
capabilities to effectively monitor managerial behaviour. 
Furthermore, Kamarudin et al. (2012) examine the role of CEO duality in earnings quality in a 
sample of Malaysian firms during the period from 2005 to 2010. They find that audit 
committee independence positively affects earnings quality, as measured using accruals 
quality estimated by the McNichols (2002) model. More importantly, they find that CEO 
duality weakens the association between audit committee independence and earnings quality, 
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which in turn results in the audit committee being less effective in monitoring the financial 
reporting process. 
The above studies support the argument that CEO duality compromises the fiduciary duty of 
the board of directors to monitor and control corporate financial reporting. However, several 
studies have failed to show a consistent association between CEO duality and financial 
reporting quality (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Ebrahim, 2007, Ghosh et al., 2010; González 
and García-Meca, 2014). 
 
3.4.2 The Audit Committee 
Although the board of directors has the responsibility of setting overall policy for the 
corporation and monitoring management, it delegates to the audit committee the responsibility 
of monitoring the financial reporting process. According to Joshi and Wakil (2004), the audit 
committee’s role involves oversight over financial reporting, internal control, and external 
auditing activity. Hence, an effective audit committee represents a governance device that 
assists the board in its monitoring role and, therefore, promotes financial reporting quality 
(Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; Beasley et al., 2009). This is achieved through strengthening 
governance, promoting conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008), and reducing 
opportunistic earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Sharma and Kuang, 
2014). Audit committees are also associated with oversight over risk management and internal 
control systems (Chambers and Weight, 2008). 
If the board of directors’ primary role is to protect shareholders’ interests, and it may also play 
a role in constraining opportunistic earnings management, then the audit committee has a 
more direct role in controlling earnings management. Several studies have investigated the 
role of audit committees in constraining earnings management. However, most of these 
studies were conducted on non-financial firms. Prior studies mainly focus on three 
characteristics of the audit committee: its size, independence, and financial expertise. 
Borrowing from the resource dependence theory, it is argued that a large audit committee can 
be seen as an indication of the resources and varied expertise available to the committee to 
effectively monitor financial reporting practices. Accordingly, several studies provide 
evidence of a negative association between the size of the audit committee and earnings 
management practices. Yang and Krishnan (2005) examine the association between audit 
committee characteristics and quarterly earnings management in a sample of 250 U.S. 
publicly traded firms (excluding financial institutions and regulated utility companies). Their 
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findings provide evidence of the negative association between the size of the audit committee 
and quarterly earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals estimated using 
the Jones (1991) model. 
From another perspective of earnings quality, Lin et al. (2006) examine the role of the audit 
committee in earnings restatement, as a proxy for earnings management. They argue that 
restatements relate to financial reporting frauds, which may lead to future bankruptcy. They 
analysed a sample of 212 U.S. firms that restated their earnings for the year 2000, and they 
find that audit committee size is negatively related to the occurrence of earnings restatement. 
Their findings support the view that a large audit committee provides greater oversight of the 
financial reporting process. 
For a sample of Australian companies, Kent et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and accruals quality. They distinguish between two components of 
accruals quality: the discretionary component that results from intentional manipulation of 
accruals, and the innate component that arises due to unintentional estimation errors. They 
find that a larger audit committee is associated with higher discretionary accruals quality. 
In a Spanish context, García et al. (2012) study the association between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management in a sample of firms listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange. They find a negative relation between audit committee size and earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary accruals. This result suggests that a larger number 
of members serving on the audit committee enables them to detect financial reporting 
manipulations. 
However, proponents of the agency theory argue that large committees tend to be less 
efficient in their governance role, as a result of coordination and communication problems. In 
line with this argument, a number of studies find a positive association between audit 
committee size and the degree of earnings management (Alonso et al., 2000; Hoitash et al., 
2009; Gulzar and Wang, 2011). 
On the other side, some studies have demonstrated that the size of the audit committee is not 
related to earnings management (Abbott et al., 2004; Bédard et al., 2004; Baxter and Cotter, 
2009; Habbash et al., 2013). 
Prior studies examining the role of audit committees in financial reporting quality have also 
considered the proportion of independent members serving on the committee. According to 
the agency theory, independent directors provide more effective governance capabilities over 
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managerial behaviour, as they are able to make independent judgements separate from 
management’s influence (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Against this background, a considerable 
number of studies provide evidence for the positive role of audit committee independence in 
enhancing the quality of financial reporting.  
Benkel et al. (2006) investigate whether independent directors on the audit committee are 
associated with reduced levels of earnings management. They analyse a sample of Australian 
companies over the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. They find that audit committees comprising 
a higher proportion of independent directors are associated with lower levels of discretionary 
accruals, estimated using the DeAngelo (1986) model. 
 Chang and Sun (2009) investigate whether the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in monitoring and enhancing the quality of 
earnings in cross-listed foreign firms. They compare the relationships between corporate 
governance structures and earnings quality in the pre-SOX period with the post-SOX period. 
They use earnings informativeness and earnings management to measure the quality of 
earnings. They find that audit committee independence is significantly associated with both 
earnings informativeness and earnings management in the post-SOX period. However, such 
associations were not found in the pre-SOX period. Their findings suggest that the provisions 
of SOX improve the effectiveness of an independent audit committee in enhancing the quality 
of earnings. Similar evidence is also provided by Chang and Sun (2010) for a sample of U.S. 
publicly traded firms, excluding foreign firms, utility companies, and financial firms. 
In a Chinese context, Chen and Zhang (2014) investigate the impact of corporate governance 
reforms in China on earnings management. For a sample of 447 non-financial Chinese listed 
companies, they find that the earnings management practices through discretionary accruals 
reduced significantly after the implementation of the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies in China in 2002. Specifically, they find that the introduction of 
independent non-executive directors to the audit committee results in reduced earnings 
management activities. 
Inaam and Khamoussi (2016), in their meta-analysis, provide consistent evidence on the 
influence of the audit committee on earnings management. Their analysis demonstrates a 
significant negative relationship between the independence of the audit committee and 
earnings management. 
The positive role of audit committees in enhancing the quality of financial reporting has been 
documented in a large number of studies (Klein, 2002, Bédard et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 
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2005; Lin and Hwang, 2010). However, some studies find that audit committee independence 
has no influence on financial reporting quality (Xie et al., 2003; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; 
Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; García et al., 2012; Habbash et al., 
2013). 
Furthermore, previous studies have assessed the effectiveness of the audit committees in 
enhancing the financial reporting quality by examining the impact of the financial expertise of 
the audit committee members. Since the primary role of the audit committee is to monitor the 
financial reporting process, then members of the committee are expected to have financial or 
accounting knowledge. Such knowledge will assist the audit committee members in dealing 
with complex financial reporting issues and it will enable them to detect opportunistic 
earnings management practices. Several studies have provided evidence supporting this 
argument and have shown that the financial expertise of the audit committee is negatively 
associated with opportunistic earnings management. 
Abbott et al. (2004) investigate the role of audit committees in improving the quality of 
financial reporting, as measured by financial restatements. They analyse a sample of U.S. 
firms that restated their financial statements during the period 1991 to 1999. They find a 
significant negative relationship between an audit committee that has financial expertise and 
financial restatement. 
Chen et al. (2007) assess whether corporate governance characteristics influence the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals, as a measure for earnings management. For a sample of 
companies listed in Taiwan, they find that audit committee members with financial expertise 
are associated with lower discretionary accruals. These findings suggest that financial 
expertise enables audit committee members to effectively monitor the financial reporting 
process and detect financial misstatements.  
Qi and Tian (2012) provide empirical evidence of the influence of audit committees' 
characteristics on earnings management practices for a sample of Chinese firms during the 
period 2004-2010. They use the performance-matched discretionary accruals to measure 
earnings management, and find that audit committee members with financial experience can 
effectively constrain earnings management practices. 
Kusnadi et al. (2016) investigate whether audit committee characteristics affect financial 
reporting quality for a sample of listed companies in Singapore. They find that the audit 




On the other side, few studies have failed to find a significant association between the audit 
committee’s financial expertise and financial reporting quality (Abdul Rahman and Ali, 2006; 
Chang and Sun, 2009; Kent et al., 2010; Al-Thuneibat et al., 2016). 
The literature reviewed above reveals that the role of boards of directors and audit committees 
in enhancing the reliability of the financial reporting process has been extensively 
documented. Table 3.3 presents a summary of the corporate governance characteristics that 
have been previously studied in relation to financial reporting quality. However, all of the 
studies reviewed in the above sections have assessed the quality of financial reporting from an 
opportunistic earnings management perspective and with regard to earnings restatements. In 
addition, the above studies have analysed non-financial firms and excluded financial 
institutions from their analysis. Recently, the global financial crisis has motivated research on 
banks’ corporate governance structures. This limited literature will be reviewed in section 
























Table 3.3 Summary of Studies Investigating Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Relation 




Board of directors size 
Xie et al. (2003), Kao and Chin (2004), Vafeas (2005), 
Bradbury et al. (2006), Ching et al. (2006), Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006), Hashim and Devi (2008), Jaggi et al. (2009), 
Iqbal and Strong (2010), Gulzar and Wang (2011), Kang and 
Kim (2012). 
Board of directors 
independence 
Beasley (1996), Dechow et al. (1996), Klein (2002), Xie et al. 
(2003), Peasnell et al. (2005), Davidson et al. (2005), Benkel 
et al. (2006), Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), Chang and Sun 
(2009), Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), Iqbal and Strong 
(2010), González and García-Meca (2014), Chen and Zhang 
(2014). 
CEO duality 
Dechow et al. (1996), Klein (2002), Persons (2006), Abdul 
Rahman and Ali (2006), Chen et al. (2006), Ebrahim (2007), 
Lo et al. (2010), Ghosh et al. (2010), Iqbal and Strong (2010), 
Kamarudin et al. (2012), González and García-Meca (2014). 
Audit committee size 
Alonso et al. (2000), Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004), 
Bédard et al. (2004), Yang and Krishnan (2005), Lin et al. 
(2006), Hoitash et al. (2009), Baxter and Cotter (2009), Kent 
et al. (2010), Gulzar and Wang (2011), García et al. (2012), 
Habbash et al. (2013).  
Audit committee 
independence 
Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Bédard et al. (2004), Davidson  
et al. (2005), Yang and Krishnan (2005), Benkel et al. (2006), 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), Chang and Sun (2009), Baxter 
and Cotter (2009), Chang and Sun (2010), Lin and Hwang 
(2010), García et al. (2012), Habbash et al. (2013), Chen and 
Zhang (2014), Inaam and Khamoussi (2016). 
Audit committee financial 
expertise 
Abbott et al. (2004), Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), Chen et 
al. (2007), Chang and Sun (2009), Kent et al. (2010), Qi and 
Tian (2012), Kusnadi et al. (2016), Al-Thuneibat et al. (2016). 
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3.4.3 The Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
A unique characteristic that differentiates the corporate governance systems of Islamic banks 
from those of conventional banks is the presence of the Shari’ah supervisory board, as part of 
their governance structures. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Islamic banks differ from conventional banks in terms of 
orientation and business models (Saif Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012; Beck et al., 2013), and 
in structures of transactions (Abdallah, 1987; Hasan and Dridi, 2011). A crucial foundation of 
Islamic banking is the compliance to the Islamic Shari’ah principles. Hence, to ensure that 
Islamic banks’ activities are in compliance with the principles of Shari’ah, there is an 
immense need for an independent body of specialist members to monitor each bank’s 
operations and transactions. For this, Shari’ah supervisory boards were established. They 
constitute an extra layer of governance, beside the traditional governance mechanisms (i.e. 
board of directors and audit committee). In fact, the establishment of a Shari’ah supervisory 
board is a principal means by which financial institutions incorporate Islamic religious beliefs 
into their operations and decision making (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
In order to understand the role of the Shari’ah supervisory board, it is essential to review its 
definition. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) defines the Shari’ah supervisory board as:  
“An independent body of specialized jurists in fiqh al-mu’amalat (Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence). However, the Shari’ah supervisory board may include 
a member other than those specialized in fiqh al-mu’amalat, but he should be an 
expert in the field of Islamic financial institutions and have knowledge of fiqh al-
mu’amalat. The Shari’ah supervisory board is entrusted with the duty of directing, 
reviewing and supervising the activities of the Islamic financial institution to 
ensure that it is in compliance with Islamic Shari’ah rules and principles.” 
(AAOIFI, 2010) 
The AAOIFI’s definition of the Shari’ah supervisory board highlights that its primary role is 
to reassure stakeholders that the Islamic bank’s activities are in compliance with the principles 
of Shari’ah. In this regard, Grais and Pellegrini (2006) divided the duties of the Shari’ah board 
into five categories: issuance of fatwas
4
 to certify the permissibility of a new product 
developed by the Islamic bank, to verify that future transactions and activities comply with 
                                                          
4
 A fatwa refers to an Islamic legal resolution. In this thesis, a fatwa relates to issues regarding Islamic finance. 
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the previously issued fatwas, calculation of Zakat payments, advising the bank on income 
distribution, and ensuring that non-Shari’ah earnings are disposed. 
The role of the Shari’ah supervisory board can be categorised as both an advisory role and a 
review role (Briston and El-Ashker, 1986; Ginena and Hamid, 2015). On one side, the 
Shari’ah supervisory board is responsible for advising the Islamic bank on Shari’ah-related 
issues, such as developing new products and services (Ahmed, 2006), developing Shari’ah-
compliant policies and procedures (Safieddine, 2009), and providing necessary training on 
Shari’ah guidelines to the Islamic bank’s staff (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). On the other side, 
the review role requires the Shari’ah supervisory board to monitor and assess the 
implementation of decisions made at the advisory phase (Sheikh Hassan, 2012). In other 
words, the review role is required to assure investors and stakeholders that the Islamic bank’s 
products, activities and profits earned are in compliance with the principles of Shari’ah.  
The advisory role of the Shari’ah supervisory board has been emphasised by the Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), where it outlines in its 
governance standards that the Shari’ah board is the authority “entrusted with the duty of 
directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the Islamic financial institutions in order 
to ensure that they are in compliance with Islamic Shari’ah Rules and Principles” (AAOIFI, 
2010). Moreover, AAOIFI standards on Shari’ah supervisory board establish that this board 
“shall assist the management by providing guidance, advice, and training relating to 
compliance with the Shari’ah” (AAOIFI, 2010). Prior literature on the advisory role of the 
Shari’ah supervisory board explains that this role involves advising the bank on strategic 
issues (Alhabshi and Bakar, 2008); providing advice on Islamic financial products and 
services (Ahmed, 2006; Ahmed, 2011), and providing overall monitoring to ensure good 
reputation and organisational image (Grassa, 2016). Considering all of these roles, the general 
task of the Shari’ah supervisory board is to ensure that the application of Shari’ah principles 
remains dominant in Islamic banks. The Shari’ah principles explicitly emphasise ethical and 
moral values (i.e. transparency, honesty, integrity, and truthfulness), which are expected to 
inhibit individuals (i.e. managers) from engaging in ethically questionable activities, such as 
opportunistic earnings management. 
Hence, members of the Shari’ah supervisory board act as investigators in conducting their 
independent audit, and issue a separate report, as part of the Islamic bank’s annual report, to 
certify that the bank’s operations are free from any element prohibited by Islamic principles 
(Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). Moreover, Shari’ah supervisory board members may also have 
to review additional information and reports, such as operating and financial reports and 
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policies (Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013). In this regard, Abdel Karim (1995) asserted that 
this responsibility of the Shari’ah supervisory board is similar to the authority of external 
independent auditors. Accordingly, the presence of the Shari’ah supervisory board gives 
legitimacy to Islamic financial institutions (Siddiqi, 2006), and plays a catalytic role in 
promoting public acceptance of the Islamic banking industry. 
It is the responsibility of the Islamic bank’s board of directors to appoint an independent 
Shari’ah supervisory board and to assure its competence. Regarding the characteristics of the 
Shari’ah supervisory board, there is no specific requirement for the size of this board (Ginena 
and Hamid, 2015). However, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) standards recommend that a Shari’ah board should comprise at least 
three scholars (AAOIFI, 2010). According to Ginena and Hamid (2015), defining an optimal 
number of Shari’ah scholars to serve on the Shari’ah supervisory board is impractical, as 
situations differ from one bank to another.  
Another characteristic determining the effectiveness of the Shari’ah board in fulfilling its 
advisory and review roles is its competence and qualifications. Despite that, there is a lack of 
agreement in the Islamic banking industry on the specific qualifications required for Shari’ah 
supervisory board members. According to the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), a 
Shari’ah supervisory board member is expected to hold a bachelor’s degree in the sciences of 
Shari’ah, and to have adequate understanding of finance in general and Islamic finance in 
particular. Due to the complex nature of Islamic banks’ activities, Shari’ah supervisory board 
members should not only be knowledgeable in Islamic commercial jurisprudence, but they 
should also be equipped with relevant expertise in modern business disciplines, economic 
developments, accounting and financial practices, and armed with adequate training and 
continuing education. Khalaf (2007) highlighted that a graduating Shari’ah scholar, who lacks 
financial knowledge, may not be sufficiently competent to perform Shari’ah supervisory 
board duties. However, in practice, most regulatory authorities have been vague on the 
required qualifications for Shari’ah scholars. For example, the regulations of GCC countries 
such as Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Emirates do not stipulate requisite qualifications for 
Shari’ah supervisory board members. Table 3.4 details the financial qualification 






Table 3.4 Financial Qualification Requirements for Shari’ah Scholars in some Countries 
Country Qualification Requirements for Shari’ah Scholars 
Bahrain Regulatory guidelines require Islamic banks to establish Shari’ah 
supervisory boards; however, there are no specific qualifications 
stipulated for Shari’ah scholars. 
Qatar  The rules require that “members appointed to the Shari’ah 
supervisory board are competent to perform their functions as 
Shari’ah supervisory board members taking into account their 
qualifications and pervious experience”. 
Kuwait The law requires Islamic financial institutions to devise Shari’ah 
supervisory boards, but does not detail competency requirements for 
members. 
Saudi Arabia Regulators have adopted a hands-off approach to Shari’ah 
governance; hence, there are no specific qualification requirements 
for Shari’ah supervisory board members. 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Regulatory guidelines do not stipulate specific financial 
qualifications for Shari’ah scholars. 
Oman The regulations provide the following “fit and proper” criteria for 
Shari’ah scholars: Members with Shari’ah background must be 
holders of academic qualifications in the field of Shari’ah 
(minimum of bachelor’s degree). Members other than Shari’ah 
scholars must be individuals generally recognised for their expertise 
in their respective field (e.g. economics, law, banking, accounting, 
finance, etc.). They should hold a minimum of master’s degree.  
Malaysia The law requires the majority of members in the Shari’ah 
committee to at least hold bachelor’s degree in Shari’ah. The 
Shari’ah committee may comprise experts from relevant 
background such as finance and law, which could support the depth 
and breadth of the Shari’ah deliberations. 
Pakistan Regulations require a Shariah scholar to have “knowledge of or at-
least be familiar with the banking industry. Minimum qualification 
is bachelor’s degree. Higher education like M.A. in Islamic studies, 




Finally, the competence of the Shari’ah scholars may also be determined by the multiple 
memberships they hold. On the one hand, multiple memberships held by Shari’ah scholars in 
many Islamic banks can promote knowledge and expertise within the Shari’ah supervisory 
board, as they are exposed to more diverse experiences (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). 
Additionally, holding multiple memberships represents a proxy for a scholar’s reputation in 
the external labour market (Shivdasani, 1993; Vafeas, 1999). Accordingly, the diverse 
knowledge and expertise of reputable Shari’ah scholars are predicted to enhance their ability 
in advising and supervising Islamic banks’ activities. On the other hand, performing the 
consultative and supervisory functions of the Shari’ah supervisory board requires significant 
effort and time from the members. Thus, members holding multiple memberships may not be 
able to conduct their roles effectively, as these multiple memberships will distract the scholars 
from their responsibilities to supervise and monitor banks’ activities. In practice, the 
reputation resource of existing Shari’ah scholars and the scarcity of experts in Islamic finance 
have led to the busyness of the Shari’ah supervisory boards in Islamic banks (Al Mannai and 
Ahmed, 2018; Trinh et al., 2019). Supporting statistics and graphs are presented in Appendix 
3. 
To date, several studies investigating the role of the Shari’ah supervisory board have been 
conducted; however, most of these studies occurred within the context of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, bank risk-taking and performance. Farook et al. (2011) examined 
the association between Shari’ah supervisory board characteristics and corporate social 
responsibility disclosure for a cross-country sample of Islamic banks, and concluded that 
Shari’ah scholars with cross-memberships and international reputation are associated with 
higher levels of such disclosures. Abdul Rahman and Bukair (2013) also found similar results 
for Islamic banks operating in the GCC countries. 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) examined whether Shari’ah supervisory boards, representing an 
additional layer of governance, are associated with performance in Islamic banks. In a sample 
of 86 Islamic banks and 86 conventional banks from 25 countries, they found that the 
extended governance structures in Islamic banks enhance their financial performance, relative 
to their conventional counterparts. This study provided evidence of the positive effect of 
Shari’ah supervisory boards on the financial performance of Islamic banks. In the same vein, 
Mollah et al. (2017) investigated whether the difference in governance structures between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks affects their risk-taking and performance. They 
discovered that the unique governance structures in Islamic banks lead to a lower risk-taking 
profile and better performance. A recent study by Almutairi and Quttainah (2017) investigated 
68 
 
the impact of Shari’ah supervisory boards on Islamic banks’ financial performance. The study 
also examined whether the characteristics of the Shari’ah boards are related to financial 
performance. In a sample of 82 Islamic banks from 15 countries, the study found that the 
presence of Shari’ah boards within Islamic banks improves their financial performance. In 
addition, the study provided significant evidence for positive associations between the 
financial performance of Islamic banks and Shari’ah supervisory board characteristics, such 
as size, financial expertise and education level. 
Although previous studies have demonstrated the crucial role of Shari’ah supervisory boards 
in enhancing the corporate social responsibility disclosure, performance, and attitude to risk-
taking in Islamic banks, investigation of the impact of Shari’ah boards in enhancing financial 
reporting quality and mitigating opportunistic earnings management is still lacking. 
The link between religiosity
5
 and corporate financial reporting decisions has been documented 
in some recent studies (Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012; Du et al., 2015; Abdelsalam 
et al., 2017). These studies have demonstrated that religiosity acts as an essential monitoring 
mechanism to constrain opportunistic managerial behaviour, and in turn mitigates earnings 
management, risk-taking and risk-shifting behaviours. Furthermore, religion promotes ethics 
and accountability in organisations (Ali and Al-Aali, 2015). It has been argued in Chapter 2, 
that Islamic banks exemplify ethically and religiously oriented organisations, which are 
assumed to operate in compliance with Shari’ah rulings and with the social norms underlying 
these rulings. Among the moral and ethical values stressed in Islamic principles are honesty, 
transparency and truthfulness (Ali and Al-Owaihan, 2008), which are all expected to result in 
enhanced financial reporting quality. 
Given the imperative role of religiosity in corporate financial reporting decisions, it is 
plausible to predict a similar role for the Shari’ah supervisory board, which is sometimes 
referred to as a religious board (Abdel Karim, 1990; Jobst, 2007; Venardos, 2010). The only 
study, to the best of my knowledge, which investigates the association between the 
characteristics of the Shari’ah supervisory board and financial reporting quality was 
conducted by Quttainah et al. (2013). In a sample of Islamic banks operating during 1993-
2008, they found that the presence of a large Shari’ah board, and having Shari’ah scholars 
who are affiliated with the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions, can contribute to lowering earnings management. However, this study did not 
                                                          
5
 Religiosity (or religiousness) is defined as the strength of individuals’ connection with, or adherence to, their 
religion to the extent that they take part in religious activities and services (King Jr., 2008). It is also defined as 
the extent of adhering to prevailing religious codes and promulgations. 
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examine the joint impact of other internal governance mechanisms, such as the board of 
directors and audit committee, nor did it investigate the role of other important Shari’ah 
supervisory board attributes. 
 
3.4.4 Financial Reporting Practices in Banking 
Financial institutions in general, and banks in particular, have a significant collective role in 
boosting economic and financial growth in communities. However, some banks have 
exhibited unethical attitudes and acted with great opacity, indulging in activities such as 
aggressive earnings management and fraudulent financial reporting (Grougiou et al., 2014)
6
. 
The complexity of banking transactions and financial instruments leads to substantial 
information asymmetries, and therefore, both the corporate governance mechanisms and 
related financial reporting in the banking industry are still questionable. 
The prior literature reviewed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 has provided extensive evidence on 
the role of different corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing financial reporting 
quality. However, the greater part of this literature has excluded banking and financial 
institutions. Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, banks’ governance structures have 
been subject to stricter oversight by regulators (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015), as the financial 
crisis revealed that the corporate governance structures in banks were inadequate, and led to 
calls for reforms to strengthen information quality and corporate governance systems in banks 
(Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012). Given the significance of the role played by banks in the 
stability of the payment system and the functioning of economic systems (Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008), an investigation of the role of different corporate governance mechanisms 
in financial reporting quality in banks is warranted. 
Although the quality of financial reporting has long been investigated in prior banking studies 
(Wahlen, 1994; Beatty and Harris, 1998; Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Pérez et al. 2008; Barth 
et al., 2017), less focus has been placed on examining the factors determining financial 
reporting quality in banks. Shen and Chih (2005) presented one of the earliest attempts in this 
context, studying earnings management behaviour in a cross-country sample of banks. Firstly, 
they provided a graphical evidence and statistical evidence for earnings management practices 
in most of the countries sampled. Secondly, they found that banks’ earnings management 
practices are negatively associated with investor protection and accounting disclosure 
requirements. Although this study explained the variations of earnings management across 
                                                          
6
 For example, the cases of Lehman Brothers and Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. highlight the severe repercussions of 
banks’ activities on their communities and market participants. 
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countries from an investor protection perspective, it did not consider the role of other 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
Some banking studies have examined the role of institutional factors in enhancing the quality 
of earnings (Kanagaretnam et al., 2014a; García-Sánchez and García-Meca, 2017). 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014a) investigated whether variations in country-wide institutional 
factors result in cross-country differences in earnings quality. To assess the quality of 
earnings, they used five different measures: income-increasing discretionary loan loss 
provisions, bench-mark beating, earnings persistence, future cash flows predictability and 
future loan charge-offs. They concluded that institutional factors are strongly related to all of 
the earnings quality measures. Furthermore, they provided evidence on the role of the legal 
system, judicial system and economic system in controlling opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour and in enhancing the information value of bank earnings. In the same 
vein, García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017) studied the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility practices and earnings quality in banks, examining institutional factors as 
moderators in this relationship. They found that commitments to corporate social 
responsibility practices positively affect cash flow predictability and earnings persistence. 
They also discovered that this effect is stronger in countries with greater bank regulation and 
higher investor protection.  
In addition to the role of institutional factors in financial reporting quality, some studies have 
considered the role of internal and external audit. Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) examined the 
association between external auditor reputation and earnings management in banks. In a 
sample of banks from 29 countries for the period 1993-2006, they found that auditor 
reputation constrains loss-avoidance and income-increasing earnings management. Their 
findings highlighted the role of independent auditors as an important monitoring mechanism 
that controls opportunistic earnings management behaviour in banks. In another study, Gras-
Gil et al. (2012) examined the role of internal audit function in financial reporting quality. In a 
sample of Spanish banks, they revealed that the involvement of the internal audit function in 
the financial reporting process leads to higher financial reporting quality. 
Another strand of literature focused on the role of religiosity in enhancing financial reporting 
quality. Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) examined the effects of religion, which is a principal 
source of morals and ethics, on financial reporting quality in banks. In an international sample 
of banks, they found that religiosity is negatively related to earnings management measures, 
and positively related to earnings persistence and cash flow predictability. Although they did 
not test with regard to a particular religion, they provided evidence for the role of informal 
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institutions such as religion in financial reporting quality. A few empirical studies have 
focused on the influence of a specific religion (i.e. Islam) (Quttainah et al., 2013; Abdelsalam 
et al., 2016; Elnahass et al., 2018). Quttainah et al. (2013) investigated whether Islamic banks 
are less likely to engage in earnings management than other types of banks, and whether the 
characteristics of the Shari’ah supervisory board affect earnings management behaviour in 
Islamic banks. In a sample of Islamic and conventional banks, they discovered that Islamic 
banks are less likely to manage their earnings through loss-avoidance techniques and 
abnormal loan loss provisions. Additionally, they provided evidence of a negative association 
between the size of the Shari’ah board and earnings management. 
Abdelsalam et al. (2016) studied the influence of organisational religious norms on the 
financial reporting quality of banks. Their comparison of Islamic banks with conventional 
banks revealed that Islamic banks adopt more conservative accounting policies, and are less 
likely to manage their earnings than their conventional counterparts. While Abdelsalam et al. 
(2016) theoretically attributed their findings to the possible effect of double-governance 
mechanisms on lowering managerial opportunism in Islamic banks, they did not assess the 
impact of different layers of internal governance in curbing earnings management behaviour 
within the two bank types, nor did they test for any specific characteristics of Shari’ah 
supervisory boards in earnings management within Islamic banks. Likewise, Elnahass et al. 
(2018) investigated the effect of applying different financial reporting regulatory systems (e.g. 
International Financial Reporting Standards versus Islamic accounting standards) on 
accounting opportunism across the two bank types within three countries: Bahrain, Jordan and 
Qatar. They found that Islamic banks (using expected loan loss models) have higher quality 
financial reporting than conventional banks, which employ incurred loan loss models. 
However, their study did not control for internal governance attributes. 
With regard to the role of internal governance mechanisms, limited evidence is available 
within conventional banking literature on the effect of internal corporate governance on 
controlling earnings management practices. Cornett et al. (2009) studied earnings 
management behaviour at large bank holding companies, and investigated the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms in controlling this behaviour. Their findings provided 
evidence for income smoothing behaviour through loan loss provisions and securities gains 
and losses. They also found that an independent board of directors limits opportunistic 
earnings management behaviour in banks. Similarly, using a corporate governance index, 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) concluded that U.S. banks with efficient corporate 
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governance are less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management practices than poorly 
governed banks. 
From another perspective of financial reporting quality, Leventis et al. (2013) examined the 
association between corporate governance effectiveness and accounting conservatism. To 
measure the effectiveness of corporate governance, they used the Corporate Governance 
Quotient, an index determined by the RiskMetrics Group Inc. Their findings provided 
evidence that banks with effective governance structures are more likely to engage in 
conservative financial reporting practices. 
In a recent study, García-Sánchez et al. (2017) investigated the effect of gender diversity on 
boards of directors and financial expertise within audit committees on accounting quality, 
measured by conservatism and earnings persistence. Using a cross-country sample of 159 
banks, they provided evidence of the positive effect of females and financial experts on the 
quality of earnings in banks. Furthermore, Delis et al. (2018) examined the role of regulatory 
intervention in enhancing bank accounting quality. They assessed accounting quality using six 
different measures: earnings smoothing, big-bath accounting, timely recognition of loan 
losses, earnings persistence, cash flow predictability, and the relationship between loan loss 
provisions and future loan charge-offs. Using a sample of U.S. banks with enforcement action 
issued to them, they provided evidence of the positive impact of regulatory interventions in 
enhancing banks’ accounting quality.  
This review of literature shows that a number of studies have been conducted to assess the 
quality of financial reporting in banks, and they have investigated different factors 
determining it. Table 3.5 presents a summary of the key prior studies that have been reviewed 






Table 3.5 Summary of Key Studies Examining Factors Determining Financial Reporting Quality in Banks (grouped based on independent 
variables) 








Sample Main Findings 
Shen and Chih 
(2005) 
To examine earnings 
management behaviour 
in banks and to 
investigate factors 
explaining cross-county 
variations in earnings 
management. 
Distributions of annual 
earnings scaled by 
common equity. 
Investor protection factors 
including director rights 
and legal enforcement, 
accounting disclosure 
index, and insider trading 
index. 
A sample of 70,955 
bank-observations for 
the period 1993-1999 
across 48 countries. 
More than two-thirds of 
the banks sampled have 
managed their earnings. 
They also find that 
banks’ earnings 
management practices 
are negatively associated 
with investor protection 
and accounting 
disclosure requirements. 
Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2014a) 
To study the association 
between cross-country 
legal, extra-legal, and 
political institutions and 
earnings quality. 
Earnings persistence 
and predictability of 
cash flows, loan loss 
provisions and future 
loan charge-offs, 
income before taxes, 
abnormal loan loss 
provisions. 




banks and tax compliance), 
political variables (state 
ownership and cost of 
starting a business). 
An international sample 
of banks from 35 
countries. 
They provide evidence 
for a significant 
association between 
country-wide legal, 
extra-legal, and political 
institutions and all 











Sample Main Findings 
Delis et al. (2018) To investigate the role 
of enforcement actions 





timely recognition of 
future loan losses, loss 
avoidance using 
discretionary loan loss 
provisions, cash flow 
predictability and 
earnings persistence, 
and the association 
between loan loss 





change in cash flows, loan 
charge-offs, earnings 
before taxes, assets 
growth, loan loss 
allowances, loan loss 
provisions, nonperforming 
loans, bank size, and total 
loans. 
A sample of U.S. banks 
with enforcement 
actions enacted on them 
over the period 1997-
2013. 
They find that risk-
related and accounting-
related enforcement 
actions result in 
improved accounting 
quality. 
Elnahass et al. 
(2018) 
To examine the impact 
of different institutional 
characteristics on 
capital and earnings 
management behaviour.  
Loan loss provisions. Tier 1 capital, earnings 
before taxes and loan loss 
provisions, change in 
nonperforming loans, 
change in total loans, 
listing status, and leverage 
ratio. 
A sample of Islamic 
banks and conventional 
banks from Bahrain, 
Jordan, and Qatar. 
They find evidence of 
capital and earnings 
management practices in 
conventional banks. 
However, such evidence 














Sample Main Findings 
Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2010) 
To investigate the 
relation between auditor 
reputation and earnings 
management. 
Income before taxes 
scaled by total assets. 
Auditor type (whether a 
Big 5 auditor), auditor 
industry specialization, 
total assets, growth in total 
assets, total loan, leverage, 
allowance for loan losses, 
law enforcement index, 
official supervisory power 
index, and private 
monitoring index. 
International sample of 
banks from 29 countries 
for the period 1993-
2006. 
They find that auditor 
type and auditor 
expertise moderate 
earnings management 
behaviour in banks. 
Gras-Gil et al. 
(2012) 
To examine the 
association between 
internal audit function 
and financial reporting 
quality. 
Financial reporting 
quality measured by 
two types of 
deficiencies: qualified 
audit report and 
presence of additional 
report to the annual 
accounts. 
Frequency of meetings and 
collaboration between 
external and internal 
auditors and internal 
auditors’ specialization. 
A sample of 72 Spanish 
banks. 
They find that greater 
collaboration between 
internal and external 
auditors and greater 
involvement of internal 
audit in reviewing 















Sample Main Findings 
Quttainah et al. 
(2013) 
To examine whether 








Income before taxes 
scaled by total assets 
and abnormal loan loss 
provisions. 
Bank type, SSB size, and 
SSB interlock. 
A sample of 82 Islamic 
banks and 82 
conventional banks 
from 15 countries for 
the period 1993-2008. 
They find that Islamic 
banks are less likely to 
manage their earnings. 
They also find evidence 
of negative association 























Sample Main Findings 
Cornett et al. (2009) To examine earnings 
management practices 






measured as the 
difference between 
discretionary realised 
security gains and 
losses and loan loss 
provisions. 
Board of director 
independence, capital 
adequacy, CEO duality, 
board of director stock 
ownership, number of 
board meetings per year, 
market-to-book ratio of 
equity, and asset size. 
A sample of bank 
holding companies 
head-quartered in the 
U.S. during the period 
1994-2002. 
Evidence of earnings 
smoothing is found. 
They also find that 
performance, board 
independence, and 
capital are negatively 





To investigate the role 
of corporate governance 
in earnings 
management behaviour. 
Net income deflated by 
lagged total assets, the 
difference between 
discretionary realised 
security gains and 
losses and discretionary 
loan loss provisions, 
and discretionary 
accruals. 
Earnings before taxes, 
corporate governance 
quotient, total assets, ratio 
of market-to-book value of 
equity, leverage, audit 
quality, and regulatory 
capital. 
A sample of 315 U.S. 
conventional banks for 
the period 2003-2008. 
They provide evidence 
that efficient corporate 
governance mechanisms 















Sample Main Findings 
Leventis et al. 
(2013) 








composite index (corporate 
governance quotient) and 
corporate governance 
quotient sub-indices (board 




A sample of U.S. 
conventional banks 
during the period 2003-
2009. 
They find that banks 
with effective 
governance structures 
engage in higher levels 
of conservative 
accounting. 
Abdelsalam et al. 
(2016) 
To examine the role 





measured by: small 
positive increases in 
income, difference 
between realised 
security gains & loan 
loss provisions, and 
discretionary 
accruals. 
CEO duality, board 
independence, state 
ownership, foreign 
ownership, bank type, 
bank size, leverage, 
capital adequacy ratio, 
market-to-book ratio, 
audit quality, cash flow 
from operating 
activities, and level of 
corruption. 
A sample of 24 
Islamic banks and 76 
conventional banks 
from 12 MENA 
countries during the 
period 2008-2013. 
They provide evidence 
that Islamic banks are 




and they adopt more 
conservative 
accounting policies. 











Sample Main Findings 
García-Sánchez et 
al. (2017) 
To examine the impact 
of gender diversity and 







measured by earnings 
persistence. 
Gender diversity on board, 




investor protection, and 
total assets. 
A sample of 159 banks 
from 9 countries over 
the period 2004-2010. 
They provide evidence 
for the positive role of 
females and financial 
experts on earnings 

























Sample Main Findings 
Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2015) 
To investigate whether 




Income before taxes 
scaled by total assets 
and discretionary loan 
loss provisions. 
Religiosity measure, total 
assets, growth in total 
assets, leverage, allowance 
for loan losses, total loans, 
net loan charge-offs, and 
nonperforming loans. 
An international sample 
of banks from 29 
countries for the period 
1995-2006. 
They find that religiosity 








To study the relation 
between commitment to 
corporate social 
responsibility activities 
and earnings quality. 
Two measures of 
earnings quality: 
earnings persistence 
and ability of current 
earnings to predict 




social index, and ethical 
index), total assets, total 
deposits, loans growth 
rate, board independence, 
board diversity, and the 
level of investor 
protection. 
A sample of 159 banks 
from 9 countries over 
the period 2004-2010. 
They provide evidence 
for a positive association 
between earnings 
persistence and cash 
flow predictability and 
commitment to corporate 
social responsibility 
practices. They also find 
that this association is 
stronger in countries 




The studies reviewed above in Table 3.5 demonstrates the lack of empirical attempts that test 
for the effect of bank type on the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial reporting quality. Most of the banking studies that consider corporate governance 
variables do not investigate the joint impact of traditional and additional governance 
mechanisms, nor do they test for the effect of bank type on financial reporting quality. In 
order to fill this gap in the literature, this thesis comparatively examines the role of different 
governance mechanisms employed across conventional and Islamic banks in improving the 
quality of financial reporting. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the prior literature on the role of different corporate governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the quality of financial reporting. These corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committees) have been considered by the 
agency theory to represent one of the classical cures in controlling conflicts of interest 
between agents and principals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Brennan, 2006). Prior studies have 
extensively investigated the roles of boards of directors and audit committees in enhancing the 
quality of corporate financial reporting. However, the greater part of this literature has 
focused on non-financial institutions, excluding banks and other financial institutions from 
investigation. In addition, most of the studies examining the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms in financial reporting quality have assessed the quality of financial reporting 
from an opportunistic earnings management perspective. A relatively limited amount of 
literature has examined financial reporting quality from an information perspective. 
Moreover, previous studies examining financial reporting quality in banks did not explicitly 
examine the effect of different bank types, nor did they distinguish between the unique 
internal governance mechanisms employed across the different banking sectors. Therefore, 
this thesis aims to bridge this gap in the literature by comparatively examining the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms employed by Islamic versus conventional banks in 
enhancing financial reporting quality. The quality of banks’ financial reporting will be 
assessed from two perspectives: the opportunistic earnings management perspective and the 
information perspective. The examination will involve traditional governance mechanisms 
(i.e. board of directors and audit committees), as well as additional mechanisms unique to 




Chapter Four: Internal Governance Mechanisms and Earnings 
Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Systems 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Extensive research has focused on the quality of financial reporting and opportunistic 
earnings management practices as factors having broad implications for various stakeholders 
(Elias, 2002; Prior et al., 2008; Vladu et al., 2017). Earnings management is one of the most 
important ethically questionable practices, which could have substantial detrimental economic 
and societal consequences (Merchant and Rockness, 1994; Dechow et al., 1996; Leuz et al., 
2003). Corporate scandals during the twenty-first century (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) have 
affirmed the presence of opportunistic managerial behaviour and have raised serious concerns 
about the credibility of financial reporting (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; González and 
García-Meca, 2014).  
A large body of literature has established that effective corporate governance mechanisms 
have a role in controlling managerial opportunistic behaviour, and in turn can limit earnings 
management practices (Becker et al., 1998; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005; Chen 
and Zhang, 2014). However, most studies in this field have been focusing on non-financial 
firms. 
Given the eminent position of banking institutions in global economies, understanding the 
role of corporate governance in banks’ earnings management is vitally important. In addition, 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed that the corporate governance structures 
in banks are inadequate, and has called for reforms to strengthen corporate governance 
mechanisms and information quality in banks (Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012; Mollah and 
Zaman, 2015). Earnings management practices in banks have mainly been addressed within 
the context of conventional banks (Shrieves and Dahl, 2003; Shen and Chih, 2005; 
Anandarajan et al., 2007; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010; 2015), but much less is known about the 
role of internal governance mechanisms in mitigating opportunistic earnings management 
practices across different bank types. Therefore, an ideal setting for such an investigation is 
the unique systems of governance in Islamic versus conventional banks. Accordingly, this 
chapter empirically investigates whether internal corporate governance mechanisms curb 
opportunistic earnings management practices in conventional and Islamic banks. Thus, this 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the theoretical framework and the 
83 
 
hypotheses development. Section 4.3 discusses the research methodology. Section 4.4 
presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
A long-accepted argument is that managers are driven merely by self-interest and that agency 
conflicts are likely to arise from the separation of ownership and control of a corporation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In line with the agency theory, 
managerial self-interest and opportunistic behaviour can be limited by establishing formal 
mechanisms of corporate governance, that are considered to be classical approaches for 
controlling conflict of interests between agents and principals. 
Despite the predominance of the agency theory in the corporate governance field, it has been 
criticised for focusing primarily on managerial self-interest and ignoring important intrinsic 
rewards, such as ethical conduct and self-satisfaction (Cohen et al., 2007). Prior literature has 
documented the impact of social norms on managerial behaviour. According to the social 
norms theory, religiosity, which is an example of social norms, has a role in shaping 
individuals’ behaviours and decision making (Dyreng et al., 2012). Because deviation from 
socially acceptable norms leads to sanctions from social networks, religiosity is expected to 
promote anti-fraudulent and anti-manipulative ethos and to encourage ethical conduct 
(McGuire et al., 2012; Callen and Fang, 2015). Accordingly, corporate managers’ behaviours 
are shaped by their informal beliefs and values, in addition to formal governance structures 
and mechanisms. 
Having reviewed the theoretical framework above, the following section discusses the 
development of the research hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. 
 
4.2.1 Board of Directors and Opportunistic Earnings Management 
As has been mentioned in Chapter 3, the board of directors is widely recognised as one of the 
most important internal governance mechanisms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Accordingly, 
several studies have examined the role of board of directors in controlling opportunistic 
managerial behaviour and hence, curtailing opportunistic earnings management practices. It 
has been established that the effectiveness of the board of directors in controlling 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour depends on its characteristics. In this research, 




The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 on the association between board of directors size and 
earnings management practices provides mixed evidence. On one side, some studies provide 
evidence supporting the agency theory as they find that the size of the board is positively 
related to the level of opportunistic earnings management (Kao and Chin, 2004; Ching et al., 
2006; Hashim and Devi, 2008; Hoitash et al., 2009; Gulzar and Wang, 2011). On the other 
side, some studies provide evidence consistent with the resource dependence theory as they 
find that board of directors size is negatively related to opportunistic earnings management 
(Xie et al., 2003; Bradbury et al., 2006; Kang and Kim, 2012; Obigbemi et al., 2016). 
Within the context of Islamic banks, the role of the board of directors in controlling agency 
problems should be similar to that in conventional banks (Safieddine, 2009). However, it is 
expected that for Islamic banks, operating on a complex and constrained banking model, the 
role of the board of directors in controlling agency problems to be more visible compared 
with that in conventional banks. Moreover, with expectations that social norms in these 
religious organisations dominant, effective scrutiny by the board of directors plays an 
executive role and tends to enforce the authority of the Shari’ah supervisory board to perform 
either supervisory or advisory roles, or both. Hence, the size of the boards of directors in 
Islamic banks can substantially influence its monitoring and controlling capabilities over 
managerial opportunism.  
Given the mixed prior evidence on the association between board size and earnings 
management, a directional hypothesis is difficult to state. Accordingly, no prediction is 
provided on the direction of the association between board size and the measures of earnings 
management for both conventional and Islamic banks. Hence, the first hypothesis is stated in 
alternative form as follows: 
𝑯𝟏𝒂: A significant (positive/ negative) relationship exists between the board of directors’ size 
and the level of earnings management practices. 
It is expected that the above relationship to be more significant in Islamic banks relative to 
conventional banks. 
In addition to the board size, the board’s effectiveness is determined by its independence 
(John and Senbet, 1998). According to the agency theory, independent directors are more 
effective in monitoring and controlling managerial behaviour than executive directors. 
Consistent with this view, several studies have provided evidence for a negative association 
between board independence and earnings management practices (Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 
2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Chen and Zhang, 2014; González and García-Meca, 2014). 
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Accordingly, it is predicted that independent boards are more effective in monitoring and 
mitigating managerial opportunism. Similar to predictions made in the first hypothesis; the 
role of independent boards of directors in controlling managerial behaviour is expected to be 
more noticeable in Islamic banks than in conventional banks, under the assumed dominance 
of religious norms in Islamic banking. This leads to the next hypothesis, stated in alternative 
form as follows: 
𝑯𝟏𝒃: A negative relationship exists between the board of directors’ independence and the 
level of earnings management practices. 
In line with predictions, this relationship is expected to be more significant in Islamic banks 
relative to conventional banks. 
Finally, the CEO duality also determines the independence of the board of directors. Several 
studies have empirically documented that CEO duality hinders effective monitoring and could 
be associated with higher opportunistic behaviour by managers in nonfinancial firms (Klein, 
2002; Lo et al., 2010; Kamarudin et al., 2012), as well as financial institutions (Cornett et al., 
2009; Abdelsalam et al., 2016). 
In line with these studies, the following hypothesis is developed, stated in alternative form: 
𝑯𝟏𝒄: A positive relationship exists between the CEO duality and the level of earnings 
management practices. 
In line with the social norms theory, it is expected that the above relationship be more 
significant in Islamic banks relative to conventional banks. 
 
4.2.2 Audit Committee and Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Prior studies reviewed in Chapter 3 have argued that, relative to the board of directors, audit 
committee may play a more direct role in constraining opportunistic earnings management 
behaviour. Previous studies have considered the size and the independence of the audit 
committee in relation to earnings management practices. As with the size of the board of 
directors, the literature on the association between the size of the audit committee and 
earnings management behaviour provide inconclusive evidence. Some studies document 
positive associations between audit committee size and earnings management practices 
(Alonso et al., 2000; Hoitash et al., 2009, Gulzar and Wang, 2011). However, in line with the 
resource dependence theory, other studies find negative associations between the size of the 
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audit committee and opportunistic earnings management behaviour (Yang and Krishnan, 
2005; Lin et al., 2006; Kent et al., 2010; García et al., 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2014). 
Given the inconclusive evidence provided by prior literature, no prediction is made on the 
direction of the association between audit committee size and earnings management practices. 
This leads to the development of the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
𝑯𝟐𝒂: A significant (positive/ negative) relationship exists between the audit committee size 
and the level of earnings management practices. 
In line with prior prediction on the role of board of directors in Islamic banks, it is expected 
that the association between audit committee size and earnings management to be stronger in 
Islamic banks than in conventional banks. 
The effectiveness of audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting process is also 
determined by its independence. Prior studies have argued that independent members in the 
audit committee are able to make independent judgements apart from the influence of the 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Consistent with this argument, several studies have 
documented negative association between audit committee independence and opportunistic 
earnings management practices (Benkel et al., 2006; Chang and Sun, 2009; Lin and Hwang 
2010; Chen and Zhang, 2014). 
Consistent with the findings of these studies, the next hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is 
developed as follows: 
𝑯𝟐𝒃: A negative relationship exists between the audit committee independence and the level 
of earnings management practices. 
 
4.2.3 Shari’ah Supervisory Board and Opportunistic Earnings Management 
This chapter also investigates whether the existence and the characteristics of the Shari’ah 
supervisory boards have a role in limiting earnings management practices in Islamic banks. 
The limited studies that have been reviewed in Chapter 3 on the role of Shari’ah supervisory 
boards reveal that most of them were carried out within the context of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, bank risk-taking, and performance. Investigation of the role of 
Shari’ah supervisory boards in financial reporting quality and in constraining opportunistic 
earnings management behaviour is still lacking. 
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It has been highlighted in Chapter 3 that through the extra layer of governance (i.e. Shari’ah 
supervisory boards), Islamic banks incorporate Islamic religious beliefs into their operations 
and decision making. As the primary role of the Shari’ah supervisory board is to reassure 
stakeholders that the activities of the Islamic bank are in compliance with the principles of 
Shari’ah, Shari’ah scholars act as investigators in conducting their independent audit. Shari’ah 
boards are responsible for issuing a separate report, as part of the Islamic banks’ annual 
reports, to certify that the banks’ operations are free from elements prohibited in Islam (Grais 
and Pellegrini, 2006). In carrying out this responsibility, Shari’ah board members may have to 
review additional information and reports, such as financial reports (Abdul Rahman and 
Bukair, 2013), where they get exposed to irregular financial reporting practices and 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour.  
Studies examining the role of Shari’ah boards have focused on their characteristics. In 
particular, they considered the size of the Shari’ah board, its financial qualification, and the 
multiple memberships held by its members. 
For the Shari’ah supervisory board size, although there is no explicit requirement, the 
standards issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) recommend that at least three members serve on the Shari’ah 
supervisory board (AAOIFI, 2010). Ginena and Hamid (2015) claimed that defining an 
optimal number of Shari’ah board members is impractical, because situations differ from one 
bank to another. Given the relative lack of empirical research on the characteristics of the 
Shari’ah boards, we base our prediction on the findings of Farook et al., (2011), Abdul 
Rahman and Bukair (2013), and Quttainah et al. (2013). These studies argue that a large 
Shari’ah board enables members to share their experience and benefit from the diverse 
knowledge. As the Shari’ah supervisory board become larger, it will be able to allocate its 
duties and functions (i.e. the workload) across more scholars, whether relating to advisory or 
review role. This will result in enhanced capacity to monitor the Islamic banks’ compliance 
with the Shari’ah rules and principles. In line with the findings of these studies, and supported 
by the resource dependence theory, a larger Shari’ah supervisory board is expected to provide 
more effective monitoring and hence, limits opportunistic earnings management in Islamic 
banks.  
The arguments and findings of the above studies lead to the development of the following 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
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𝑯𝟑𝒂: A negative relationship exists between the Shari’ah supervisory board size and the level 
of earnings management practices in Islamic banks. 
In addition to the size, the effectiveness of the Shari’ah supervisory board is likely to be 
determined by the scholars’ financial qualification. It has been highlighted in Chapter 3 that 
graduating Shari’ah scholars who lack financial qualification may not be sufficiently 
competent to carry out Shari’ah board duties, especially with the complex nature of banking 
activities in Islamic banks. Hence, Shari’ah supervisory board members should possess a 
certain level of capabilities and competencies. In accordance with the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), a Shari’ah scholar is expected to hold an academic degree in Shari’ah, 
in addition to comprehensive knowledge in accounting, banking and Islamic finance. Despite 
the importance of financial qualifications for Shari’ah scholars, most regulatory authorities 
have been vague on the required qualifications for Shari’ah supervisory board members. The 
financial qualification of a Shari’ah scholar (college/university undergraduate or postgraduate 
degree in finance, accounting, or Islamic finance, or professional qualifications, for example 
CPA, ACCA, CFA, or CIA) is expected to enable him/her to understand complex financial 
reporting practices, monitor the financial reporting process, and detect opportunistic 
managerial acts. Hence, the next hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows: 
𝑯𝟑𝒃: A negative relationship exists between the Shari’ah supervisory board financial 
qualification and the level of earnings management practices in Islamic banks. 
Finally, the competence of the Shari’ah board in carrying out its duties is also influenced by 
the multiple memberships held by its members. It has been discussed in Chapter 3 that the 
scarcity of experts in Islamic finance and the reputation resource of existing Shari’ah scholars 
led to the busyness of the Shari’ah supervisory board in Islamic banks, where Shari’ah 
scholars hold a multiple of memberships in different banks at the same time. Multiple 
memberships held by Shari’ah board members may enrich their knowledge and expertise, as 
they are exposed to more diverse experiences (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Additionally, 
multiple memberships are proxy for the scholars’ reputation in the external labour market 
(Shivdasani 1993; Vafeas, 1999). Accordingly, the diverse knowledge and expertise of 
reputable Shari’ah scholars are predicted to enhance their ability to monitor and control 
managerial behaviour. However, performing the consultative and supervisory functions of the 
Shari’ah board requires significant efforts and time from the members. Thus, holding multiple 
memberships at the same time may distract the Shari’ah board members from their 
supervisory responsibilities and will negatively affect their ability to monitor and control 
managerial performance. Given the possible validity of both arguments, it is difficult to 
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develop a directional hypothesis. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in alternative 
form: 
𝑯𝟑𝒄: A significant (positive/ negative) relationship exists between the Shari’ah supervisory 
board members’ multiple memberships and the level of earnings management practices 
in Islamic banks. 
 
4.3 Research Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
The multi-country sample covers the period from 2007 to 2015. The relevance of this sample 
period is that the Basel II Capital Adequacy framework (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006) became mandatory for Islamic banks in 2007 (see IFSB 2005; Ariss and 
Sarieddine, 2007). This period also allows an examination of whether bank managers 
opportunistically deviate from accounting standards and regulations during the 2007-2008 
financial crisis (see Hoffmann et al., 2013). 
An initial list of all conventional and Islamic banks was retrieved from the BankScope 
database. Initially, there were 486 conventional banks and 145 Islamic banks from 23 
countries. The distribution of the initial sample across countries and across the two bank types 














Table 4.1 Distribution of Initial Sample by Country and Bank Type 
Country Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Algeria 17 0 
Bahrain 12 19 
Bangladesh 40 8 
Egypt 23 3 
Indonesia 101 10 
Iraq 13 7 
Islamic Republic of Iran 1 17 
Jordan 11 3 
Kuwait 6 11 
Lebanon 49 3 
Libya 10 0 
Malaysia 37 18 
Morocco 16 0 
Oman 6 2 
Pakistan 22 9 
Palestine 3 2 
Qatar 7 6 
Saudi Arabia 10 5 
Syrian Arab Republic 13 2 
Tunisia 17 0 
Turkey 46 6 
United Arab Emirates 21 10 
Yemen 5 4 
Total 486 145 
Notes: This table presents the distribution of the initial sample across countries and across 
the two bank types (retrieved from BankScope). 
 
Following Beck et al. (2013) and Mollah et al. (2017), three sample criteria were applied: (1) 
countries having both types of banks (conventional and Islamic); (2) the availability of 
corporate governance data for both types of banks; and (3) the availability of at least three 
consecutive years of bank data. 
Moreover, the sample excludes conventional banks with Islamic windows. These refer to 
traditional conventional banks that provide products that are compliant with Shari’ah (Beck et 
al., 2013). The conventional banks with Islamic windows are excluded as they do not provide 
separate financial data that allow for the distinguishing between these windows and the full 
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conventional banks (Čihák and Hesse, 2010). In addition, the supervisory issues and capital 
adequacy requirements for those windows are different from Islamic banks (IFSB, 2005). 
Application of the above sampling criteria results in a final sample of 729 bank-year 
observations (100 banks) including 469 bank-year observations of conventional banks (61 
banks) and 260 bank-year observations of Islamic banks (39 banks), across 16 countries
7
.  
Financial data are collected from BankScope, DataStream, and Bloomberg, while country-
specific macroeconomic and governance data are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Data on corporate and Shari’ah governance are hand-collected from 
banks’ annual reports.  




















                                                          
7
 The final sample countries include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates. 
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Final Sample by Country and Bank Type 







Full Sample Observations 
Bahrain 5 39 2 18 7 56 
Bangladesh 6 22 6 34 12 61 
Egypt 1 6 1 9 2 15 
Indonesia 1 6 8 55 9 61 
Jordan 2 14 9 76 11 90 
Kuwait 5 35 4 33 9 67 
Lebanon 0 0 4 32 4 29 
Malaysia 1 9 2 18 3 27 
Oman 2 6 3 18 5 24 
Pakistan 2 18 2 17 4 35 
Palestine 2 14 2 16 4 30 
Qatar 3 22 5 42 8 64 
Saudi Arabia 4 28 1 9 5 37 
Tunisia 0 0 3 18 3 18 
Turkey 2 17 7 61 9 78 
United Arab Emirates 3 18 2 13 5 31 
Banks 39  61  100  
Observations  260  469  729 






4.3.2 Earnings Management Models 
To examine earnings management practices in banks, three different models are employed to 
measure earnings management in the two banking sectors. The first model is based on 
managers’ motivation to maintain a pattern of increasing earnings and avoid reporting losses. 
This motivation stems from “the psychological important distinction between positive 
numbers and negative numbers (or zero)” (Degeorge et al., 1999, p. 2). The importance of 
reporting positive earnings is documented in several studies. For example, DeAngelo et al. 
(1996) demonstrated that firms that break a pattern of earnings increases suffer negative stock 
returns.  
Several lines of evidence suggest that corporate managers endeavour to report small positive 
earnings and avoid negative earnings. Hence, the frequency of small positive net income has 
been used as a measure of earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et 
al., 1999). 
Lezu et al. (2003) examine systematic differences in earnings management behaviour across 
31 countries. They use the frequency of small positive earnings as a measure for earnings 
management, and they find that economies with large stock markets and strong investor 
protection exhibit lower levels of earnings management. 
Furthermore, Barth et al. (2008) investigate whether the application of International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) positively affects accounting quality. They use the frequency of 
small positive earnings as a measure for earnings management, and they find that firms 
applying IAS from 21 countries generally evidence less earnings management. 
Recent empirical banking studies also use the frequency of small positive earnings as an 
earnings management measure. Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) investigated the role of 
corporate governance in earnings management behaviour by US conventional banks. They 
provide evidence that banks with efficient corporate governance mechanisms report small 
positive income less frequently than banks with weak governance mechanisms. 
In a more recent study that investigates the impact of organisational religiosity on the earnings 
quality, Abdelsalam et al. (2016) find that Islamic banks are less likely to report small 
positive incomes than conventional banks. Their results suggest that religious norms have a 
significant impact on financial reporting quality. 
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Leuz et al. (2003), and Barth et al. (2008), the 
frequency of small positive net income is used as a proxy for earnings management. The 
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notion is that managers avoid reporting losses by reporting small positive net income. 
Accordingly, an indicator variable for loss avoidance (LOSS_AVOID) is introduced, that 
takes 1 if net income scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01 for each given year, 
and 0 otherwise (Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012; Abdelsalam et al., 2016). The first model 
of earnings management utilises LOSS_AVOID as a dependent variable in a logit regression 
specified as: 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎2𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                  (1) 
Where 
IG = a vector of internal governance variables 
IB = an indicator variable taking 1 if the bank is Islamic, and 0 otherwise 
Control = a vector of control variables 
𝜀 = error term 
A significant and negative coefficient on IG indicates that banks with effective internal 
governance report small positive income to avoid losses less frequently and hence are less 
likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management. 
The second model to measure earnings management practices in both bank types is based on 
the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals to manage banks’ earnings. Since 
business transactions and events are recorded based on the accrual accounting system, the 
discrepancy between the timing of cash flow and the timing of the recognition of the 
transaction gives rise to accruals (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Accruals refer to all accounting 
entries needed to adjust cash inflow and outflow to calculate a measure of financial 
performance for a specific period of time (Goncharov, 2005). Despite the superiority of the 
accrual accounting system over cash accounting, accrual accounting presents some problems. 
It requires management to make judgements, which gives management discretionary power 
that can be used opportunistically to alter reported earnings (Dechow, 1994). Accruals are 
divided into two elements: non-discretionary accruals (unmanaged) that arise from the normal 
application of accounting rules, and discretionary accruals (managed) that arise from 
aggressive or conservative accounting choices (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Previous banking studies provide evidence of bank managers using loan loss provisions to 
manage reported earnings (Scheiner, 1981; Ma, 1988; Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988). 
According to Beaver and Engel (1996), loan loss provisions reflect the amount of adjustment 
needed to bring the balance of loan loss allowance to an adequate level to cover expected 
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future loan losses. The use of discretionary loan loss provisions as a tool for earnings 
management has been well documented in the U.S. banking industry (Wahlen, 1994; Liu et 
al., 1997; Kim and Kross, 1998). For example, Kanagaretnam et al. (2003) suggest that 
managers’ use of loan loss provisions to manage reported earnings is motivated by 
opportunistic reasons (i.e. to reduce job security concerns) as well as efficiency reasons (i.e. 
to reduce the cost of borrowing). Similar conclusions are drawn from studies using Japanese 
banks (Shrieves and Dahl, 2003), Spanish banks (Anandarajan et al., 2003), and Australian 
banks (Anandarajan et al., 2007). Moreover, global banking studies have documented the use 
of loan loss provisions to manage earnings in several countries (Leventis et al., 2011). Prior 
studies in earnings management within the Islamic banking context provide inconclusive 
evidence for the use of loan loss provisions in earnings management by Islamic banks (Ismail 
and Be Lay, 2002; Zoubi and Al-Khazali, 2007; Taktak et al., 2010; Abdelsalam et al., 2016; 
Elnahass et al., 2018).  
In addition to the use of loan loss provisions to manage earnings, the prior literature shows 
that banks’ earnings can also be managed through realised securities gains and losses. Since 
Since security gains and losses are not realised until the securities are sold, it is unlikely that 
auditors and regulators will raise issue with such decisions. Thus, realised security gains and 
losses represent a relatively unaudited and unregulated managerial action (Beatty and Harris, 
1998). Consequently, the use of realised security gains and losses to manage earnings has 
been documented by several studies (Beatty et al., 1995, 2002; Shrieves and Dahl, 2003). 
For a sample of bank holding companies headquartered in the United States, Cornett et al. 
(2009) examined whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management. 
Their results provide evidence of earnings smoothing. Specifically, they find that banks with 
higher income and capital record fewer security gains and more loan losses and vice versa for 
banks with lower income and capital. They also find that independent boards of directors curb 
income-increasing earnings management. Similarly, Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) 
investigated the role of corporate governance in earnings management for a sample of U.S. 
conventional banks during the era of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2003-2008). They found that 
well-governed banks were less likely to engage in aggressive earnings management practices 
through the use of discretionary loan loss provisions and realised security gains and losses. 
Additionally, Abdelsalam et al. (2016) conducted a comparison study between Islamic banks 
and conventional banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. They provided 
evidence for the impact of religious norms on financial reporting quality. In particular, they 
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found that Islamic banks were less prone to earnings management through discretionary loan 
loss provisions and discretionary security gains and losses. 
In a recent attempt, Barth et al. (2017) investigated whether and how banks used realised 
security gains and losses to manage regulatory capital and earnings. For a sample of publicly 
listed and non-listed U.S. conventional banks over the period from 1996 to 2011, they provide 
evidence of the use of realised security gains and losses to smooth earnings and to increase 
regulatory capital. 
Both loan loss provisions and realised securities gains and losses are the combination of a 
non-discretionary component and a discretionary component (Cornett et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, an additional measure of earnings management is defined, that is based on 
estimating the discretionary part of loan loss provisions through the following fixed-effect 
model, which is specified as: 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑡 +  𝑏1𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝑏3𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝑏4𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝑏5𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+  𝑏6𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                    (𝑎) 
Where 
LOSS = loan loss provisions as a ratio of total loans 
LnTA = natural logarithm of total assets 
NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans 
LLR = ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans 
LOANR = ratio of real estate loans to total loans 
LOANC = ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans 
LOANI = ratio of consumer and instalment loans to total loans 
𝜀 = error term 
The discretionary part of loan loss provisions (DLLP) is the error term from this regression. 
We standardise the error term by total assets, and define the measure of discretionary loan 
loss provisions as: 
𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = (𝜀𝑖𝑡  ×  𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡)/ 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡                                                                                           (𝑏) 
Where 
LOANS = total loans 
ASSETS = total assets 
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To estimate the discretionary part of realised securities gains and losses, the following fixed-
effect model is estimated (Cornett et al., 2009; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012): 
𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑡 +  𝑏1𝐿𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝑏2𝑈𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                             (𝑐) 
Where 
RSGL = realised securities gains and losses as a ratio of total assets 
LnTA = natural logarithm of total assets 
URSGL = unrealised securities gains and losses 
𝜀 = error term 
The error term from the regression above is the discretionary component of realised securities 
gains and losses (DRSGL). The estimated measure of earnings management is defined as the 
difference between the discretionary component of realised securities gains and losses and the 
discretionary component of loan loss provisions, which is specified as: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝐷𝑅𝑆𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 −  𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                (𝑑) 
This leads to the second model for earnings management estimated using random-effect 
estimation
8
 and specified as follows: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎2𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (2) 
It is predicted that higher levels of earnings management correspond to understating loan loss 
provisions and overstating realised securities gains and losses. Accordingly, a significant and 
negative coefficient on IG is expected, suggesting that banks with effective internal 
governance are less likely to manage their earnings through loan loss provisions and/or 
realised securities gains and losses. 
The second model explained above considered the disaggregated approach to measuring 
earnings management through discretionary accruals. This approach focuses on an individual 
accounting accrual that involves considerable managerial judgement (Goncharov, 2005). 
Focusing on a single item results in accurate estimations. However, it provides “one-choice-
at-a-time analysis” (Francis, 2001, p. 314). Thus, another stream of research examines the 
quality of accruals using the aggregated approach, which accounts for multiple accrual 
accounting choices. 
                                                          
8
 The use of random-effect estimation is justified by the fact that corporate governance variables (board of 
directors and audit committee characteristics) do not vary much over time. Hence, using fixed-effect estimation 
would result in substantial loss of the degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
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Hence, the third model for measuring earnings management is based on the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals (DACC), a measure that is widely used as a proxy for earnings 
management (Becker et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 2004; Lai et al., 2018). It aggregates the net 
effect of all accounting choices into a single measure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The 
magnitude of accruals is viewed as an inverse measure of financial reporting quality (Sloan, 
1996), in that accruals consist of non-discretionary components and discretionary portions, 
which can be manipulated by corporate managers. 
Although the magnitude of discretionary accruals has long been examined in prior studies, the 
empirical literature in the banking industry is not very extensive. In one of the earliest 
attempts, Yasuda et al. (2004) examined the association between discretionary accruals and 
the level of bank risk in a sample number of Japanese banks. Their results provide evidence of 
the “naive investor hypothesis”. In particular, they find that discretionary accruals are 
negatively associated with the level of bank risk, indicating that investors misinterpret high 
earnings inflated by discretionary accruals as being favourable information about banks’ 
financial position, and undervalue bank risk. 
The magnitude of discretionary accruals was also used by Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012) 
as a measure of earnings management. They investigated the role of corporate governance in 
earnings management and found that well-governed banks are less likely to use discretionary 
accruals to manage reported earnings. Abdelsalam et al. (2016) reach the same conclusion for 
Islamic banks. Specifically, their results demonstrate that Islamic banks are less likely to 
manage earnings through discretionary accruals relative to conventional banks. 
The third model for measuring earnings management in this study is based on the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals (DACC). This measure of discretionary accruals is estimated from a 
variation of the Jones (1991) model, developed by Yasuda et al. (2004). This model adjusts 
for firm-specific factors in banking institutions. To obtain the discretionary component of 
total accruals, the following regression model is estimated, following Yasuda et al. (2004): 









ACCR = total accruals calculated as the difference between net income and 
operating cash flows 
TA = total assets 
∆OI = the change in operating income between t − 1 to t 
PPE = the bank’s property, plant, and equipment 
𝜀 = error term 
To reduce heteroscedasticity, all variables are deflated, including the intercept in the above 
model, by lagged total assets (Jones, 1991). The residuals from equation (e) are defined as the 
discretionary accruals (DACC), which is introduced as the dependent variable in the 
following regression model estimated using random-effect: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                (3) 
Discretionary accruals are viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality (i.e. higher 
discretionary accruals reduce earnings quality). Accordingly, a significant and negative 
coefficient on IG is predicted, indicating that banks with effective internal governance report 
lower discretionary accruals and hence have higher financial reporting quality. 
 
4.3.3 Internal Governance Measures 
Prior studies are followed to measure traditional internal governance mechanisms (i.e. the 
board of directors and audit committee) represented by their size and independence (e.g. 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; González and García-Meca, 2014; Katmon and Al 
Farooque, 2017) within the two banking sectors. The board size (BODSIZE) is measured as 
the total absolute number of board members, the board independence (BODINDEP) is 
measured as the ratio of independent members over the total number of board members, and 
the CEO duality is measured by an indicator variable (CEODUAL) that takes 1 if the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
For the audit committee, the size of the audit committee (ACSIZE) is measured as the total 
absolute number of audit committee members, and the audit committee independence 
(ACINDEP) is measured as the ratio of independent audit committee members over the total 
number of members serving in the committee (Habbash et al., 2013; He and Yang, 2014).  
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For the influence of the additional governance mechanisms (i.e. the Shari’ah supervisory 
board) on Islamic banks’ earnings management practices, three characteristics of the Shari’ah 
supervisory board are examined in this chapter: size, financial qualification, and multiple 
memberships. First, the size of the Shari’ah supervisory board (SSBSIZE) is measured as the 
total absolute number of Shari’ah supervisory board members (Farook et al., 2011; Mollah 
and Zaman, 2015; Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017). Second, in line with Farook et al. (2011), 
the effect of the financial qualification of Shari’ah supervisory board members (SSBQUAL) 
is tested. This variable is measured as the ratio of Shari’ah supervisory board members with 
financial/accounting qualification (college/university undergraduate or postgraduate degree in 
finance, accounting, or Islamic finance, or professional qualifications, for example CPA, 
ACCA, CFA, or CIA) over the total number of Shari’ah supervisory board members. Finally, 
Shari’ah supervisory board multiple memberships (SSBMM) is measured as the ratio of 
Shari’ah supervisory board members with multiple memberships over the total number of 
Shari’ah supervisory board members. Following Core et al. (1999), Perry and Peyer (2005), 
and Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), a member with multiple memberships is defined as a 
member serving on at least three boards of different Islamic banks at the same time.  
 
4.3.4 Control Variables  
The empirical models additionally control for bank-specific and country-level factors that 
may explain variations in the earnings management models. First, banks’ earnings 
performance is controlled for through earnings before taxes (EBT). This variable measures a 
bank’s capacity to use its assets to generate earnings before its contractual obligations 
(Leventis et al., 2011). If income smoothing is an important determinant, positive relations 
between earnings before taxes and the three earnings management measures will be observed 
(Anandarajan et al., 2007). In addition, the empirical models control for the leverage (LEV), 
measured as the ratio of total debt to equity (Chang and Sun, 2009). Managers of highly 
leveraged firms tend to manage reported earnings to avoid debt covenant violation. Therefore, 
a positive coefficient on the leverage variable (LEV) is expected. Furthermore, following 
Mollah et al. (2017), the level of capital adequacy is considered, and the capital position of the 
bank is measured as Tier 1 capital (TIER1). According to Moyer (1990), bank managers have 
incentives to manage reported earnings to prop up capital levels as they decline relative to 
regulatory requirements. On the other hand, it has been argued by Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) 
that well-capitalised banks are subject to less regulatory supervision, and hence, have more 
opportunities to manage earnings. Thus, no prediction is made on the direction of the 
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coefficient on Tier 1. Moreover, the empirical models control for the bank age (AGE), 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years the bank has operated in the 
country. Additionally, the bank size (BANK SIZE) is controlled for, where it is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the year-end total assets. Consistent with Cornett et al. (2009), a 
negative coefficient is expected on the BANK SIZE variable. Furthermore, the empirical 
models control for the financial performance using net cash flows (CFO) from operating 
activities deflated by average total assets. In line with prior studies, firms with strong financial 
performance are less motivated to manage reported earnings, and hence a negative coefficient 
is expected (Dechow et al., 1995; Becker et al., 1998). In addition, the models control for the 
banks’ investment and growth opportunities that might affect the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals (Lai, 2009). Growth opportunities (GRW) are measured as the ratio of market-to-
book value of equity (Cornett et al., 2009) and a negative coefficient on GRW is predicted. To 
control for the external audit quality, an indicator variable (BIG4) is introduced, which takes 1 
if the bank’s auditor is a Big Four, and 0 otherwise. Earnings management is likely to be 
tempered in companies audited by a highly reputable audit firm (Becker et al., 1998; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). Therefore, a negative coefficient on the BIG4 variable is 
predicted. Moreover, the empirical models address the role of ownership structure in banks 
earnings management by controlling for government ownership (GOV_OWN), measured as 
the proportion of shares held by the government. Prior literature has demonstrated that 
government ownership is associated with poor corporate governance and opportunistic 
behaviours including fraud and corruption (Megginson et al., 1994; Shleifer, 1998). 
Accordingly, a positive coefficient on the GOV_OWN variable is expected. Moreover, 
because the sample period encounters the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the empirical models 
control for the effect of this exogenous shock by including an indicator variable (CRISIS), 
which takes 1 for the years 2007 and 2008, and 0 otherwise. Extant literature provides mixed 
evidence for the impact of economic crises on earnings management practices in banking. 
Prior literature documents that periods of economic stress are associated with higher levels of 
earnings management, either to avoid significant stock price declines (Charitou et al., 2007) 
or to avoid debt covenant violations (Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). Therefore, a positive 
coefficient on the CRISIS variable is expected. Regarding the country-level factors, it is 
controlled for the GDP annual growth rate to adjust for the impact of macroeconomic cycle 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2015). To capture between-country differences in governance 
perceptions, a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) is introduced, following Čihák 
and Hesse (2010). This variable is measured as the average of six governance measures – 
control for corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the 
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rule of law, and voice and accountability. Finally, following Elnahass et al. (2018), an 
indicator variable (AAOIFI) is introduced to control for financial reporting regulatory 
differences across Islamic banks which apply either Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions standards or International Financial Reporting Standards. 
This variable takes 1 if an Islamic bank is located in Bahrain, Jordan, or Qatar and applies 
AAOIFI standards, and 0 for an Islamic bank located in another country and applies IFRS. 






























Table 4.3 List of Variables, their Definitions, and Measures 
Variables Definitions and Measures 
LOSS_AVOID An indicator variable for loss avoidance that takes 1 if net income 
scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.01 for each given 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
EM Earnings management measure, estimated as the difference between 
discretionary realised securities gains and losses and discretionary 
loan loss provisions. 
DACC Discretionary accruals estimated as the residuals from the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model as modified by Yasuda et al. (2004). 
BODSIZE The board of directors size, measured as the total absolute number of 
board members. 
BODINDEP The board of directors independence, measured as the ratio of 
independent members over the total number of board members. 
CEODUAL An indicator variable for CEO duality that takes 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
ACSIZE The audit committee size, measured as the total absolute number of 
audit committee members. 
ACINDEP The audit committee independence, measured as the ratio of 
independent audit committee members over the total number of 
members serving in the committee. 
EBT Earnings before taxes deflated by lagged total assets. 
LEV Leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to equity. 
TIER1 Capital adequacy, measured as Tier 1 capital. 
AGE Bank age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years 
the bank has operated in the country. 
BANK SIZE Bank size, measured as the natural logarithm of the year-end total 
assets. 
CFO Financial performance, measured as net cash flows (CFO) from 
operating activities deflated by average total assets. 
GRW Growth opportunities, measured as the ratio of market-to-book value 
of equity. 
BIG4 An indicator variable for audit quality that takes 1 if the bank’s 
auditor is a Big Four, and 0 otherwise. 
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Variables Definitions and Measures 
GOV_OWN Government ownership, measured as the proportion of shares held 
by the government. 
CRISIS An indicator variable for the financial crisis that takes 1 for the years 
2007 and 2008, and 0 otherwise. 
GDP The country-prevailing GDP annual growth rate. 
COUNTRY_GOV A country governance index, measured as the average of six 
governance measures – control for corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule of law, 
and voice and accountability. 
AAOIFI An indicator variable that take 1 if the Islamic bank applies AAOIFI 
standards, and 0 if the Islamic bank applies IFRS. 
SSBSIZE The Shari’ah supervisory board size, measured as the total absolute 
number of Shari’ah supervisory board members. 
SSBQUAL The Shari’ah supervisory board financial qualification, measured as 
the ratio of Shari’ah supervisory board members with 
financial/accounting qualification over the total number of Shari’ah 
supervisory board members. 
SSBMM The Shari’ah supervisory board multiple memberships, measured as 
the ratio of Shari’ah supervisory board members with multiple 


















4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample (Panel A), the conventional 
banks sub-sample (Panel B), and the Islamic banks sub-sample (Panel C). It also presents the 
mean differences t-test, comparing means for conventional banks and Islamic banks sub-
samples. 
For the dependent variables, it is found that for conventional banks (Islamic banks) the mean 
LOSS_AVOID is 0.318 (0.285), EM is 0.002 (0.001), and DACC is -0.038 (-0.120), 
respectively. These results are comparable to those of Abdelsalam et al. (2016) who report 
similar LOSS_AVOID of 0.356 (0.264), EM of 0.002 (0.001), and DACC of -0.041 (-0.039) 
for conventional banks and (Islamic banks), respectively. These results indicate that Islamic 
banks have lower mean values across the three measures of earnings management relative to 
conventional banks. Reported t-tests show a significant difference in the third measure (i.e. 
DACC), implying that Islamic banks are less likely to manage their earnings through 
discretionary accruals relative to conventional banks.  
Regarding the internal governance variables, it is found that for conventional banks (Islamic 
banks), the mean board of directors’ size (BODSIZE) is 9.663 (10.015), board’s independence 
(BODINDEP) is 0.368 (0.371), CEO duality is 0.038 (0.050), audit committee size (ACSIZE) 
is 3.660 (3.550), and audit committee independence (ACINDEP) is 0.542 (0.532), 
respectively. 
For bank-specific variables, conventional banks have a significantly higher average for EBT 
of 0.020 than Islamic banks (i.e. 0.014). Results also show that Islamic banks are less 
leveraged, have higher capital adequacy, younger in age, smaller in size, and they hold lower 
cash flows which might be attributable to the restrictions on their liquidity management, as 
compared with conventional banks. Finally, the descriptive statistics show that 83%-88% of 
banks in the sample are audited by a Big Four audit firm. This high percentage might be 
explained by the sophisticated nature of the banking activities, which requires complex 
processes of risk assessment and monitoring by international audit firms. 
For the Shari’ah governance indicators within Islamic banks, results show that the mean of 
Shari’ah supervisory board size (SSBSIZE) is 4.442. This finding is comparable to that of 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) who report a similar mean size of 4.171. The mean of Shari’ah 
supervisory board financial qualification (SSBQUAL) is 29%, indicating the relatively low 
percentage of financially qualified Shari’ah scholars dominating the sample. This result is 
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consistent with the theoretical argument of Khalaf (2007) and Mollah and Zaman (2015), 
identifying the scarcity of financially experienced Shari’ah scholars worldwide. Finally, the 
Shari’ah supervisory board multiple membership’s rate is relatively high (63%) which can be 
































Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics 
 PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE PANEL B: CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
SUB-SAMPLE 




Variables Obs. Mean Std. Median Obs. Mean Std. Median Obs. Mean Std. Median T-test 
LOSS_AVOID 729 0.306 0.461 0 469 0.318 0.466 0 260 0.285 0.452 0 -0.928 
EM 560 0.002 0.009 0.003 403 0.002 0.011 0.004 157 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.911 
DACC 728 -0.067 0.135 -0.044 469 -0.038 0.089 -0.028 259 -0.120 0.180 -0.106 -8.223*** 
BODSIZE 729 9.789 2.792 10 469 9.663 2.662 10 260 10.015 3.004 9 1.634 
BODINDEP 664 0.369 0.234 0.333 424 0.368 0.229 0.333 240 0.371 0.244 0.333 0.126 
CEODUAL 729 0.043 0.202 0 469 0.038 0.192 0 260 0.050 0.218 0 0.744 
ACSIZE 658 3.623 0.956 3 438 3.660 0.964 3 220 3.550 0.937 3 -1.391 
ACINDEP 610 0.539 0.330 0.600 421 0.542 0.329 0.500 189 0.532 0.333 0.667 -0.374 
EBT 728 0.018 0.021 0.019 469 0.020 0.014 0.020 259 0.014 0.030 0.015 -3.574*** 
LEV 729 7.784 3.860 7.725 469 8.364 2.780 8.093 260 6.736 5.117 6.050 -5.567*** 
TIER1 700 16.830 8.808 14.095 446 15.286 6.500 13.670 254 19.541 11.333 15.270 6.315*** 
AGE 729 3.322 0.804 3.526 469 3.592 0.668 3.761 260 2.835 0.800 2.944 -13.639*** 
BANK SIZE 729 15.672 1.542 15.732 469 15.947 1.519 16.047 260 15.178 1.461 15.328 -6.635*** 
CFO 729 0.015 0.072 0.019 469 0.019 0.054 0.019 260 0.009 0.096 0.019 -1.815* 
GRW 714 1.605 1.601 1.280 461 1.679 1.867 1.310 253 1.469 0.929 1.220 -1.672* 
BIG4 729 0.866 0.341 1 469 0.883 0.322 1 260 0.835 0.372 1 -1.826* 
GOV_OWN 729 0.076 0.132 0.008 469 0.083 0.144 0.008 260 0.063 0.104 0 -1.952* 
CRISIS 729 0.130 0.337 0 469 0.143 0.350 0 260 0.108 0.311 0  
GDP 729 4.814 3.942 4.790 469 4.962 3.954 4.876 260 4.547 3.913 4.410  
COUNTRY_GOV 726 -0.165 0.478 -0.089 469 -0.169 0.462 -0.093 257 -0.157 0.506 -0.078  
AAOIFI         260 0.288 0.454 0  
SSBSIZE         260 4.442 1.753 4  
SSBQUAL         260 0.289 0.253 0.250  
SSBMM         260 0.631 0.315 0.667  
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical models. The sample period is 2007 to 2015. Panel A presents the results 
for the full sample including conventional and Islamic banks with 729 bank-year observations. Panel B presents the results for conventional banks sub-sample 
comprising 469 bank-year observations. Panel C presents the results for Islamic banks sub-sample comprising 260 bank-year observations. The last column also 
reports the mean differences and two-sample t-test (comparison of means for conventional banks and Islamic banks sub-samples). 
A list of the variables, their definitions, and measures is presented in Table 5.1. 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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Table 4.5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample. The traditional 
internal mechanisms (i.e. BODSIZE, BODINDEP, ACSIZE, and ACINDEP) show significant 
and negative correlations with the two earnings management models, LOSS_AVOID and 
EM. The Shari’ah governance indicators (SSBSIZE and SSBQUAL) report significant and 
negative correlations with the first and second earnings management models (LOSS_AVOID 
and EM). These results provide some preliminary insights into the role of effective 
governance in mitigating managerial opportunistic behaviour. All other correlations are in line 
with expectations, and the matrix of the correlation coefficients affirms that multicollinearity 
does not appear to be a serious statistical problem, except for the independence of the board of 
directors and audit committee (BODINDEP and ACINDEP), which have a significant 
positive correlation (72%). Therefore, to mitigate the problem of collinearity between the 
BODINDEP and ACINDEP, the individual effect of board and audit committee 
characteristics on earnings management are examined separately (i.e. across separate 
regression estimations). 
In addition to the Pearson correlation coefficient analysis, the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
are calculated. Results of VIF tests are presented in Table 4.6. The results indicate that no 
predictor variable produces a VIF greater than 10. These results confirm that multicollinearity 



















Table 4.5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Years 2007-2015 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. LOSS_AVOID 1            
2. EM 0.24 1           
3. DACC 0.11 0.12 1          
4. BODSIZE -0.16 -0.27 -0.06 1         
5. BODINDEP -0.27 -0.12 -0.10 -0.26 1        
6. CEODUAL 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 1       
7. ACSIZE -0.29 -0.21 -0.04 0.24 0.22 -0.01 1      
8. ACINDEP -0.33 -0.16 -0.16 -0.05 0.72 0.03 0.19 1     
9. EBT -0.04 0.12 0.06 0.10 -0.18 0.06 0.09 -0.13 1    
10. LEV 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.17 -0.11 -0.08 0.11 0.08 0.03 1   
11. TIER1 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.09 0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.12 -0.61 1  
12. AGE -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.13 -0.12 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.22 -0.41 1 
13. BANK SIZE -0.17 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.16 -0.13 0.09 0.29 0.24 0.19 -0.39 0.48 
14. CFO 0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.08 0.20 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 
15. GRW 0.04 0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.03 -0.03 
16. BIG4 -0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.12 0.14 0.02 -0.08 0.16 0.02 -0.24 0.05 0.25 
17. GOV_OWN -0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.06 
18. CRISIS 0.15 0.11 0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 -0.09 -0.14 0.20 0.01 0.06 -0.02 
19. GDP -0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.21 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 
20. COUNTRY_GOV -0.10 0.13 0.04 -0.23 0.18 -0.02 -0.07 0.13 0.03 -0.32 0.01 0.10 
21. AAOIFI -0.01 0.11 0.10 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 -0.26 -0.04 0.05 -0.49 0.21 0.01 
22. SSBSIZE -0.34 -0.33 -0.11 0.61 -0.02 -0.12 0.40 0.14 0.05 0.31 -0.33 0.14 
23. SSBQUAL -0.10 -0.17 -0.05 -0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.06 
24. SSBMM 0.03 0.17 -0.02 -0.32 0.25 -0.24 -0.37 0.08 -0.13 -0.19 0.18 0.05 
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the earnings management variables (LOSS_AVOID, EM, and DACC), internal governance 
variables (BODSIZE, BODINDEP, CEODUAL, ACSIZE, ACINDEP, SSBSIZE, SSBQUAL, and SSBMM), bank-specific variables (EBT, LEV, TIER1, AGE, BANK 
SIZE, CFO, GRW, BIG4, GOV_OWN, CRISIS), and country-specific variables (GDP and COUNTRY_GOV) included in the models. The correlations are reported 
for the full sample including conventional and Islamic banks with 729 bank-year observations.  






Table 4.5 (continued): Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Years 2007-2015 
Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
13. BANK SIZE 1            
14. CFO 0.03 1           
15. GRW 0.07 0.09 1          
16. BIG4 0.40 -0.15 -0.06 1         
17. GOV_OWN 0.29 -0.02 0.14 0.22 1        
18. CRISIS 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.08 1       
19. GDP 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.19 1      
20. COUNTRY_GOV 0.39 -0.05 0.01 0.47 0.30 0.09 0.12 1     
21. AAOIFI -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.43 1    
22. SSBSIZE 0.22 0.04 0.08 -0.40 -0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.20 -0.25 1   
23. SSBQUAL -0.18 -0.01 -0.38 0.08 -0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.03 1  
24. SSBMM 0.19 -0.14 0.12 0.41 0.37 -0.10 -0.18 0.44 0.38 -0.40 0.02 1 
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the earnings management variables (LOSS_AVOID, EM, and DACC), internal governance 
variables (BODSIZE, BODINDEP, CEODUAL, ACSIZE, ACINDEP, SSBSIZE, SSBQUAL, and SSBMM), bank-specific variables (EBT, LEV, TIER1, AGE, BANK 
SIZE, CFO, GRW, BIG4, GOV_OWN, CRISIS), and country-specific variables (GDP and COUNTRY_GOV) included in the models. The correlations are reported 
for the full sample including conventional and Islamic banks with 729 bank-year observations.  












Table 4.6: VIF Test Results 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
BANK SIZE 4.69 0.213 
COUNTRY_GOV 4.54 0.220 
LEV 3.99 0.251 
BODSIZE 3.46 0.289 
AAOIFI 3.27 0.306 
BODINDEP 3.03 0.330 
ACINDEP 2.98 0.335 
SSBSIZE 2.91 0.344 
GOV_OWN 2.90 0.344 
SSBMM 2.83 0.354 
BIG4 2.82 0.355 
TIER1 2.77 0.361 
SSBQUAL 1.87 0.535 
ACSIZE 1.80 0.556 
EBT 1.78 0.561 
GRW 1.71 0.584 
CFO 1.68 0.595 
CEODUAL 1.58 0.631 
AGE 1.56 0.642 
CRISIS 1.38 0.724 
GDP 1.20 0.833 
Mean VIF 2.61  
Notes: This table presents the results of the variance inflation factors (VIF) tests. 
 
4.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Table 4.7 reports the results from examining the effect of traditional internal governance 
mechanisms in mitigating opportunistic earnings management practices for the full sample, 
using the three measures of earnings management (LOSS_AVOID, EM, and DACC). The 
three models are estimated separately for the board and audit committee characteristics. 
Columns 1-3 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 4-6 present the results 
for the audit committee. Results show that the coefficient on board of directors’ size 
(BODSIZE) is consistently significant and negative across all three earnings management 
models (i.e. LOSS_AVOID, EM, and DACC). These results suggest that, banks with larger 
boards tend to avoid reporting losses less frequently compared with banks that have smaller 
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boards. Moreover, these banks are, on average, less likely to manage their earnings through 
either loan loss provisions or realised securities gains and losses. Banks with large boards also 
appear not to use discretionary accruals to manage their earnings. These findings suggest that 
a large board enhances bank’s financial reporting quality, which benefits from the members’ 
knowledge and expertise in mitigating accounting opportunism (Dalton et al., 1999; Xie et al., 
2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005).  
Results for the boards’ independence (BODINDEP) variable also show statistically significant 
and negative associations across the three earnings management models, suggesting lower 
earnings management practices for banks employing independent board of directors. These 
findings support the arguments by the agency theory that independent directors enhance 
monitoring and can restrain opportunistic behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Klein, 2002). 
For audit committee characteristics, it was found that the coefficient on the audit committee 
size (ACSIZE) is significantly and negatively associated with the three earnings management 
measures. These findings suggest that large audit committees are associated with lower levels 
of earnings management. Large audit committees appear to increase the effectiveness of the 
committee by including members with varied expertise and consequently promote higher 
financial reporting quality for their banks (Bédard et al, 2004; Lin et al., 2006). For the audit 
committee independence (ACINDEP), results show that greater audit committee 
independence is associated with lower levels of earnings management, with significant and 
negative coefficients across the three measures of earnings management. These results are in 
line with prior studies suggesting that independent audit committees can effectively lessen 
opportunistic earnings management activities through effective monitoring (Klein, 2002; 
Vafeas, 2005; Benkel et al., 2006; Chang and Sun, 2009; Chen and Zhang, 2014). 
Regarding the control variables, results show that the coefficient on the leverage variable 
(LEV) is positive and statistically significant under both the LOSS_AVOID and EM models 
(in columns 1-2 and 4-5). This outcome is consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis which 
suggests that managers in highly leveraged firms tend to manage reported earnings to reduce 
the probability of covenant violation in debt contracts. Results also show that the coefficient 
on the capital adequacy level (TIER1) is positive and significant under the LOSS_AVOID 
and EM models. This finding support the argument that well-capitalised banks are subject to 
less scrutiny by regulators, which allows for more opportunities to manage earnings 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). Moreover, the banks’ age (AGE) is found to be significantly 
negative with the third earnings management measure (DACC), in column 3. Additionally, 
results show that the financial crisis (CRISIS) is positively and significantly related to the first 
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measure of earnings management (LOSS_AVOID). This finding is in line with the argument 
that periods of economic stress are associated with higher levels of earnings management 
(Charitou et al., 2007; Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009). For the macroeconomic effect of GDP, 
results show a positive and significant association under the DACC model (in column 6). 
Finally, the coefficient on the Islamic bank indicator variable (IB) is negative and significant 
in the DACC model only (in columns 3 and 6), indicating that Islamic banks report 
significantly lower discretionary accruals relative to their conventional counterparts. This 





























Table 4.7: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Full Sample  
Estimated Equations: 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡/ 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡/ 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎2𝐼𝐵𝑖 +  𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          



















Constant 12.3362** 0.0066 0.1005 9.2767** 0.0021 0.0167 
 (2.53) (0.81) (1.51) (2.14) (0.24) (0.24) 
BODSIZE -0.6593*** -0.0014*** -0.0063***    
 (-4.75) (-8.21) (-4.59)    
BODINDEP -4.9270*** -0.0103*** -0.1124***    
 (-6.60) (-5.90) (-7.93)    
CEODUAL -0.5844 -0.0016 -0.0270    
 (-0.79) (-0.97) (-1.06)    
ACSIZE    -1.6156*** -0.0021*** -0.0076** 
    (-5.24) (-4.81) (-2.30) 
ACINDEP    -4.5135*** -0.0039*** -0.0940*** 
    (-5.90) (-2.90) (-9.85) 
EBT 2.4137 0.0388 -0.1944 4.2345 0.0372 -0.1595 
 (0.29) (1.48) (-1.35) (0.48) (1.28) (-1.11) 
LEV 0.3063*** 0.0005*** 0.0005 0.3455*** 0.0005*** 0.0005 
 (3.47) (3.04) (0.04) (3.91) (2.89) (0.35) 
TIER1 0.0721** 0.0001* 0.0003 0.0711** 0.0001* 0.0001 
 (2.15) (1.79) (0.49) (2.13) (1.76) (0.27) 
AGE -0.4195 -0.0007 -0.0162** -0.2300 -0.0015 -0.0129 
 (-0.81) (-0.71) (-2.02) (-0.49) (-1.38) (-1.54) 
BANK SIZE -0.4822 0.0004 0.0010 -0.3797 0.0003 0.0039 
 (-1.55) (0.76) (0.23) (-1.39) (0.56) (0.85) 
CFO 0.9278 0.0004 0.0175 2.7605 0.0060 0.0074 
 (0.37) (0.06) (0.50) (1.01) (0.97) (0.18) 
GRW 0.3232 0.0002 -0.0038 -0.0798 0.0002 -0.0051* 
 (1.62) (0.60) (-1.39) (-0.46) (0.55) (-1.85) 
BIG4 0.3514 0.0023 0.0118 -0.0715 0.0026 0.0113 
 (0.50) (1.56) (1.05) (-0.10) (1.62) (0.97) 
GOV_OWN -2.2201 -0.0004 -0.0283 -2.4844 0.0004 -0.0213 
 (-0.76) (-0.08) (-0.67) (-0.88) (0.07) (-0.44) 
CRISIS 1.0423** -0.0001 0.0033 0.9872** -0.0004 -0.0061 
 (2.19) (-0.12) (0.45) (1.98) (-0.36) (-0.80) 
GDP -0.0227 0.0001 0.0008 0.0309 0.0001 0.0015** 
 (-0.52) (1.25) (1.25) (0.68) (1.60) (2.32) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.2241 0.0011 0.0070 0.8858 0.0021 0.0148 
 (0.27) (0.76) (0.58) (1.17) (1.31) (1.15) 
IB -0.0947 0.0005 -0.0768*** -0.7424 -0.0018 -0.0792*** 
 (-0.12) (0.01) (-6.51) (-1.05) (-1.14) (-6.21) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  18.24% 23.51%  12.76% 24.42% 
Wald Chi2 61.01*** 155.63*** 155.98*** 66.32*** 79.98*** 178.49*** 
Hausman Test 15.78 14.68 16.52 13.26 13.34 15.37 
Observations 631 511 631 580 477 580 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for three models (i.e. logistic regression for LOSS_AVOID, and 
random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional internal governance mechanisms in 
opportunistic earnings management for the full sample. Columns 1-3 report the results for board characteristics, 
while columns 4-6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
IB is indicator variable that takes 1 if the bank is Islamic, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 4.3. 
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The analysis is further extended to identify the effect of bank type on the association between 
internal governance mechanisms and opportunistic earnings management. Table 4.8 reports 
the results for conventional banks, using the three measures of earnings management (i.e. 
LOSS_AVOID, EM, and DACC) and estimating separate regressions for board characteristics 
(in columns 1-3) and audit committee characteristics (in columns 4-6). Results for the 
influence of board of directors show that conventional banks with either large or independent 
boards are less likely to manage their earnings, with the two variables (BODSIZE and 
BODINDEP) showing significant negative coefficients under all of the earnings management 
measures. For the effect of audit committees on earnings management, it was found that both 
ACSIZE and ACINDEP are negatively associated with the three measures of earnings 
management. These findings suggest that large and more independent audit committees can 
significantly mitigate opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
For control variables, results show (in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5) that leverage is positively and 
significantly associated with the two measures of earnings management (LOSS_AVOID and 
EM). Additionally, capital adequacy (TIER1) is positive and significant under the second 
earnings management model (EM), in columns 2 and 5. These results are consistent with the 
results in Table 4.7. The bank’s size (BANK SIZE) has a marginally significant negative 
association with LOSS_AVOID (in column 4), suggesting that larger banks are less likely to 
manage their earnings relative to smaller banks (Cornett et al., 2009; Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, 2012). A significant and negative association is also found between growth 
opportunities (GRW) and DACC (in column 6). This result verifies earlier expectations and 
supports results of Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2012). Finally, GDP shows positive and 
significant association under the DACC model (in columns 3 and 6). 
Overall findings highlight the substantial importance of traditional internal governance 
mechanisms in restraining managerial opportunism in conventional banks. These findings are 










Table 4.8: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Conventional Banks Sub-Sample 
Estimated Equations: 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡/ 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡/ 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          



















Constant 10.0002* 0.0097 0.1999*** 9.1019* 0.0026 0.1018* 
 (1.77) (0.82) (3.53) (1.67) (0.22) (1.71) 
BODSIZE -0.5479*** -0.0017*** -0.0086***    
 (-3.84) (-6.97) (-6.22)    
BODINDEP -5.4698*** -0.0116*** -0.0948***    
 (-5.89) (-4.68) (-6.12)    
CEODUAL 0.7889 0.0007 -0.0228    
 (0.63) (0.20) (-1.17)    
ACSIZE    -1.7587*** -0.0025*** -0.0099*** 
    (-4.10) (-4.46) (-2.76) 
ACINDEP    -4.5446*** -0.0043** -0.0788*** 
    (-4.91) (-2.52) (-7.41) 
EBT 4.2400 0.0489 -0.3289 5.7115 0.0509 -0.4399 
 (0.79) (1.31) (-1.34) (0.86) (1.29) (-1.60) 
LEV 0.5201*** 0.0007** -0.0018 0.6321*** 0.0009*** -0.0001 
 (3.50) (2.38) (-1.07) (4.12) (3.12) (-0.02) 
TIER1 0.0289 0.0003** -0.0014 0.0792 0.0003** -0.0007 
 (0.46) (2.12) (-1.60) (1.27) (2.51) (-0.88) 
AGE 0.0220 0.0003 0.0023 0.2477 -0.0006 -0.0012 
 (0.03) (0.18) (0.29) (0.35) (-0.34) (-0.14) 
BANK SIZE -0.5559 -0.0001 -0.0061 -0.6579* -0.0002 -0.0027 
 (-1.42) (-0.15) (-1.58) (-1.78) (-0.30) (-0.68) 
CFO 6.4629 -0.0017 -0.0191 5.8280 0.0005 -0.0114 
 (1.57) (-0.23) (-0.37) (1.54) (0.06) (-0.22) 
GRW 0.1594 0.0002 -0.0044 -0.1061 0.0001 -0.0062** 
 (0.76) (0.39) (-1.62) (-0.53) (0.17) (-2.22) 
BIG4 0.2642 0.0027 0.0077 0.3864 0.0033 0.0057 
 (0.26) (1.11) (0.58) (0.38) (1.34) (0.42) 
GOV_OWN -2.3559 0.0037 0.0409 -2.9001 0.0016 0.0281 
 (-0.71) (0.50) (1.36) (-0.95) (0.23) (0.87) 
CRISIS 0.9371 -0.0012 0.0117 0.4610 -0.0017 -0.0007 
 (1.59) (-0.99) (1.39) (0.79) (-1.32) (-0.09) 
GDP 0.0233 0.0002 0.0018** 0.0731 0.0002* 0.0020** 
 (0.39) (1.56) (2.17) (1.24) (1.87) (2.48) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.3006 0.0008 -0.0011 0.6697 0.0020 0.0073 
 (0.30) (0.36) (-0.11) (0.72) (0.96) (0.68) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  17.21% 18.64%  13.03% 15.70% 
Wald Chi2 49.48*** 117.67*** 100.94*** 50.55*** 72.40*** 103.51*** 
Observations 403 366 403 400 365 400 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for three models (i.e. logistic regression for LOSS_AVOID, and 
random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional internal governance mechanisms in 
opportunistic earnings management for the conventional banks sub-sample. Columns 1-3 report the results for 
board characteristics, while columns 4-6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 




To examine whether possible differential earnings management behaviours between the two 
bank types can be explained by the distinct governance mechanisms (i.e. both traditional and 
additional governance) employed in each sector, the three earnings management models are 
estimated within the Islamic banks sub-sample.  
Results are reported in Table 4.9, with the joint estimates of the board of directors and 
Shari’ah supervisory board characteristics on earnings management are presented in columns 
(1-3). Columns (4-6) present the results of the joint impacts of the audit committee and 
Shari’ah supervisory board characteristics. Results show that the coefficient on BODSIZE is 
significant and negatively associated with LOSS_AVOID and EM measures, while 
BODINDEP is significantly negative under the three earnings management models. These 
results highlight the important role that a large and independent board of directors plays in 
controlling managerial opportunism within Islamic banks. These findings are consistent with 
the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and 
support the notion that large boards in Islamic banks can promote valuable connections and a 
broad spectrum of expertise, which tends to help the board to detect possible discretionary 
managerial behaviour. Moreover, results show that Islamic banks with large audit committees 
are associated with significantly lower earnings management practices under the 
LOSS_AVOID model. For the ACINDEP variable, the findings provide strong evidence of 
significant and negative effect of having an independent audit committee in reducing 
managerial opportunism, particularly across the LOSS_AVOID and DACC models. These 
findings are similar to those for conventional banks, and suggest that having a large and 
independent audit committee improves internal monitoring and promotes varied expertise of 
committee members, leading to higher financial reporting quality (Lin and Hwang, 2010; 
García et al., 2012).  
For control variables, results show that the leverage (LEV) is positively associated with the 
LOSS_AVOID measure (in columns 1 and 4) and with the EM measure (in columns 2 and 5), 
confirming that highly leveraged Islamic banks tend to manage their earnings more than lower 
leveraged banks. In addition, large Islamic banks are more likely to manage their earnings via 
loan loss provisions and realised securities gains and losses (in columns 2 and 5). Results also 
show that the bank’s financial performance, measured as cash flows from operating activities 
(CFO), is significant and positively associated with EM (in columns 2 and 5). This finding 
contradicts the initial prediction for the effect of financial performance on earnings 
management. A plausible explanation for this outcome might be the existence of restrictions 
on liquidity management in the Islamic banks. Results also show significant negative 
118 
 
association between growth opportunities (GRW) and the second earnings management 
measure (EM), in column 2. Finally, consistent with the results of the full sample (in Table 
4.7), the financial crisis (CRISIS) is found to have significant and positive associations with 
the LOSS_AVOID and EM measures (in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5).  
Taken together, findings in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 indicate that no systematic differences exist 
among the traditional governance mechanisms within the two bank types. These findings 
imply that neither the dominance of religious norms in Islamic banks nor the presence of 
institutional differences among Islamic banks and conventional banks promotes variations in 
the main findings of both bank types. Moreover, Islamic banks appear to benefit from the 
presence of the two internal governance mechanisms (i.e. board and audit committees) in 
mitigating their extended agency problems under their constrained banking models. These 
findings are inconsistent with expectations for the stronger impacts of board and audit 
committee on mitigating managerial opportunism in Islamic banks relative to conventional 
banks. However, the results support negative associations under the first and second 
hypotheses for both bank types. 
In Table 4.9, when examining the incremental influence of the Shari’ah supervisory board in 
lowering opportunistic earnings management within Islamic banks, it was found that the 
coefficient on the Shari’ah supervisory board size (SSBSIZE) is consistently significant and 
negative across all models. These findings indicate that the presence of a large Shari’ah 
supervisory board in fact mitigates managerial discretion in Islamic banks, and therefore 
reduces opportunistic earnings management practices. This result supports the argument that a 
large Shari’ah supervisory board enables Shari’ah scholars to share their experience and to 
benefit from the diverse knowledge of other scholars (Farook et al., 2011; Abdul Rahman and 
Bukair, 2013). Hence, this promotes effective monitoring over managers’ financial reporting 
practices. Results also show significant and negative coefficients on SSBQUAL under the 
three earnings management models (i.e. tested jointly with the board of directors) and also 
under LOSS_AVOID when controlling for the audit committee characteristics (in column 4). 
This finding suggests that a financially qualified Shari’ah supervisory board plays an essential 
role in deterring opportunistic earnings management behaviour within Islamic banks. 
Moreover, it was found that the Shari’ah supervisory board multiple memberships are 
negatively related only to the third measure of earnings management (i.e. DACC), after 
controlling for board of directors’ characteristics (in column 3). This provides evidence that 
Shari’ah scholars holding multiple memberships across several banks can promote extended 
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business networking and knowledge exchange, which can contribute to risk mitigation, 
including discretionary acts. 
Overall, findings indicate that, even with the presence of effective monitoring by boards of 
directors and audit committees, strong Shari’ah governance can still offer substantial 
restrictions on opportunistic behaviour in Islamic banks. These results imply that a large 
Shari’ah supervisory board with financially qualified and highly reputable Shari’ah scholars is 
likely to promote higher financial reporting quality for this banking sector. These results also 
imply that the impact of Islamic social norms on lowering managerial opportunism seems to 
be more visible through effective Shari’ah monitoring than other traditional governance 
mechanisms (i.e. boards of directors and audit committees). These findings support the third 
group of hypotheses (𝐻3𝑎, 𝐻3𝑏, 𝐻3𝑐), and confirm prior arguments in the literature (e.g. 
Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Elnahass et al., 2018) that higher financial reporting quality in 
Islamic banks is possibly attributable to the presence of a double layer of governance through 























Table 4.9: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Islamic Banks Sub-Sample 
Estimated Equations: 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡/ 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡/ 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          



















Constant 6.4513 -0.0029 -0.1187 3.9148 -0.0169** -0.1992 
 (1.47) (-0.40) (-0.80) (1.21) (-1.99) (-1.15) 
BODSIZE -1.3161** -0.0006*** 0.0002    
 (-2.16) (-2.87) (0.07)    
BODINDEP -6.4594*** -0.0056*** -0.0515**    
 (-2.78) (-4.05) (-2.00)    
CEODUAL -1.1383 -0.0022 -0.0178    
 (-1.34) (-1.39) (-1.02)    
ACSIZE    -3.1865*** -0.0003 0.0128 
    (-2.61) (-0.94) (1.58) 
ACINDEP    -5.9869*** 0.0002 -0.0663*** 
    (-2.94) (0.15) (-3.36) 
SSBSIZE -5.3198*** -0.0006** -0.0157*** -6.3236*** -0.0009*** -0.0143*** 
 (-7.43) (-2.10) (-2.71) (-8.80) (-3.78) (-2.60) 
SSBQUAL -7.3237** -0.0045*** -0.0820*** -8.0085* -0.0001 -0.0541 
 (-2.56) (-3.09) (-2.85) (-1.71) (-0.06) (-1.53) 
SSBMM 1.9244 0.0002 -0.0603** 1.6909 -0.0006 -0.0032 
 (0.53) (0.15) (-2.41) (0.36) (-0.42) (-0.11) 
EBT -6.7900 0.0049 0.0063 6.8922 0.0160 0.1006 
 (-0.38) (0.24) (0.04) (0.51) (0.70) (0.53) 
LEV 0.8179** 0.0004*** 0.0016 1.3531*** 0.0002** 0.0037 
 (2.23) (3.40) (0.74) (3.34) (2.14) (1.48) 
TIER1 0.2238* 0.0005 0.0012 0.1932 0.0004 0.0006 
 (1.78) (1.19) (1.55) (1.28) (0.87) (0.82) 
AGE -1.9082 -0.0013* -0.0093 -2.2274 0.0003 -0.0117 
 (-1.01) (-1.84) (-0.61) (-1.05) (0.34) (-0.67) 
BANK SIZE -0.6374 0.0010** 0.0094 -0.0466 0.0012** 0.0100 
 (-0.38) (2.33) (0.95) (-0.03) (2.17) (0.86) 
CFO -3.4754 0.0112** 0.0632 -1.7873 0.0300*** -0.0044 
 (-0.41) (2.18) (1.30) (-0.22) (4.68) (-0.06) 
GRW 0.8578 -0.0009** -0.0047 -0.6378 -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.95) (-2.10) (-0.69) (-0.55) (-0.28) (0.00) 
BIG4 2.9129 0.0020 0.0311 -4.3239 0.0005 0.0098 
 (1.30) (1.03) (0.76) (-1.08) (0.40) (0.46) 
GOV_OWN -6.9961 -0.0064 -0.1336 -4.9241 0.0230 -0.5094 
 (-1.04) (-1.48) (-1.12) (-0.30) (1.35) (-1.58) 
CRISIS 2.2042** 0.0026*** -0.0194 8.1261*** 0.0030** -0.0144 
 (2.21) (2.71) (-1.24) (3.62) (2.48) (-0.77) 
GDP -0.1462 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0698 0.0001 0.0004 
 (-0.91) (0.86) (-0.52) (-0.42) (1.64) (0.34) 
COUNTRY_GOV -5.4099 0.0021 0.0037 -3.4985 0.0004 0.0166 
 (-1.41) (1.58) (0.13) (-0.63) (0.26) (0.45) 
AAOIFI 1.6488 0.0013 0.0174 4.9320 -0.0018 0.0567 
 (0.37) (0.86) (0.53) (0.86) (-0.76) (1.43) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  25.55% 10.51%  28.69% 15.74% 
Wald Chi2 135.98*** 161.56*** 56.83*** 118.64*** 122.61*** 39.65*** 
Observations 228 145 228 180 112 180 
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Table 4.9 (continued): Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Islamic Banks Sub-Sample 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for three models (i.e. logistic regression for LOSS_AVOID, and 
random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional and additional internal governance 
mechanisms in opportunistic earnings management for the Islamic banks sub-sample. Columns 1-3 report the 
results for the joint effect of board characteristics and Shari’ah supervisory board, while columns 4-6 present the 
results for the joint effect of audit committee and Shari’ah supervisory board. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 






























4.4.3 Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
To assess the validity of the findings, additional tests were performed. First, the definitions of 
several internal governance variables are changed. The size of the board of directors 
(BODSIZE), the size of the audit committee (ACSIZE), and the size of the Shari’ah 
supervisory board (SSBSIZE) are all replaced with dummy variables, taking 1 if the 
board/committee is larger than the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. Instead of defining the 
Shari’ah supervisory board financial qualification (SSBQUAL) as a ratio variable, a dummy 
variable is introduced, that takes 1 if there is at least one Shari’ah scholar with financial 
qualification, and 0 otherwise. In addition, the Shari’ah supervisory board multiple 
memberships (SSBMM) is replaced with a dummy variable, that takes 1 if at least 50% of the 
Shari’ah scholars are holding multiple memberships, and 0 otherwise. The models are re-
estimated using the newly defined variables. The results are reported in Table 4.10 for the full 
sample, and in Table 4.11 for the Islamic banks sub-sample. The reported results show that 























Table 4.10: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Full Sample – First Sensitivity Test 



















Constant 6.3743* -0.0022 0.0654 4.4897 -0.0033 0.0018 
 (1.67) (-0.26) (0.99) (1.15) (-0.39) (0.03) 
Dummy BODSIZE -1.4645*** -0.0030*** -0.0188***    
 (-3.51) (-3.52) (-2.86)    
BODINDEP -7.1101*** -0.0101*** -0.1096***    
 (-6.10) (-5.49) (-7.60)    
CEODUAL -0.2669 -0.0009 -0.0239*    
 (-0.37) (-0.52) (-1.72)    
Dummy ACSIZE    -2.4351*** -0.0014* -0.0017 
    (-5.25) (-1.77) (-0.28) 
ACINDEP    -4.5026*** -0.0049*** -0.0981*** 
    (-5.81) (-3.57) (-10.26) 
EBT 0.9377 0.0407 -0.1979 3.0194 0.0461 -0.1357 
 (0.12) (1.48) (-1.35) (0.34) (1.56) (-0.94) 
LEV 0.2520*** 0.0005*** -0.0008 0.3164*** 0.0006*** 0.0007 
 (3.31) (3.10) (-0.01) (3.78) (2.98) (0.55) 
TIER1 0.0639** 0.0001* 0.0002 0.0670** 0.0001* 0.0002 
 (2.09) (1.89) (0.40) (2.07) (1.93) (0.33) 
AGE -0.3977 -0.0011 -0.0164** -0.1917 -0.0016 -0.0132 
 (-0.92) (-1.08) (-2.04) (-0.43) (-1.49) (-1.59) 
BANK SIZE -0.4415* 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.3564 0.0002 0.0031 
 (-1.74) (0.41) (-0.02) (-1.38) (0.42) (0.68) 
CFO 2.0275 0.0043 0.0292 2.7667 0.0061 0.0031 
 (0.89) (0.74) (0.82) (1.02) (0.96) (0.08) 
GRW 0.1532 0.0003 -0.0035 -0.0697 0.0003 -0.0046* 
 (0.96) (0.79) (-1.27) (-0.41) (0.70) (-1.66) 
BIG4 0.5404 0.0027* 0.0152 -0.0542 0.0027 0.0120 
 (0.87) (1.76) (1.35) (-0.08) (1.62) (1.03) 
GOV_OWN -1.7832 -0.0005 -0.0270 -2.4542 0.0006 -0.0201 
 (-0.75) (-0.10) (-0.64) (-0.92) (0.11) (-0.42) 
CRISIS 1.1355*** 0.0003 0.0047 1.0925** -0.0003 -0.0047 
 (2.58) (0.31) (0.63) (2.25) (-0.02) (-0.61) 
GDP -0.0146 0.0008 0.0008 0.0186 0.0001 0.0013** 
 (-0.36) (0.99) (1.22) (0.42) (1.14) (2.03) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.5863 0.0029* 0.0135 0.8301 0.0024 0.0172 
 (0.85) (1.91) (1.12) (1.15) (1.53) (1.35) 
IB -0.6656 -0.0012 -0.0837*** -0.7821 -0.0018 -0.0788*** 
 (-1.07) (-0.78) (-7.18) (-1.16) (-1.13) (-6.21) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  16.84% 23.23%  14.04% 23.99% 
Wald Chi2 65.56*** 90.45*** 140.76*** 67.48*** 57.72*** 171.61*** 
Observations 631 511 631 580 477 580 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the first sensitivity test for three models (i.e. logistic 
regression for LOSS_AVOID, and random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional internal 
governance mechanisms in opportunistic earnings management for the full sample. Columns 1-3 report the results 
for board characteristics, while columns 4-6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dummy BODSIZE/ACSIZE is an indicator variable that takes 1 if the board/committee is larger than the sample 
mean, and 0 otherwise.  




Table 4.11: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Islamic Banks Sub-Sample – First 
Sensitivity Test 



















Constant 8.4928 -0.0081 -0.1214 -0.9636 -0.0241*** -0.1733 
 (0.91) (-1.01) (-0.80) (-0.14) (-3.01) (-0.97) 
Dummy BODSIZE -2.7103** -0.0009 0.0148    
 (-2.20) (-1.30) (1.13)    
BODINDEP -6.7441*** -0.0057*** -0.0848***    
 (-2.83) (-3.99) (-3.25)    
CEODUAL 0.3781 -0.0001 -0.0015    
 (0.30) (-0.12) (-0.08)    
ACSIZE    -2.0187*** -0.0011 0.0170 
    (-2.60) (-1.45) (1.45) 
ACINDEP    -3.8512*** -0.0004 -0.0789*** 
    (-2.58) (-0.02) (-3.95) 
EBT -7.6571 0.0006 0.0184 -6.2750 0.0262 0.0994 
 (-0.67) (0.03) (0.10) (-1.16) (1.08) (0.51) 
LEV 0.2500 0.0003** -0.0005 0.1536 0.0001 0.0025 
 (1.59) (2.42) (-0.22) (1.57) (1.29) (0.99) 
TIER1 0.0994* 0.0003 0.0009 0.0681* 0.0002 0.0003 
 (1.78) (0.70) (1.15) (1.68) (0.51) (0.42) 
AGE -0.2499 -0.0012 -0.0184 0.1348 0.0003 -0.0177 
 (-0.31) (-1.62) (-1.19) (0.25) (0.53) (-1.02) 
BANK SIZE -0.5903 0.0008* 0.0070 -0.0095 0.0012** 0.0084 
 (-0.98) (1.78) (0.69) (-0.02) (2.52) (0.71) 
CFO -0.4935 0.0117** 0.0556 -1.1921 0.0305*** 0.0213 
 (-0.13) (2.35) (1.09) (-0.28) (4.53) (0.29) 
GRW 0.0904 -0.0006 -0.0034 -0.7871* -0.0004 -0.0008 
 (0.17) (-1.37) (-0.47) (-1.65) (-0.57) (-0.01) 
BIG4 1.7904 0.0035 0.0253 0.5978 0.0025 0.0104 
 (1.35) (0.56) (1.35) (0.62) (1.32) (0.49) 
GOV_OWN -5.5641 -0.0089* -0.1315 -4.6126 0.0081 -0.4939 
 (-0.89) (-1.87) (-1.10) (-0.56) (0.51) (-1.52) 
CRISIS 2.8155** 0.0039*** -0.0135 4.5293*** 0.0039*** -0.0131 
 (1.99) (3.73) (-0.80) (3.58) (3.24) (-0.67) 
GDP -0.0635 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0344 0.0001 0.0004 
 (-0.79) (0.28) (-0.89) (-0.45) (1.36) (0.31) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.5702 0.0030** 0.0095 -0.4654 0.0010 0.0222 
 (-0.36) (2.32) (0.34) (-0.41) (0.95) (0.60) 
AAOIFI 1.2165 0.0008 0.0107 -0.0240 -0.0016 0.0564 
 (0.73) (0.05) (0.33) (-0.02) (-0.80) (1.42) 
Dummy SSBSIZE -1.2209 -0.0017** -0.0136 0.5040 -0.0015* -0.0070 
 (-0.81) (-2.22) (-0.96) (0.59) (-1.67) (-0.41) 
Dummy SSBQUAL -4.5462*** -0.0029*** -0.0264** -2.0458** 0.0003 -0.0180 
 (-2.60) (-4.17) (-2.08) (-2.21) (0.27) (-1.14) 
Dummy SSBMM 0.6312 0.0019 -0.0117 1.9703 0.0021 0.0120 
 (0.64) (0.38) (-0.85) (1.00) (1.58) (0.86) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  60.77% 15.08%  61.69% 18.43% 
Wald Chi2 115.66*** 141.73*** 32.50** 52.32*** 149.74*** 31.07** 
Observations 228 145 228 180 112 180 
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Table 4.11 (continued): Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Islamic Banks Sub-Sample 
– First Sensitivity Test 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the first sensitivity test for three models (i.e. logistic 
regression for LOSS_AVOID, and random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional and 
additional internal governance mechanisms in opportunistic earnings management for the Islamic banks sub-sample. 
Columns 1-3 report the results for the joint effect of board characteristics and Shari’ah supervisory board, while 
columns 4-6 present the results for the joint effect of audit committee and Shari’ah supervisory board. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dummy BODSIZE/ACSIZE/SSBSIZE is an indicator variable that takes 1 if the board/committee is larger than the 
sample mean, and 0 otherwise. Dummy SSBQUAL is an indicator variable that takes 1 if there is at least one Shari’ah 
scholar with financial qualification, and 0 otherwise. Dummy SSBMM is an indicator variable that take 1 if at least 
50% of the Shari’ah scholars are holding multiple memberships, and 0 otherwise.  





























Second, additional tests examine whether the activity of the board of directors and audit 
committee influence the extent of earnings management practices. Prior studies suggest that 
active boards of directors and audit committees are better able to constrain opportunistic 
earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Ebrahim, 2007). Consequently, 
the main models are extended to control for the effect of the board of directors and audit 
committees’ activity, which is measured by the number of meetings held in a year. The results 
reported in Table 4.12 show that the frequency of meetings of board of directors and audit 






























Table 4.12: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Full Sample – Second Sensitivity Test  
 



















Constant 11.4882*** 0.0049 0.0799 11.6053** -0.0103 0.0374 
 (3.20) (0.42) (1.10) (2.39) (-0.76) (0.47) 
BODSIZE -0.6486*** -0.0018*** -0.0061***    
 (-4.26) (-8.98) (-4.01)    
BODINDEP -7.6287*** -0.0079*** -0.1026***    
 (-5.32) (-4.23) (-6.49)    
CEODUAL 0.9907 -0.0005 -0.0055    
 (0.84) (-0.19) (-0.25)    
BODMEET -0.0830 0.0001 0.0012    
 (-1.50) (1.38) (1.55)    
ACSIZE    -1.3491*** -0.0023*** -0.0070* 
    (-4.20) (-4.94) (-1.93) 
ACINDEP    -3.5966*** -0.0033** -0.0918*** 
    (-4.24) (-2.16) (-8.06) 
ACMEET    -0.0533 0.0007 0.0012 
    (-0.99) (0.69) (1.58) 
EBT 11.6321 0.0464* -0.2269 6.3192 0.0514 -0.0857 
 (1.03) (1.68) (-1.41) (0.64) (1.56) (-0.53) 
LEV 0.2714*** 0.0007*** 0.0008 0.3165*** 0.0009*** 0.0013 
 (2.98) (3.77) (0.56) (3.55) (3.90) (0.92) 
TIER1 0.0354 0.0001* 0.0007 0.0611 0.0003*** 0.0007 
 (0.97) (1.67) (1.11) (1.52) (2.59) (1.10) 
AGE 0.0693 -0.0007 -0.0193** 0.0577 -0.0015 -0.0150* 
 (0.13) (-0.47) (-2.18) (0.12) (-0.93) (-1.65) 
BANK SIZE -0.8992** 0.0004 0.0008 -0.6153** 0.0008 0.0004 
 (-2.55) (0.56) (0.16) (-2.00) (0.84) (0.08) 
CFO 2.6144 -0.0016 0.0471 1.6308 0.0052 0.0383 
 (0.98) (-0.32) (1.11) (0.55) (0.77) (0.80) 
GRW 0.2332 -0.0002 -0.0041 -0.1414 -0.0001 -0.0048 
 (1.13) (-0.45) (-1.39) (-0.80) (-0.26) (-1.57) 
BIG4 1.0343 0.0018 0.0146 -0.2430 0.0014 0.0241 
 (1.26) (1.07) (1.11) (-0.27) (0.63) (1.64) 
GOV_OWN -1.6585 0.0029 -0.0265 -2.1130 0.0047 -0.0328 
 (-0.57) (0.36) (-0.60) (-0.76) (0.49) (-0.65) 
CRISIS 1.5420*** 0.0003 0.0025 1.4036** -0.0005 -0.0089 
 (2.82) (0.03) (0.29) (2.49) (-0.44) (-1.03) 
GDP 0.0112 0.0006 0.0011 0.0260 0.0001 0.0017** 
 (0.21) (0.82) (1.42) (0.48) (1.19) (2.22) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.1303 -0.0005 0.0141 1.3156 0.0019 0.0190 
 (0.14) (-0.03) (1.03) (1.54) (0.76) (1.26) 
IB 0.0181 0.0018 -0.0723*** -0.7325 -0.0003 -0.0762*** 
 (0.02) (0.73) (-5.58) (-1.02) (-0.10) (-5.47) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  14.41% 23.58%  21.88% 24.99% 
Wald Chi2 44.91*** 175.31*** 121.14*** 45.40*** 85.37*** 125.26*** 
Observations 513 417 513 464 378 464 
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Table 4.12 (continued): Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Full Sample – Second 
Sensitivity Test 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the second sensitivity test for three models (i.e. logistic 
regression for LOSS_AVOID, and random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional internal 
governance mechanisms in opportunistic earnings management for the full sample. Columns 1-3 report the results 
for board characteristics, while columns 4-6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
BODMEET is the board of director’s activity level, measured as the number of board’s meetings held in a year. 
ACMEET is the audit committee’s activity level, measured as the number of committee’s meetings held in a year.  






























Third, as the main results presented in Table 4.9 show a negative association between 
Shari’ah scholars multiple memberships and the third measure of earnings management (in 
column 3), additional test investigates whether or not this relationship is non-linear. This is 
tested using the squared term of Shari’ah supervisory board multiple memberships variable 
(SSBMM). The results reported in Table 4.13 show a negative coefficient on SSBMM 
variable (in column 3), while the coefficient on the squared term is positive. Hence, this result 
suggests that the multiple memberships held by Shari’ah scholars have a non-linear 
relationship with earnings management in Islamic banks. In other words, as Shari’ah scholars 
get busier due to extended multiple memberships in several banks, their ability to effectively 



























Table 4.13: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Islamic Banks Sub-Sample – Third 
Sensitivity Test 



















Constant 9.2891 -0.0016 -0.0620 10.7795 -0.0150 -0.1700 
 (1.62) (-0.21) (-0.41) (1.22) (-1.64) (-0.95) 
BODSIZE -1.2778** -0.0006*** -0.0004    
 (-2.08) (-2.76) (-0.11)    
BODINDEP -12.4786*** -0.0057*** -0.0513**    
 (-2.76) (-4.12) (-2.00)    
CEODUAL -3.9190 -0.0023 -0.0214    
 (-1.16) (-1.52) (-1.23)    
ACSIZE    -3.2005*** -0.0002 0.0127 
    (-2.75) (-0.42) (0.83) 
ACINDEP    -12.2684*** 0.0001 -0.0675*** 
    (-3.00) (0.12) (-3.40) 
EBT -8.7400 0.0036 -0.0193 12.5966 0.0155 0.0916 
 (-0.51) (0.17) (-0.11) (0.54) (0.66) (0.48) 
LEV 0.7554** 0.0004*** 0.0021 1.3444*** 0.0003** 0.0041 
 (2.12) (3.27) (0.95) (3.26) (2.13) (1.58) 
TIER1 0.2406* 0.0005 0.0012 0.1879 0.0004 0.0007 
 (1.93) (1.27) (1.60) (1.25) (0.89) (0.86) 
AGE -0.7879 -0.0015** -0.0114 -2.2689 0.0001 -0.0122 
 (-0.36) (-1.97) (-0.73) (-1.06) (0.15) (-0.69) 
BANK SIZE -0.6801 0.0010** 0.0070 -0.1343 0.0010* 0.0086 
 (-0.48) (2.17) (0.70) (-0.07) (1.76) (0.73) 
CFO -2.7914 0.0115** 0.0614 -1.7015 0.0294*** -0.0069 
 (-0.33) (2.24) (1.27) (-0.21) (4.60) (-0.09) 
GRW 0.8739 -0.0010** -0.0063 -0.6840 -0.0001 -0.0010 
 (0.93) (-2.19) (-0.92) (-0.59) (-0.19) (-0.13) 
BIG4 2.7384 0.0023 0.0320* -3.8424 0.0003 0.0103 
 (1.22) (1.23) (1.82) (-1.00) (0.28) (0.48) 
GOV_OWN -9.5356 -0.0065 -0.1177 -6.1196 0.0239 -0.5002 
 (-0.64) (-1.42) (-0.97) (-0.13) (1.23) (-1.53) 
CRISIS 6.1137** 0.0028*** -0.0189 10.9978*** 0.0029** -0.0148 
 (2.22) (2.86) (-1.21) (3.82) (2.31) (-0.79) 
GDP -0.1377 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0711 0.0001 0.0005 
 (-0.87) (0.85) (-0.31) (-0.43) (1.38) (0.44) 
COUNTRY_GOV -4.2925 0.0020 0.0013 -3.2616 0.0006 0.0193 
 (-1.15) (1.48) (0.04) (-0.63) (0.38) (0.52) 
AAOIFI -0.3647 0.0011 0.0179 4.5892 -0.0019 0.0551 
 (-0.06) (0.70) (0.53) (0.76) (-0.68) (1.37) 
SSBSIZE -4.9612*** -0.0006* -0.0144** -6.1273*** -0.0009*** -0.0141** 
 (-7.27) (-1.94) (-2.45) (-9.23) (-3.68) (-2.55) 
SSBQUAL -12.1631** -0.0044*** -0.0761*** -9.9457* -0.0008 -0.0527 
 (-2.53) (-2.89) (-2.64) (-1.78) (-0.37) (-1.49) 
SSBMM -1.9635 -0.0034 -0.1794** 2.3941 0.0013 -0.0571 
 (-0.18) (-0.93) (-2.50) (0.18) (0.31) (-0.69) 
SSBMM2 3.0303 0.0035 0.1093* -0.9203 -0.0016 0.0486 
 (0.33) (1.05) (1.78) (-0.09) (-0.42) (0.69) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  65.92% 12.36%  63.09% 17.32% 
Wald Chi2 113.29*** 157.98*** 60.97*** 142.02*** 100.86*** 40.12*** 
Observations 228 145 228 180 112 180 
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Table 4.13 (continued): Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Islamic Banks Sub-Sample 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the third sensitivity test for three models (i.e. logistic 
regression for LOSS_AVOID, and random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional and 
additional internal governance mechanisms in opportunistic earnings management for the Islamic banks sub-sample 
and investigating whether the relationship between Shari’ah scholars multiple memberships and earnings 
management is non-linear. Columns 1-3 report the results for the joint effect of board characteristics and Shari’ah 
supervisory board, while columns 4-6 present the results for the joint effect of audit committee and Shari’ah 
supervisory board. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
SSBMM2 is the squared term of Shari’ah supervisory board multiple memberships.  






























Fourth, to address the “unbalanced” nature of the sample, additional tests were performed. 
Table 4.2 shows some countries with zero observations related to Islamic banks (i.e. Lebanon 
and Tunisia). Although all the sampled counties operate a dual banking system, no 
information was available about the Islamic banks operating in Lebanon and Tunisia. Hence, 
the tests examining the effect of traditional internal governance mechanisms in mitigating 
opportunistic earnings management practices are re-estimated for only the countries that have 
observations on both types of banks. The results from this additional test are reported in Table 
4.14. Although the significance level of some variables differs, the results for the main test 




























Table 4.14: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Full Sample – Fourth Sensitivity Test 



















Constant 13.7582*** -0.0064 0.0909 9.8665** -0.0102 0.0070 
 (2.63) (-0.69) (1.31) (2.17) (-1.08) (0.10) 
BODSIZE -0.6895*** -0.0015*** -0.0061***    
 (-4.72) (-7.86) (-4.36)    
BODINDEP -8.9025*** -0.0098*** -0.1097***    
 (-6.40) (-5.09) (-7.61)    
CEODUAL -0.5842 -0.0012 -0.0282    
 (-0.79) (-0.66) (-1.07)    
ACSIZE    -1.5754*** -0.0028*** -0.0074** 
    (-5.05) (-5.91) (-2.23) 
ACINDEP    -4.7429*** -0.0033** -0.0942*** 
    (-5.87) (-2.21) (-9.62) 
EBT -1.2938 0.0579* -0.3110 1.7113 0.0422 -0.2617 
 (-0.09) (1.71) (-1.40) (0.11) (1.17) (-1.18) 
LEV 0.2871*** 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.3299*** 0.0008*** 0.0006 
 (3.24) (4.32) (0.15) (3.75) (3.87) (0.47) 
TIER1 0.0634* 0.0002*** 0.0003 0.0668** 0.0002** 0.0002 
 (1.84) (2.61) (0.59) (1.97) (2.43) (0.44) 
AGE -0.4284 -0.0009 -0.0163** -0.2509 -0.0017 -0.0127 
 (-0.82) (-0.81) (-2.00) (-0.54) (-1.50) (-1.49) 
BANK SIZE -0.5435 0.0010* 0.0012 -0.4045 0.0010* 0.0041 
 (-1.64) (1.69) (0.26) (-1.41) (1.72) (0.84) 
CFO 1.1716 0.0005 0.0201 2.9900 0.0069 0.0096 
 (0.47) (0.08) (0.58) (1.08) (1.06) (0.24) 
GRW 0.3667* 0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0587 0.0007 -0.0044 
 (1.77) (0.12) (-1.07) (-0.33) (0.18) (-1.58) 
BIG4 0.1354 0.0034 0.0175 -0.3112 0.0038 0.0158 
 (0.18) (1.09) (1.52) (-0.40) (1.21) (1.32) 
GOV_OWN -1.4391 -0.0015 -0.0333 -1.6757 -0.0012 -0.0220 
 (-0.48) (-0.25) (-0.76) (-0.58) (-0.19) (-0.44) 
CRISIS 0.9990** 0.0002 0.0047 0.9585* -0.0005 -0.0047 
 (2.06) (0.25) (0.64) (1.89) (-0.05) (-0.61) 
GDP -0.0213 0.0007 0.0006 0.0323 0.0001 0.0014** 
 (-0.47) (0.83) (0.95) (0.69) (1.18) (2.14) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.4950 -0.0002 0.0049 1.1569 0.0004 0.0132 
 (0.57) (-0.14) (0.38) (1.43) (0.22) (0.97) 
IB 0.1723 0.0004 -0.0781*** -0.5295 -0.0018 -0.0791*** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (-6.39) (-0.74) (-1.06) (-5.99) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  16.63% 23.39%  17.05% 24.21% 
Wald Chi2 57.27*** 149.18*** 146.05*** 64.25*** 96.33*** 169.17*** 
Observations 606 492 606 555 458 555 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for three models (i.e. logistic regression for LOSS_AVOID, and 
random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional internal governance mechanisms in 
opportunistic earnings management for the full sample (including only countries that have observations on both 
types of banks). Columns 1-3 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 4-6 present the results for 
audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 





Fifth, to address the issue of insignificant variables, additional tests were performed to 
examine whether the signs and values of significant variables change when the insignificant 
variables are dropped from the analysis. The main results presented in Table 4.7 show that 
some control variables have insignificant values (i.e. BANK SIZE, CFO, BIG4, GOV_OWN, 
and COUNTRY_GOV). Consequently, the tests examining the effect of traditional internal 
governance mechanisms in mitigating opportunistic earnings management practices are re-
estimated excluding the insignificant variables. The results from these additional tests are 
reported in Table 4.15. The reported results show that the results for the main variables (board 
size, board independence, audit committee size, audit committee independence) remain 
unchanged after dropping insignificant control variables. 
Finally, to mitigate potential endogeneity between corporate governance variables and 
opportunistic earnings management, Two-step system generalised method of moments 
(GMM) and Three-stage least squares (3SLS) were used. The GMM approach, adopted by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), allows to treat all explanatory 
variables as endogenous and use their lag values as instrumental variables. Furthermore, 3SLS 
estimations are utilised to mitigate potential endogeneity problem from simultaneity bias. 
Unreported results show that, after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity, using GMM and 3SLS, the results on the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in earnings management are similar to the main findings presented in 

















Table 4.15: Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Full Sample – Fifth Sensitivity Test 



















Constant 6.1279*** 0.0115** 0.1238*** 3.9264* 0.0067 0.0744** 
 (2.58) (2.10) (3.61) (1.81) (1.16) (2.05) 
BODSIZE -0.6391*** -0.0016*** -0.0065***    
 (-4.75) (-7.83) (-4.90)    
BODINDEP -9.0931*** -0.0106*** -0.1102***    
 (-6.83) (-5.06) (-7.98)    
CEODUAL -0.3863 -0.0016 -0.0278    
 (-0.52) (-0.81) (-1.04)    
ACSIZE    -1.5795*** -0.0026*** -0.0080** 
    (-5.24) (-4.97) (-2.44) 
ACINDEP    -4.6297*** -0.0034** -0.0906*** 
    (-6.16) (-2.14) (-9.71) 
EBT -6.4143 0.0644* -0.3064 -2.1219 0.0593 -0.2531 
 (-0.46) (1.73) (-1.41) (-0.15) (1.48) (-1.16) 
LEV 0.2848*** 0.0006*** -0.0003 0.3143*** 0.0006*** -0.0003 
 (3.59) (3.32) (-0.26) (4.04) (2.78) (-0.22) 
TIER1 0.0746** 0.0001* 0.0010 0.0741** 0.0001 -0.0005 
 (2.23) (1.76) (0.19) (2.29) (1.56) (-0.10) 
AGE -0.7428 0.0002 -0.0137** -0.4474 -0.0007 -0.0075 
 (-1.61) (0.16) (-1.96) (-1.07) (-0.58) (-0.99) 
GRW 0.3166 0.0005 -0.0040 -0.0671 0.0001 -0.0051* 
 (1.56) (0.12) (-1.45) (-0.39) (0.28) (-1.83) 
CRISIS 1.1163** -0.0005 0.0032 1.0471** -0.0006 -0.0059 
 (2.41) (-0.48) (0.44) (2.18) (-0.51) (-0.79) 
GDP -0.0183 0.0001 0.0008 0.0344 0.0002 0.0016** 
 (-0.43) (1.34) (1.33) (0.77) (1.64) (2.51) 
IB -0.0781 0.0010 -0.0763*** -0.6693 -0.0014 -0.0794*** 
 (-0.10) (0.55) (-6.65) (-0.98) (-0.75) (-6.31) 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐  12.13% 23.54%  14.21% 23.90% 
Wald Chi2 62.78*** 126.52*** 154.49*** 66.94*** 64.35*** 172.47*** 
Observations 631 511 631 580 477 580 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the first sensitivity test for three models (i.e. logistic 
regression for LOSS_AVOID, and random effect for both EM and DACC) examining the role of traditional internal 
governance mechanisms in opportunistic earnings management for the full sample. Columns 1-3 report the results 
for board characteristics, while columns 4-6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Dummy BODSIZE/ACSIZE is an indicator variable that takes 1 if the board/committee is larger than the sample 
mean, and 0 otherwise.  








The issue of earnings management and the impact of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms in controlling managerial opportunism have received considerable attention from 
regulators and market participants during the last decade. However, the investigation of the 
role of corporate governance in opportunistic earnings management in banking is still lacking, 
particularly across alternative banking models (i.e. conventional versus Islamic banks). This 
study attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by investigating whether internal governance 
mechanisms have a role in mitigating opportunistic earnings management practices in 
conventional and Islamic banks. This study examines both traditional (i.e. boards of directors 
and audit committees) and non-traditional (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory boards) corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
The multi-country sample of listed banks’ results provide strong evidence that effective 
traditional governance mechanisms play a significant role in mitigating earnings management 
for the whole sample of banks. In particular, the results show that having large and 
independent boards of directors and audit committees significantly reduces opportunistic 
earnings management within both conventional and Islamic banks. The mitigation in 
opportunistic earnings management is identified through less frequent loss avoidance 
practices and lower discretionary accruals. The boards of directors and audit committees 
constitute traditional internal governance mechanisms, relative to the extra (additional) layer 
of governance in Islamic banks (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory boards). These findings suggest that, 
despite the institutional differences across the two bank types, no structural differences exist 
between conventional and Islamic banks in terms of the role of the traditional governance 
mechanisms in earnings management. When examining the effect of the extended layer of 
governance within Islamic banks through the Shari’ah supervisory board, results show that 
having a large Shari’ah board with financially qualified and highly reputed Shari’ah scholars 
can significantly mitigate earnings management practices in Islamic banks. These findings 
support the notion that additional mechanisms of banking governance are important to 
preserve public confidence in the Islamic banking industry and to maintain higher financial 
reporting quality.  
To summarise the main findings of this study, the results provide evidence that, within 
conventional banks, banks with larger and independent boards of directors and audit 
committees are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management practices. 
Moreover, within Islamic banks, banks with large and financially qualified Shari’ah boards 
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exhibit less opportunistic earnings management behaviour, relative to banks with small and 
less financially qualified Shari’ah boards. 
The findings of this study offer new insights toward an ongoing debate about the need to 
reconsider double mechanisms of governance, including the traditional and extended system 
of governance in the global banking business models. Both conventional and Islamic banks 
should consider factors affecting the effectiveness of different internal governance 
mechanisms in monitoring managerial behaviour. Additionally, Islamic banks should ensure 
effective Shari’ah governance by employing highly qualified/ reputable Shari’ah scholars in 
order to maintain and promote public confidence in the Islamic banking industry. This raises a 
call to regulators of Islamic banks to promote effective Shari’ah governance by establishing 
academic and professional institutions to provide education, training, and continued 
development courses to Shari’ah scholars. Finally, banks regulatory authorities and 
independent auditors should consider the role of different layers of governance in improving 


















Chapter Five: Internal Governance Mechanisms and Information Value of 
Banks Earnings: Evidence from Alternative Banking Systems 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Corporate financial reports serve as the primary source of accounting information. Financial 
reports provide information about firms’ financial position and performance. Such 
information is highly influential for decision-making by managers, investors, creditors, 
regulators, and other stakeholders (Francis et al., 2004; Beyer et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2018).  
As has been mentioned in Chapter 3, the importance of accounting information arises from its 
dual role; informativeness and stewardship (Feltham et al., 2006; Cascino et al., 2014). The 
informativeness role emerges as users demand information that enables them to assess their 
risk and predict future cash flows.  
Given the important role of accounting numbers, high quality accounting information is 
crucial for well-functioning markets, as it reduces information asymmetry between managers 
and capital providers (Biddle and Hilary, 2006), reduces the risks of moral hazards and 
adverse selection (Li, 2008), and enhances the efficiency of capital allocation (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2003).  
A considerable literature investigates the concept of financial reporting generally, and 
earnings quality specifically. Part of these studies have focused on defining and measuring the 
quality of earnings (Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Dechow et al. 
2010). Other studies have considered the determinants of earnings quality (Francis et al., 
2005; Doyle et al., 2007; He, 2015), and its consequences (Gong et al., 2008; Rodriguez-
Ariza et al., 2016). However, corporate financial scandals over the last decade (like Enron and 
WorldCom) have brought criticisms and raised attention to the role for different corporate 
governance mechanisms in ensuring high-quality financial reporting. Furthermore, the failure 
of world’s leading financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear, Stearns and Co., 
have raised regulators’ interest in banking governance. Effective governance in banks 
enhances the quality of reported earnings, and thereby increases financial transparency. 
The greater part of the literature on the role of corporate governance in enhancing information 
quality and transparency assesses the quality of financial reporting from an opportunistic 
earnings management perspective and considers only nonfinancial institutions. This empirical 
study aims to bridge this gap in the literature by investigating the role of internal governance 
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mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committee) in enhancing the information value 
of bank earnings. It also examines the possible impact of different institutional bank 
characteristics on the association between corporate governance and information value of 
earnings. Thus, this study is among the early attempts to examine the relation between banks 
governance and financial reporting quality from an informational perspective. Accordingly, 
this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 demonstrates the theoretical framework and 
the hypotheses development. Section 5.3 describes the research methodology. Section 5.4 
discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
It has long been established by the agency theory that formal governance mechanisms and 
tools play a primary role in controlling agency problems between principals and managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Brennan, 2006). It has been detailed in Chapter 3 that effective 
governance mechanisms can also reduce conflicts of interests resulting from agency 
relationships, as the role of such mechanisms involves monitoring and controlling the 
management in order to maximise the benefit for all the parties involved. Several empirical 
studies have argued that internal governance mechanisms can lessen information asymmetry, 
and in turn promote financial information transparency (Mallin, 2002; Arnold and De Lange, 
2004; Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Haß et al., 2014). Among the internal governance mechanisms 
that have been examined are the board of directors and audit committee. 
 
5.2.1 Board of Directors and Information Value of Earnings 
According to the agency theory, board of directors is considered as a primary governance 
mechanism employed to address conflicts of interests arising from agency relationships. 
Beasley (1996) claims that the board of directors is responsible for ensuring that high-quality 
financial information is available to all stakeholders. Prior studies have provided evidence that 
effective board of directors enhances the quality of financial reporting. However, these studies 
have assessed the quality of financial reporting from an opportunistic earnings management 
perspective. The impact of board of directors’ effectiveness on the information value of 
earnings has not been broadly investigated. 
From an information perspective, the quality of financial reporting increases as managers 
disclose more accurate information and ensure that the financial information precisely reflect 
the firms’ future earnings and cash flows. This informativeness role of accounting information 
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has been highlighted by the conceptual framework for financial reporting developed by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) where it illustrates that the objective of 
financial reporting is to provide useful information about the reporting entity to existing and 
potential investors, lenders and other creditors. Those users rely on financial statements to 
help them assess the risks and prospects for future cash flow to the entity (International 
Financial Reporting Standards, 2018). Given that the board of directors is responsible to 
ensure that high-quality accounting information is available to all users (Beasley, 1996), 
effective governance through the board is expected to enhance the information value of 
reported earnings. 
Prior studies investigating information value of earnings have examined it in relation to 
improvements in internal control (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010), legal, extra-legal, and political 
institutional factors (Kanagaretnam et al., 2014a), corporate social responsibility practices 
(García-Sánchez and García-Meca, 2017), and regulatory enforcement actions (Delis et al., 
2018). Examination of information value of earnings in relation to internal governance 
mechanisms is still lacking. 
Borrowing from the resource dependence theory and the agency theory, an effective board of 
directors, that is large and more independent, is expected to enhance the information value of 
bank earnings (Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Kang and Kim, 2012; González and 
García-Meca, 2014). A large board of directors is capable of bringing enhanced skills, 
knowledge, and expertise to exert effective monitoring over financial reporting. Furthermore, 
an independent board can exercise autonomous judgement to protect shareholders’ interests 
when an agency conflict rises. Such association is expected to be stronger under strict and 
more extended institutional environments (i.e. Islamic banks). 
This leads to the development of the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
𝑯𝟏: Effective board of directors (large and independent) increases the information value of 
bank earnings. 
 
5.2.2 Audit Committee and Information Value of Earnings 
As had been mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, the board of directors delegates to the audit 
committee the duty of monitoring and controlling the financial reporting process, as the role 
of the audit committee involves oversight over financial reporting, internal control, and 
external audit activity (Joshi and Wakil, 2004). Prior literature has established that an 
effective audit committee represents a governance device that aids the board of directors in its 
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monitoring role and, thus, enhances financial reporting quality (Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; 
Beasley et al., 2009). The role of audit committee in enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting has been extensively examined. Prior studies in this context have assessed the 
quality of financial reporting from opportunistic earnings management perspective (Yang and 
Krishnan, 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; García et al., 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2014), 
financial restatements perspective (Abbott et al., 2004; Srinivasan, 2005; Carcello et al., 
2011), and conservative accounting (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Sultana, 2015). 
Examination of financial reporting quality from an information value perspective is still 
lacking. One exception is the study of García-Sánchez et al., (2017), where they examine the 
role of gender diversity on board and financial expertise on audit committee in enhancing 
bank’s earnings quality. For a cross-country sample of banks, their results illustrate that 
women and financial expert directors improve earnings persistence and ability to predict 
future cash flows in banks. 
Based on the resource dependence theory and the agency theory, an effective audit committee, 
that is large and composed of independent directors, is expected to enhance the information 
value of bank earnings. Such association is expected to be stronger under strict and more 
extended institutional environments (i.e. Islamic banks). 
Consistent with the resource dependence and agency theories, and in line with the findings of 
previous studies, the next hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is developed as follows: 
𝑯𝟐: Effective audit committee (large and independent) increases the information value of 
bank earnings. 
 
5.3 Research Methodology 
5.3.1 Sample Selection and Data 
The multi-country sample comprises 729 bank-year observations of 100 listed banks between 
years 2007 and 2015. Initially, there were 486 conventional banks and 145 Islamic banks 
from 23 countries. Then, three sample criteria were applied, following Beck et al. (2013): (1) 
countries having both, Islamic and conventional banking systems; (2) availability of 
governance data; and (3) availability of at least three consecutive years of bank data. The final 
sample represents observations from 61 conventional banks and 39 Islamic banks.  
142 
 
Financial data are collected from DataStream, Bloomberg, and BankScope. Country-specific 
macroeconomic data are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Corporate and Shari’ah governance data are hand-collected from banks’ annual reports.  

















Table 5.1 Distribution of Final Sample by Country and Bank Type 







Full Sample Observations 
Bahrain 5 39 2 18 7 56 
Bangladesh 6 22 6 34 12 61 
Egypt 1 6 1 9 2 15 
Indonesia 1 6 8 55 9 61 
Jordan 2 14 9 76 11 90 
Kuwait 5 35 4 33 9 67 
Lebanon 0 0 4 32 4 29 
Malaysia 1 9 2 18 3 27 
Oman 2 6 3 18 5 24 
Pakistan 2 18 2 17 4 35 
Palestine 2 14 2 16 4 30 
Qatar 3 22 5 42 8 64 
Saudi Arabia 4 28 1 9 5 37 
Tunisia 0 0 3 18 3 18 
Turkey 2 17 7 61 9 78 
United Arab Emirates 3 18 2 13 5 31 
Banks 39  61  100  
Observations  260  469  729 






5.3.2 Measuring the Information Value of Earnings 
The main assumption in this study is that the various internal governance mechanisms 
employed in banks affect their financial reporting quality. Unlike most of the previous 
attempts in the literature that examine earnings quality from an opportunistic earnings 
management perspective, this empirical study uses three measures of earnings quality that 
particularly reflect the information enhancing role of earnings. These measures are earnings 
persistence, ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows, and future loan write-offs. 
 
5.3.2.1 Earnings persistence and predictability of future cash flows 
Earnings quality is examined using two related but distinct accounting-based attributes: 
earnings persistence, and predictive ability of earnings. These two attributes relate to the time-
series properties of earnings. According to the time-series perspective, earnings can be 
classified into two elements: a permanent element and a transitory (temporary) element 
(Easton et al., 2000). Permanent earnings are the product of business transactions that 
generate earnings that will continue in the future. Transitory earnings represent irregular (non-
recurring) items recorded in the income statement (Goncharov, 2005; Pan, 2007). 
Earnings persistence refers to the extent to which current earnings prevail in the earnings 
series (Dechow and Schrand, 2004), thus, it is associated with recurrence of earnings over 
time. Persistent earnings are considered desirable as they are permanent, less transitory, and 
therefore more useful for future earnings forecasts (Schipper and Vincent, 2003; Frankel and 
Litov, 2009; Parte-Esteban and García, 2014; García-Sánchez et al., 2017). Earnings 
persistence has been used in prior literature as a measure for earnings quality, as it contributes 
to the value relevance of information and it is considered a good input for equity valuation 
models (Ali and Zarowin, 1992; Ramakrishnan and Thomas, 1998; Dechow et al., 2010). The 
persistence of earnings is determined by the firm’s fundamental performance and the 
accounting measurement system used to evaluate the performance (García-Sánchez et al., 
2017). Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2014a), earnings persistence is estimated as the 
coefficient on current period earnings (EBT) in a regression of future earnings on current 
earnings. 
The second accounting-based attribute is earnings predictability, which refers to “the ability 
of past earnings to predict future earning” (Lipe, 1990, p. 50). It will be recollected that 
financial statement users rely on accounting information in order to make decisions regarding 
capital provisions. This process requires assessing firms’ risks and future cash flow. Earnings 
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with high predictive power enable users to make the most accurate assessments for future 
performance and cash flow. Consequently, predictable earnings are considered high-quality 
earnings. 
It has been claimed that “Persistence and predictability are desired outcomes of financial 
reporting from the valuation perspective. Earnings that are highly predictable and persistent 
are easier to predict” (Goncharov, 2005, p. 8). Hence, several empirical studies have used 
earnings persistence and predictability as measures of financial reporting quality (Francis et 
al., 2004; Doyle et al., 2007; Gaio, 2010; Givoly et al., 2010; Parte-Esteban and García, 2014; 
Latif et al., 2017). However, these studies exclude banks and financial institutions from their 
analysis because of the unique regulatory environment of these institutions. 
The use of earnings persistence and predictability as measures for earnings quality has 
recently been documented in banking literature. Altamuro and Beatty (2010) examined the 
effect of internal control provisions mandated by the Federal Depository Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) on banks’ financial reporting quality. In particular, 
they compared financial reporting of banks affected by the FDICIA’s internal control 
provisions to that of unaffected banks. They found that improvements in internal control 
monitoring increased earnings persistence and predictability of cash flow, indicating an 
enhanced quality of financial reporting in the banking industry. 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014a) examined the relationship between legal, extra-legal and political 
institutional factors and earnings quality of banks across 48 countries. To measure the 
information value of bank financial reporting, they used earnings persistence and the ability of 
current earnings to predict the next period's cash flow. They provided evidence that stronger 
legal, extra-legal and political institutions are associated with higher levels of earnings 
persistence and cash flow predictability. 
Another two cross-country studies by García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017), and García-
Sánchez et al. (2017) use earnings persistence and the ability of earnings to predict future cash 
flow as measures for earnings quality in a sample of banks from nine countries. García-
Sánchez and García-Meca (2017) found that banks' commitment to corporate social 
responsibility practices enhance the persistence of earnings and the predictability of cash 
flow. Moreover, García-Sánchez et al. (2017) examined the role of gender diversity on boards 
and financial expertise on audit committees in enhancing banks' earnings quality. Their results 
illustrate that women and financial expert directors improve earnings persistence and ability 
to predict future cash flow in banks.  
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In a very recent study that uses cash flow predictability and earnings persistence as measures 
for accounting quality, Delis et al. (2018) investigated whether and how regulatory 
enforcement actions issued on banks for violations of rules and regulations improved earnings 
quality of the punished banks. They found that both the risk-related and the accounting-
related enforcement actions significantly improve cash flow predictability and earnings 
persistence in a sample of US banks that have been subject to enforcement actions between 
2000 and 2010. 
To investigate the effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms on earnings persistence 
and predictability, the following regression models are estimated: 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+  𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐺𝑂𝑉 +  𝛽11 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2007
𝑡=2015
 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (1) 
 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+  𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉 +  𝛽11 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2007
𝑡=2015








earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions during year t+1 
deflated by lagged total assets 
GOVERNANCE 
= 
the two principal components of internal governance system 
represented by the board of directors (size and independence) and 
audit committee (size and independence) 
GOVERNANCE*
EBT = 
interaction variable used to examine the role of internal 
governance mechanisms in enhancing the persistence and 
predictability of earnings 
SIZE 
= 






bank age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
years the bank has operated in the country 
BIG4 
= 
an indicator variable for audit quality that takes 1 if the bank’s 
auditor is a Big Four, and 0 otherwise 
CEODUAL 
= 
an indicator variable for CEO duality that takes 1 if the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise 
CAP = capital adequacy, measured as Tier 1 capital 
GDP = the country-prevailing GDP annual growth rate 
COUNTRY_GOV 
= 
a country governance index, measured as the average of six 
governance measures – control for corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule of law, 
and voice and accountability 
𝜀 = error term 
 
Following earlier studies (Gaio, 2010; Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Wang and Campbell, 
2012; García-Sánchez et al., 2017), the empirical models control for bank-specific factors 
such as bank size (SIZE), bank age (AGE), and capital adequacy level (CAP). Prior literature 
also finds that financial reporting quality differs depending on some other corporate 
governance characteristics such as the external audit quality (Abdelsalam et al., 2016) and 
whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Cornett et al., 2009). Accordingly, the 
models control for the quality of the external audit by introducing an indicator variable 
(BIG4) for banks audited by a Big Four audit firm. An indicator variable (CEODUAL) is also 
introduced to reflect CEO duality. 
The empirical models control for country-level factors that may explain variations in financial 
reporting quality. These include the annual growth rate of GDP to account for macroeconomic 
conditions. Additionally, to account for the effect of different country-governance measures 
on the information value of earnings, country governance indicator (COUNTRY_GOV) is 
introduced.  
In the above models (1) and (2), the coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction 
variable GOVERNANCE*EBT, which is expected to have a positive sign, in line with the 
claim that effective corporate governance mechanisms enhance the persistence of earnings 
and their predictability of future cash flows. 
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5.3.2.2 The relationship between loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs  
Although the main purpose of loan loss provisions is to reflect expected future loan losses, 
prior studies provide evidence that managers may use loan loss provisions to pursue other 
objectives. These objectives range from earnings management (Beatty et al., 2002; Agarwal et 
al., 2007), capital management (Ahmed et al., 1999; Anandarajan et al., 2007), to signalling 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2005; Leventis et al., 2012). A weaker association between current 
period’s loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs implies the existence of managerial 
discretionary practices. If effective corporate governance mechanisms enhance the validity of 
loan loss provision, then it is expected to observe a larger association between current 
period’s loan loss provisions and next period’s loan charge-offs. To test this argument, the 
following regression model is estimated: 
𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+  𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉 + < 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 >  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (3) 
Where 
𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 = the loan charge offs during year t+1 deflated by lagged total assets 
LLP 
= 




interaction variable used to examine the role of internal 
governance mechanisms in enhancing the validity of loan loss 
provision 
All other variables are as defined earlier. 
The coefficient of interest in model (3) is the coefficient on the interaction variable 
GOVERNANCE*LLP, which is expected to have a positive sign in line with the claim that 
effective corporate governance mechanisms enhance the validity of loan loss provisions in 





5.3.2.3 Estimation method 
In this study, the random-effect GLS estimation technique is used, based on the results from 
the Hausman Tests
9
. The use of random-effect estimation method is also justified by the fact 
that corporate governance variables (board of directors and audit committee characteristics) 
do not vary much over time. Thus, using fixed-effect estimations would result in massive loss 
of the degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 


























                                                          
9
 Results of Hausman Tests are reported in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7. 
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Variables Definitions and Measures 
EBTt+1 Earnings before taxes during year t+1 deflated by lagged total 
assets. 
EBTLLPt+1 Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions during year t+1 
deflated by lagged total assets. 
CHGOFFt+1 Loan charge offs during year t+1 deflated by lagged total assets. 
LLP Loan loss provisions during year t deflated by lagged total assets. 
GOVERNANCE The two principal components of internal governance system 
represented by the board of directors (BOD) and audit committee 
(AC). 
BOD An index for the structure of the board of directors, measured by 
combining its size (BODSIZE) and independence (BODINDEP). 
AC An index for the structure of the audit committee, measured by 
combining its size (ACSIZE) and independence (ACINDEP). 
GOVERNANCE*EBT An interaction variable used to examine the role of internal 
governance mechanisms in enhancing the persistence and 
predictability of earnings. 
GOVERNANCE*LLP An interaction variable used to examine the role of internal 
governance mechanisms in enhancing the validity of loan loss 
provision. 
SIZE Bank size, measured as the natural logarithm of the year-end total 
assets. 
AGE Bank age, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
years the bank has operated in the country. 
BIG4 An indicator variable for audit quality that takes 1 if the bank’s 
auditor is a Big Four, and 0 otherwise. 
CEODUAL An indicator variable for CEO duality that takes 1 if the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
CAP Capital adequacy, measured as Tier 1 capital. 
GDP The country-prevailing GDP annual growth rate. 
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Variables Definitions and Measures 
COUNTRY_GOV A country governance index, measured as the average of six 
governance measures – control for corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule of 

































5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample (in Panel A), the conventional 
banks (in Panel B), and the Islamic banks (in Panel C). In addition, the two-sample t-tests 
(comparing means for conventional banks and Islamic banks) are reported in the last column. 
The mean values of the current reported earnings (𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡) are 0.019 and 0.014 for conventional 
and Islamic banks, respectively. This finding indicates that conventional banks report 
significantly higher earnings relative to Islamic banks (two-sample t-test of -3.603). These 
results are comparable to those of Abdelsalam et al. (2016) who report similar EBT of 0.018 
and 0.014 for conventional banks and Islamic banks, respectively. Regarding the loan loss 
provisions and the (loan charge-offs), conventional banks and Islamic banks report 
comparable figures of 0.006 (0.004) and 0.006 (0.005), respectively. With respect to the 
internal governance variables, results show that for conventional banks (Islamic banks), the 
mean board of directors’ size (BODSIZE) is 9.655 (10.023), board’s independence 
(BODINDEP) is 0.369 (0.372), audit committee size (ACSIZE) is 3.661 (3.553), and audit 
committee independence (ACINDEP) is 0.544 (0.534), respectively. 
For bank-specific variables, results show that Islamic banks are significantly smaller in size, 
younger in age, and they have significantly higher capital adequacy than conventional banks. 
It was also found that, on average, 83%-86% of the banks in the sample are audited by a Big 
















Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE PANEL B: CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
SUB-SAMPLE 




Variables Obs. Mean Std. Median Obs. Mean Std. Median Obs. Mean Std. Median T-test 
EBT 723 0.017 0.021 0.019 466 0.019 0.014 0.020 257 0.014 0.029 0.015 -3.603*** 
EBTt+1 723 0.016 0.015 0.018 466 0.018 0.013 0.019 257 0.013 0.018 0.014 -5.020*** 
EBTLLPt+1 721 0.024 0.015 0.023 465 0.026 0.012 0.024 256 0.020 0.019 0.020 -4.674*** 
CHGOFFt+1 722 0.004 0.009 0.002 465 0.004 0.010 0.002 257 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.766 
LLP 723 0.006 0.009 0.005 466 0.006 0.010 0.004 257 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.460 
BODSIZE 723 9.786 2.801 10 466 9.655 2.669 10 257 10.023 3.018 9 1.697* 
BODINDEP 661 0.370 0.234 0.333 422 0.369 0.228 0.333 239 0.372 0.244 0.333 0.130 
ACSIZE 655 3.624 0.958 3 436 3.661 0.966 3 219 3.553 0.939 3 -1.363 
ACINDEP 607 0.541 0.329 0.333 419 0.544 0.328 0.571 188 0.534 0.332 0.667 -0.345 
SIZE 723 15.672 1.532 15.732 466 15.934 1.515 16.019 257 15.197 1.449 15.345 -6.355*** 
AGE 723 3.291 0.787 3.497 466 3.546 0.677 3.714 257 2.828 0.762 2.944 -13.046*** 
BIG4 723 0.851 0.357 1 466 0.863 0.345 1 257 0.829 0.377 1 -1.222 
CEODUAL 723 0.100 0.300 0 466 0.120 0.326 0 257 0.062 0.242 0 -2.497** 
CAP 714 16.496 13.565 14.060 460 15.136 6.383 13.670 254 18.959 20.861 15.270 3.635*** 
GDP 723 4.785 3.942 4.790 466 4.930 3.946 4.876 257 4.522 3.928 4.396  
COUNTRY_GOV 723 -0.165 0.478 -0.089 466 -0.166 0.462 -0.093 257 -0.165 0.508 -0.083  
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics. The sample period is 2007 to 2015. Panel A presents the results for the full sample including conventional and 
Islamic banks with 723 bank-year observations. Panel B presents the results for conventional banks sub-sample comprising 466 bank-year observations. Panel C 
presents the results for Islamic banks sub-sample comprising 257 bank-year observations. The last column also reports the mean differences and two-sample t-
test (comparison of means for conventional banks and Islamic banks sub-samples). 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 







Table 5.4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the full sample. Panel (A) presents the 
correlation coefficients for the variables used in the persistence and cash flow predictability 
models, while Panel (B) presents the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the third 
model (i.e. loan loss provision and future loan charge-offs). Panel (A) reveals significant 
positive correlations between current earnings (𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡) and both one-period-ahead earnings 
before taxes and earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions. Panel (B) also reveals 
significant positive correlation between current period loan loss provisions and one-period-
ahead loan charge-offs. The Pearson correlation matrix presented in Table 5.4 affirms that 




























Table 5.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Years 2007-2015 
Panel (A): Pearson correlation matrix for variables used in persistence and cash flow predictability models. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. EBTt+1 1            
2. EBTLLPt+1 0.80 1           
3. EBTt 0.68 0.71 1          
4. BOD 0.13 0.13 0.12 1         
5. AC 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.22 1        
6. SIZE 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.04 0.17 1       
7. AGE 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.45 1      
8. BIG4 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.14 -0.07 0.42 0.25 1     
9. CEODUAL 0.10 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.10 1    
10. CAP -0.15 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 -0.19 -0.31 0.12 -0.02 1   
11. GDP 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 1  
12. COUNTRY_GOV -0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.19 -0.03 0.41 0.08 0.50 -0.19 0.06 0.12 1 
Panel (B): Pearson correlation matrix for variables used in loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs model. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1. CHGOFFt+1 1           
2. LLP 0.48 1          
3. BOD -0.04 -0.06 1         
4. AC 0.08 0.09 0.22 1        
5. SIZE -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.17 1       
6. AGE -0.05 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.45 1      
7. BIG4 -0.07 -0.04 -0.14 -0.07 0.42 0.25 1     
8. CEODUAL -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.10 1    
9. CAP -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 -0.19 -0.31 0.12 -0.02 1   
10. GDP -0.12 -0.18 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 1  
11. COUNTRY_GOV 0.03 0.05 -0.19 -0.03 0.41 0.08 0.50 -0.19 0.06 0.12 1 
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample. Panel (A) presents the correlation coefficients for the variables used in 
persistence and cash flow predictability models. Panel (B) presents the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the loan loss provision and future loan 
charge-offs model. 




5.4.2 Earnings Persistence and Cash Flow Predictability Tests 
Table 5.5 reports the results for the earnings persistence test for the full sample (in Panel A), 
conventional banks sample (in Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (in Panel C). It is expected 
that effective corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committee) 
enhance the information value of banks earnings, through more persistent earnings. 
In Panel A, the two models separately test for the role of board of directors (BOD) and audit 
committee (AC) where BOD includes the size and the independence of the board and AC 
includes the size and the independence of the committee. In all the models, current EBT is 
positively and significantly associated with future EBT. These findings indicate that, earnings 
reported by conventional banks and Islamic banks are relatively persistent. Of primary 
concern is the coefficient on the interaction variable GOV*EBT. Positive and significant 
coefficients in models (1), (2), (5), and (6) indicate that effective board of directors and audit 
committee (i.e. large and more independent) enhance the persistence of earnings in the full 
sample and the Islamic banks sample. These results support the resource dependence theory 
and the agency theory, and they are consistent with prior literature claiming that larger boards 
and audit committees can benefit from the member’s knowledge and expertise to enhance the 
quality of reported earnings (Dalton et al., 1999; Xie et al., 2003; Chang and Sun, 2009; Chen 
and Zhang, 2014). 
However, in model (3), the coefficient on the interaction variable GOV*EBT is not 
significant, implying that board of directors characteristics (i.e. size and independence) have 
no role in enhancing conventional banks earnings persistence. In addition, the coefficient on 
the interaction variable GOV*EBT is positive and marginally significant in model (4), 
implying a marginal role for the audit committee in enhancing the persistence of earnings in 
conventional banks. The difference in the results between Islamic banks and conventional 
banks may be due to the unique institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic banks from 
conventional banks, as prior literature supports the view that strong institutional environment 
enhances the quality of financial reporting (McGuire et al., 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015). 
These results also indicate that effective audit committee (larger and more independent) is 
more able to positively influence the information value of earnings, relative to the board of 
directors. 
The above results support the first and second hypotheses on the association between board’s 
and audit committee’s effectiveness and earnings persistence, although such association is 




Table 5.5: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Earnings Persistence Test  
Estimated Equations: 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐺𝑂𝑉 +  𝛽11 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2007
𝑡=2015
 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡            
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant -0.0078 -0.0071 -0.0046 -0.0012 -0.0097 -0.0329 
 (-0.91) (-1.06) (-0.60) (-0.21) (-0.42) (-1.52) 
EBT 0.4184*** 0.1828*** 0.7448*** 0.6160*** 0.2174** 0.2009** 
 (3.48) (3.68) (6.03) (7.78) (2.09) (2.00) 
GOV 0.0003 -0.0108*** 0.0002 -0.0054** 0.0004 -0.0022 
 (1.18) (-4.37) (0.91) (-1.97) (0.90) (-1.23) 
GOV * EBT 0.5088** 0.5366*** 0.0873 0.1977* 1.5516*** 1.5632** 
 (2.25) (5.47) (1.30) (1.67) (2.68) (2.42) 
SIZE 0.0006 0.0009** 0.0001 0.0006 0.0017 0.0038*** 
 (1.24) (2.09) (0.42) (0.17) (1.32) (2.72) 
AGE 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0003 0.0021 0.0031 
 (0.88) (1.31) (-1.59) (-0.37) (0.91) (1.09) 
BIG4 0.0034 0.0020 0.0054* 0.0050*** 0.0003 -0.0027 
 (1.29) (1.19) (1.90) (3.36) (0.09) (-0.81) 
CEODUAL 0.0025 0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0012 0.0028 0.0083* 
 (1.06) (1.20) (-0.23) (-0.84) (0.97) (1.85) 
CAP -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0001** -0.0001* 
 (-2.33) (-3.51) (-0.35) (-0.14) (-2.28) (-1.89) 
GDP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.56) (0.74) (0.29) (0.60) (-0.10) (-1.29) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0032** -0.0028** -0.0028*** -0.0027** -0.0061** -0.0098** 
 (-2.41) (-2.00) (-2.66) (-2.52) (-1.98) (-2.57) 
EBT + GOV*EBT 0.9272*** 0.7193*** 0.8321*** 0.8137*** 1.7690*** 1.7641*** 
 (6.45) (12.04) (13.62) (14.37) (3.40) (3.05) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 56.42% 56.19% 67.98% 66.90% 55.53% 54.08% 
Wald Chi2 239.80*** 555.74*** 315.08*** 743.80*** 258.69*** 462.40*** 
Hausman Test 18.79 14.91 12.00 16.70 15.52 17.45 
Observations 654 604 418 387 236 187 
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Table 5.5 (continued): Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Earnings Persistence Test  
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the first model (i.e. earnings persistence), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing 
earnings persistence for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results 
for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.6 reports the regression results for the cash flow predictability test for the full sample 
(in Panel A), conventional banks sample (in Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (in Panel C). 
The premise is that effective corporate governance mechanisms can enhance the information 
value of earnings through enhancing the ability of current earnings to predict future cash 
flows. 
In all the models, results show that current EBT is positively and significantly associated with 
future cash flows (EBTLLP). This finding suggests that in both conventional banks and 
Islamic banks, current earnings are able to predict future cash flows. Of primary interest is the 
coefficient on the interaction variable GOV*EBT. Positive and significant coefficients in 
models (1), (2), (5), and (6) illustrate that effective boards of directors and audit committees 
have a role in enhancing the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows in the full 
sample and in Islamic banks. However, the coefficients on the interaction variable GOV*EBT 
are not significant in models (3) and (4). These results indicate that although current earnings 
in conventional banks are able to predict future cash flows, the boards of directors and audit 
committees have no impact on this predictive power. Relative to the findings in Islamic 
banks, the lack of significant results on the boards of directors and audit committees may be 
justified by the fact that internal governance mechanisms are effective in enhancing the 
information value of earnings only under strong and extended institutional environments.   
The above findings support the earlier hypotheses, and highlight the important role played by 
the traditional internal governance mechanisms in enhancing the information value of banks 
reported earnings, through enhancing the persistence and predictive ability of earnings. 















Table 5.6: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Cash Flow Predictability Test  
Estimated Equations: 
𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉 +  𝛽11 ∑ 𝑇𝑡
2007
𝑡=2015
 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0002 0.0021 0.0048 0.0105 -0.0101 -0.0147 
 (0.01) (0.25) (0.38) (0.90) (-0.63) (-0.74) 
EBT 0.3061*** 0.1988** 0.5260*** 0.5364*** 0.2958*** 0.2303*** 
 (3.54) (2.20) (7.79) (7.79) (7.47) (5.18) 
GOV 0.0002 -0.0012** 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0008** 0.0001 
 (1.00) (-2.11) (0.30) (-0.02) (1.97) (0.12) 
GOV * EBT 0.5243** 0.0432** 0.1152 0.1717 1.1031*** 1.3795*** 
 (2.16) (1.97) (1.07) (1.59) (2.73) (2.70) 
SIZE 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0005 0.0014 0.0022* 
 (1.15) (1.50) (1.34) (0.92) (1.38) (1.69) 
AGE 0.0010 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0034** 0.0056** 
 (0.76) (1.30) (-0.53) (-0.83) (1.99) (2.50) 
BIG4 0.0015 0.0017 0.0015 0.0022 0.0046 0.0034 
 (0.63) (0.93) (0.38) (0.50) (1.35) (0.89) 
CEODUAL 0.0012 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0063* 0.0020 
 (0.54) (1.12) (-0.39) (-0.36) (1.81) (0.40) 
CAP -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0008 -0.0006 
 (-1.16) (-1.35) (-1.93) (-1.73) (-1.64) (-1.00) 
GDP -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0002 
 (-0.18) (0.51) (-0.21) (-0.40) (0.23) (-0.49) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0032* -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0051 -0.0095** 
 (-1.90) (-1.43) (-1.16) (-1.14) (-1.62) (-2.52) 
EBT + GOV*EBT 0.8303*** 0.2419*** 0.6413*** 0.7081*** 1.3989*** 1.6098*** 
 (4.63) (3.50) (7.11) (8.81) (3.58) (3.24) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 51.66% 51.41% 59.91% 58.67% 56.46% 52.85% 
Wald Chi2 309.97*** 365.07*** 633.23*** 446.41*** 215.88*** 135.62*** 
Hausman Test 13.71 17.26 15.03 16.27 14.86 16.00 
Observations 653 601 417 414 236 187 
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Table 5.6 (continued): Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Cash Flow Predictability Test  
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the second model (i.e. cash flow predictability), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
enhancing the predictive power of earnings for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). Columns 1, 3, 
and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
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5.4.3 Loan Loss Provisions and Future Loan Charge-Offs 
The results for the loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs tests are reported in Table 
5.7. Panel (A) reports the results for the full sample, Panel (B) reports the results for the 
conventional banks, while the results for the Islamic banks are reported in Panel (C). 
In Panel (A), the coefficient on the current loan loss provisions (LLP) is positive and 
significant in models (1) and (2). This indicates that current loan loss provisions reported by 
banks are positively associated with future loan charge-offs. These findings are consistent 
with prior studies (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014a). More 
importantly, results show positive and significant coefficients on the interaction variable 
GOV*LLP in both models. This finding emphasizes the role of boards of directors and audit 
committees in monitoring the financial reporting process, and ensuring its reliability 
(Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; Beasley et al., 2009). 
However, the results in Panel (B) fail to provide support to the initial expectation on the role 
of boards of directors and audit committees in enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions 
in conventional banks. Although results show that current loan loss provisions in conventional 
banks are significantly and positively associated with future loan charge-offs, it seems that 
this association is not influenced neither by the board of directors nor the audit committee. 
In Panel (C), results show that the coefficient on current loan loss provisions is positive and 
significant in models (5) and (6). These results are consistent with those for the full sample, 
confirming the validity of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks, as current reported provisions 
reflect future losses on loans. The coefficient of interest is the interaction variable GOV*LLP. 
Results show significant positive effect of boards of directors and audit committees in 
enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions. These results are in line with the resource 
dependence theory as they support prior arguments that large and independent boards and 
audit committees are effective monitors over the financial reporting process and contribute to 










Table 5.7: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Future Loan Charge-Offs Test  
Estimated Equations: 
𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑡+1 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽10 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐺𝑂𝑉 + < 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 >  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0117** 0.0082*** 0.0249*** 0.0244*** -0.0034 -0.0007 
 (2.56) (2.86) (3.15) (3.20) (-0.78) (-0.15) 
LLP 0.2721*** 0.3150*** 0.1883*** 0.1038** 0.4839*** 0.5599*** 
 (7.30) (12.26) (3.91) (2.12) (7.38) (11.01) 
GOV -0.0131*** 0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0003 0.0002* 0.0007** 
 (-3.75) (1.29) (-1.75) (-0.78) (1.68) (2.07) 
GOV * LLP 1.4755*** 0.4694** 0.0923 0.3258 0.3932** 0.4274* 
 (4.57) (2.24) (0.15) (0.52) (2.14) (1.71) 
SIZE -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (-0.87) (-1.21) (-1.24) (-1.31) (0.16) (-0.52) 
AGE -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0007 -0.0010 0.0007 -0.0001 
 (-0.82) (-1.79) (-0.60) (-1.02) (0.12) (-0.30) 
BIG4 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0019*** 0.0019** 
 (-1.38) (-0.67) (-0.92) (-0.97) (2.64) (2.03) 
CEODUAL -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0031** -0.0015 
 (-1.37) (-1.12) (-0.22) (-0.44) (-2.04) (-1.09) 
CAP -0.0004 -0.0003* -0.0001* -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-1.44) (-1.85) (-1.72) (-1.99) (-1.17) (-1.30) 
GDP -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-1.12) (0.03) (-0.92) (-0.13) (1.49) (1.09) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.0020** 0.0003 0.0031** 0.0029** -0.0008 -0.0003 
 (2.10) (0.51) (2.06) (1.98) (-1.00) (-0.32) 
LLP + GOV*LLP 1.7477*** 0.7844*** 0.2806 0.4296 0.8771*** 0.9872*** 
 (5.69) (3.83) (0.44) (0.70) (5.15) (4.32) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 27.30% 34.40% 18.23% 13.20% 52.60% 64.78% 
Wald Chi2 171.45*** 225.93*** 48.22*** 33.20** 146.15*** 275.21*** 
Hausman Test 9.57 12.08 11.39 13.07 10.41 12.49 
Observations 713 601 417 414 236 187 
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Table 5.7 (continued): Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Future Loan Charge-Offs Test  
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the third model (i.e. loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs), examining the role of internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel 
C). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
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5.4.4 Additional Tests on the Role of Shari’ah Governance 
For Islamic banks, additional tests are conducted to examine the role of Shari’ah supervisory 
boards in enhancing the information value of earnings. Specifically, the models test for the 
size, financial qualification, and multiple directorships of Shari’ah supervisory board.  
Table 5.8 reports the regression results for the earnings persistence (Panel A), cash flow 
predictability (Panel B), and the relationship between loan loss provisions and future loan 
charge-offs (Panel C). 
The results show that the coefficient on current EBT is positive and significant (0.5012) and 
(0.5754) in Panels (A) and (B), respectively. These results indicate that current earnings 
reported by Islamic banks are persistent and can predict future cash flows. In addition, Panel 
(C) shows that the coefficient on current loan loss provisions (LLP) is positive and significant 
at the 1% level (0.3896), suggesting that current provisions reported by banks reflect expected 
future loan losses. These findings provide evidence that the financial reporting in Islamic 
banks is of good quality. 
However, when examining whether Shari’ah supervisory boards have a role in enhancing the 
information value of earnings, results do not provide evidence on the role of Shari’ah boards 
in this aspect. The coefficients on the interaction variables SSB*EBT and SSB*LLP are not 
significant across Panels (A), (B), and (C), where SSB is an index for the structure of the 
Shari’ah supervisory board, measured by combining its size, its financial qualification, and 
the multiple memberships held by its members. The lack of evidence on the role of Shari’ah 
boards in enhancing the information value of earnings may be due to the limited direct role 
played by Shari’ah scholars in the financial reporting process. Moreover, the complex nature 
of Islamic bank’s activities and financial reporting issues require accounting and financial 
expertise to effectively monitor managerial financial reporting decisions. These claims 
support Khalaf’s (2007) argument that graduating Shari’ah scholars, who lack financial 
education may not sufficiently be competent to perform their duties with regard to monitoring 









Table 5.8: Regression Results for the Additional Tests on Shari’ah Supervisory Boards in Islamic Banks  
Panel (A) Earnings Persistence Panel (B) Cash Flow Predictability Panel (C) LLP and Future Loan Charge-Offs 
Constant -0.0359** Constant -0.0192 Constant 0.0011 
 (-2.26)  (-1.19)  (0.22) 
EBT 0.5012*** EBT 0.5754*** LLP 0.3896*** 
 (4.13)  (4.74)  (2.71) 
SSB -0.0006 SSB 0.0017** SSB 0.0002 
 (-0.08)  (2.16)  (0.52) 
SSB * EBT -0.0370 SSB * EBT -0.0383 SSB * LLP 0.0335 
 (-1.45)  (-1.51)  (1.28) 
SIZE 0.0034*** SIZE 0.0017 SIZE -0.0001 
 (3.13)  (1.57)  (-0.30) 
AGE 0.0013 AGE 0.0028 AGE -0.0005 
 (0.80)  (1.64)  (-0.84) 
BIG4 -0.0018 BIG4 0.0042 BIG4 0.0018 
 (-0.49)  (1.16)  (1.55) 
CEODUAL 0.0056 CEODUAL 0.0079** CEODUAL -0.0030*** 
 (1.60)  (2.27)  (-2.71) 
CAP -0.0008* CAP -0.0003 CAP -0.0002 
 (-1.72)  (-0.60)  (-1.21) 
GDP 0.0009 GDP 0.0008 GDP 0.0001 
 (0.37)  (0.34)  (1.51) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0076** COUNTRY_GOV -0.0042 COUNTRY_GOV -0.0008 
 (-2.27)  (-1.22)  (-0.77) 
AAOIFI 0.0044 AAOIFI -0.0003 AAOIFI 0.0007 
 (1.42)  (-0.00)  (0.71) 
Year Dummies YES Year Dummies YES Year Dummies YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 54.32% Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 57.64% Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 56.32% 
Wald Chi2 215.09*** Wald Chi2 286.10*** Wald Chi2 215.53*** 
Observations 254 Observations 254 Observations 254 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the additional tests, examining the role of Shari’ah supervisory board in enhancing the information value of 
earnings, through enhancing earnings persistence (Panel A), enhancing cash flow predictability (Panel B), and enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions (Panel 
C).  
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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5.4.5 Robustness Checks 
To assess the credibility of the main findings, additional tests were performed. First, to 
account for the “unbalanced” nature of the study sample, all tests examining the role of 
internal governance mechanisms in enhancing the information value of earnings are re-
estimated for only the countries with observations on both types of banks (conventional and 
Islamic). The results from these additional tests are reported in Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11. The 
results reported support the main findings in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7. These results provide 
evidence for the role of boards of directors and audit committees in enhancing earnings 
persistence, cash flow predictability, and reliability of loan loss provisions. However, the 
results show more evidence for such role under strict and extended institutional environments 




















Table 5.9: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Earnings Persistence Test – First Sensitivity Test 
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant -0.0066 -0.0074 -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0097 -0.0329 
 (-0.83) (-1.13) (-0.34) (0.08) (-0.42) (-1.52) 
EBT 0.4094*** 0.1853*** 0.7196*** 0.6009*** 0.2174** 0.2009** 
 (3.48) (3.67) (5.45) (7.21) (2.09) (2.00) 
GOV 0.0003 -0.0099*** 0.0002 -0.0049* 0.0004 -0.0022 
 (1.18) (-3.89) (0.96) (-1.69) (0.90) (-1.23) 
GOV * EBT 0.4731** 0.5108*** 0.0743 0.1966 1.5516*** 1.5632** 
 (2.19) (5.10) (1.05) (1.59) (2.68) (2.42) 
SIZE 0.0010* 0.0013*** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0017 0.0038*** 
 (1.83) (2.83) (1.03) (0.73) (1.32) (2.72) 
AGE 0.0008 0.0010 -0.0011* -0.0004 0.0021 0.0031 
 (0.84) (1.20) (-1.66) (-0.54) (0.91) (1.09) 
BIG4 0.0046 0.0031* 0.0065** 0.0057*** 0.0003 -0.0027 
 (1.59) (1.74) (2.04) (3.59) (0.09) (-0.81) 
CEODUAL 0.0045 0.0050** 0.0008 0.0005 0.0028 0.0083* 
 (1.60) (2.30) (0.41) (0.26) (0.97) (1.85) 
CAP -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001* 
 (-2.28) (-3.28) (-0.26) (0.02) (-2.28) (-1.89) 
GDP 0.0009 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.63) (0.81) (0.60) (0.86) (-0.10) (-1.29) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0061** -0.0098** 
 (-3.01) (-2.95) (-2.91) (-3.00) (-1.98) (-2.57) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 57.50% 57.18% 68.56% 67.31% 55.53% 54.08% 
Wald Chi2 241.57*** 543.81*** 769.27*** 700.05*** 258.69*** 462.40*** 
Observations 622 576 386 359 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the first model (i.e. earnings persistence), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing 
earnings persistence for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). The results reflect only countries with 
observations on both bank types. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 





Table 5.10: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Cash Flow Predictability Test – First Sensitivity Test  
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0017 0.0021 0.0052 0.0120 -0.0101 -0.0147 
 (0.14) (0.27) (0.43) (1.10) (-0.63) (-0.74) 
EBT 0.3128*** 0.1985** 0.5003*** 0.5175*** 0.2958*** 0.2303*** 
 (3.59) (2.15) (7.82) (7.74) (7.47) (5.18) 
GOV 0.0002 -0.0013** 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0008** 0.0001 
 (1.01) (-2.13) (0.42) (-0.11) (1.97) (0.12) 
GOV * EBT 0.4706** 0.0428* 0.0662 0.1321 1.1031*** 1.3795*** 
 (1.98) (1.91) (0.67) (1.34) (2.73) (2.70) 
SIZE 0.0013 0.0013** 0.0013* 0.0009 0.0014 0.0022* 
 (1.63) (2.17) (1.87) (1.48) (1.38) (1.69) 
AGE 0.0011 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0034** 0.0056** 
 (0.85) (1.41) (-0.52) (-0.81) (1.99) (2.50) 
BIG4 0.0030 0.0033* 0.0036 0.0042 0.0046 0.0034 
 (1.16) (1.70) (0.80) (0.86) (1.35) (0.89) 
CEODUAL 0.0029 0.0042** 0.0017 0.0015 0.0063* 0.0020 
 (1.13) (2.02) (1.06) (0.97) (1.81) (0.40) 
CAP -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0008 -0.0006 
 (-1.03) (-1.11) (-1.95) (-1.75) (-1.64) (-1.00) 
GDP -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002 
 (-0.20) (0.46) (-0.21) (-0.47) (0.23) (-0.49) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0051 -0.0095** 
 (-3.02) (-2.87) (-2.43) (-2.28) (-1.62) (-2.52) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 53.99% 53.52% 61.35% 59.80% 56.46% 52.85% 
Wald Chi2 309.45*** 368.32*** 629.75*** 506.83*** 215.88*** 135.62*** 
Observations 621 569 385 382 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the second model (i.e. cash flow predictability), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
enhancing the predictive power of earnings for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). The results 
reflect only countries with observations on both bank types. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the 
results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 




Table 5.11: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Future Loan Charge-Offs Test – First Sensitivity Test  
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0084* 0.0082*** 0.0213*** 0.0258*** -0.0034 -0.0007 
 (1.88) (2.67) (2.58) (3.08) (-0.78) (-0.15) 
LLP 0.2732*** 0.3124*** 0.1807*** 0.0974* 0.4839*** 0.5599*** 
 (7.07) (11.78) (3.59) (1.90) (7.38) (11.01) 
GOV -0.0130*** 0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0004 0.0002* 0.0007** 
 (-3.58) (1.27) (-1.71) (-0.77) (1.68) (2.07) 
GOV * LLP 1.4649*** 0.4728** 0.1158 0.3433 0.3932** 0.4274* 
 (4.39) (2.19) (0.17) (0.52) (2.14) (1.71) 
SIZE -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (-0.75) (-1.14) (-1.21) (-1.35) (0.16) (-0.52) 
AGE -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0007 -0.0001 
 (-0.78) (-1.69) (-0.55) (-0.91) (0.12) (-0.30) 
BIG4 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0035 -0.0035 0.0019*** 0.0019** 
 (-1.18) (-1.56) (-0.71) (-0.77) (2.64) (2.03) 
CEODUAL -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0031** -0.0015 
 (-1.26) (-0.92) (-0.28) (-0.39) (-2.04) (-1.09) 
CAP -0.0004 -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-1.42) (-1.78) (-1.73) (-1.95) (-1.17) (-1.30) 
GDP -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-1.08) (-0.01) (-0.86) (-0.18) (1.49) (1.09) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.0006 0.0003 0.0009* 0.0030* -0.0008 -0.0003 
 (1.58) (0.47) (1.68) (1.84) (-1.00) (-0.32) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 26.65% 33.64% 17.39% 12.60% 52.60% 64.78% 
Wald Chi2 155.08*** 202.24*** 39.78*** 33.28** 146.15*** 275.21*** 
Observations 671 569 385 382 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the third model (i.e. loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs), examining the role of internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel 
C). The results reflect only countries with observations on both bank types. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 
6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 




Second, additional tests examine whether the ownership structure in banks influence the 
information value of banks’ earnings. Hence, the main models are extended to control for the 
effect of government ownership (GOV_OWN), which is measured as the proportion of shares 
held by the government. Existing literature has documented that government ownership is 
associated with poor corporate governance (Megginson et al., 1994; Shleifer, 1998), however, 
no evidence exists on the impact of government ownership on information value of earnings. 
The results reported in Tables 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 show that the main findings remain after 
controlling for government ownership. The results demonstrate that government ownership 
does not influence the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 

















Table 5.12: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Earnings Persistence Test – Second Sensitivity Test 
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant -0.0009 -0.0026 -0.0002 0.0045 0.0007 -0.0166 
 (-0.14) (-0.42) (-0.03) (0.81) (0.03) (-0.83) 
EBT 0.4030*** 0.1840*** 0.7437*** 0.6063*** 0.2120** 0.1950** 
 (3.25) (3.70) (5.35) (7.67) (2.07) (1.97) 
GOV 0.0003 -0.0106*** 0.0002 -0.0055** 0.0003 -0.0023 
 (1.07) (-4.31) (0.86) (-2.02) (0.71) (-1.27) 
GOV * EBT 0.7344* 0.5283*** -0.0889 0.1956* 1.5494*** 1.4757** 
 (1.89) (5.37) (-0.41) (1.66) (2.63) (2.17) 
SIZE 0.0006 0.0009** 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0038*** 
 (1.34) (2.12) (0.51) (-0.07) (1.42) (2.74) 
AGE 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0020 0.0032 
 (0.75) (1.32) (-1.57) (-0.09) (0.88) (1.10) 
BIG4 0.0041 0.0023 0.0057* 0.0051*** 0.0008 -0.0020 
 (1.50) (1.37) (1.88) (3.36) (0.24) (-0.58) 
CEODUAL 0.0020 0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0026 0.0076* 
 (0.91) (1.18) (-0.27) (-0.75) (0.88) (1.65) 
GOV_OWN -0.0096 0.0019 0.0054 0.0041 -0.0018 -0.0080 
 (-1.13) (0.47) (0.93) (1.48) (-0.16) (-0.55) 
CAP -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 (-2.72) (-3.31) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-2.30) (-2.08) 
GDP 0.0006 0.0009 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.46) (0.72) (0.32) (0.56) (-0.12) (-1.28) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002** -0.0003** 
 (-2.44) (-2.27) (-2.68) (-2.81) (-1.98) (-2.45) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 56.77% 56.29% 68.10% 67.17% 55.41% 53.74% 
Wald Chi2 245.49*** 554.36*** 472.62*** 750.94*** 245.54*** 827.78*** 
Observations 654 604 418 387 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the first model (i.e. earnings persistence), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing 
earnings persistence for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results 
for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.13: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Cash Flow Predictability Test – Second Sensitivity Test  
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0066 0.0054 0.0079 0.0133 -0.0014 0.0052 
 (0.61) (0.70) (0.67) (1.25) (-0.09) (0.27) 
EBT 0.2945*** 0.1987** 0.5175*** 0.5271*** 0.2919*** 0.2282*** 
 (3.45) (2.21) (7.61) (7.65) (7.36) (5.17) 
GOV 0.0002 -0.0013** 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0007* -0.0001 
 (0.78) (-2.14) (0.31) (-0.02) (1.74) (-0.11) 
GOV * EBT 0.7371** 0.0427* 0.3109 0.4301* 1.1262*** 1.1802** 
 (2.48) (1.95) (1.23) (1.77) (2.76) (2.26) 
SIZE 0.0010 0.0010* 0.0009 0.0007 0.0015 0.0018 
 (1.39) (1.70) (1.47) (1.10) (1.43) (1.30) 
AGE 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0033* 0.0059*** 
 (0.56) (1.26) (-0.55) (-0.92) (1.92) (2.57) 
BIG4 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0028 0.0053 0.0036 
 (0.88) (1.18) (0.51) (0.60) (1.48) (0.92) 
CEODUAL 0.0007 0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0061* 0.0006 
 (0.32) (1.00) (-0.59) (-0.56) (1.75) (0.12) 
GOV_OWN -0.0150** -0.0047 -0.0072 -0.0101 0.0006 -0.0303 
 (-2.31) (-0.77) (-0.94) (-1.43) (0.01) (-1.50) 
CAP -0.0008* -0.0005 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0008 -0.0009 
 (-1.66) (-1.35) (-1.87) (-1.69) (-1.55) (-1.43) 
GDP -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0010 
 (-0.25) (0.57) (-0.18) (-0.38) (0.22) (-0.30) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0002* -0.0002* 
 (-2.13) (-1.76) (-1.48) (-1.39) (-1.71) (-1.65) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 53.12% 51.49% 60.38% 59.38% 56.43% 53.03% 
Wald Chi2 324.65*** 367.64*** 675.47*** 410.91*** 212.74*** 137.28*** 
Observations 653 601 417 414 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the second model (i.e. cash flow predictability), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
enhancing the predictive power of earnings for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). Columns 1, 3, 
and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.14: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Future Loan Charge-Offs Test – Second Sensitivity Test  
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0083* 0.0078*** 0.0183** 0.0233*** -0.0016 -0.0005 
 (1.95) (2.77) (2.39) (3.07) (-0.42) (-0.13) 
LLP 0.2750*** 0.2891*** 0.1690*** 0.0820* 0.4818*** 0.5572*** 
 (7.38) (11.10) (3.45) (1.65) (7.23) (10.73) 
GOV -0.0128*** 0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0004 0.0002 0.0007** 
 (-3.68) (1.31) (-1.78) (-0.87) (1.57) (2.10) 
GOV * LLP 1.4602*** 1.1172*** 1.3006 1.7558** 0.4480* 0.4234** 
 (4.52) (4.30) (1.43) (1.98) (1.86) (2.57) 
SIZE -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0010 
 (-0.77) (-0.88) (-0.96) (-1.08) (0.14) (-0.35) 
AGE -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0007 -0.0010 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (-0.87) (-1.68) (-0.61) (-0.98) (0.07) (-0.30) 
BIG4 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0035 -0.0036 0.0020*** 0.0020** 
 (-1.30) (-1.62) (-0.86) (-0.98) (2.73) (2.02) 
CEODUAL -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0032** -0.0014 
 (-1.43) (-1.42) (-0.36) (-0.50) (-2.05) (-0.99) 
GOV_OWN -0.0071 -0.0095*** -0.0116* -0.0135** -0.0015 0.0005 
 (-1.33) (-4.10) (-1.87) (-2.25) (-0.47) (0.11) 
CAP -0.0004 -0.0003** -0.0001* -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-1.47) (-2.17) (-1.66) (-1.85) (-1.23) (-1.04) 
GDP -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-1.05) (0.26) (-0.73) (0.01) (1.45) (1.10) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.0006* 0.0007 0.0001 0.0034 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (1.73) (1.23) (1.03) (1.33) (-0.93) (-0.50) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 27.18% 36.47% 18.50% 14.35% 52.75% 64.80% 
Wald Chi2 169.84*** 247.41*** 49.71*** 38.56*** 145.60*** 269.73*** 
Observations 713 601 417 414 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the third model (i.e. loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs), examining the role of internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel 
C). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. 
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Third, additional tests were performed to address the issue of insignificant variables. These 
tests examine whether the signs and values of significant variables change when the 
insignificant variables are dropped from the analysis. The main results presented in Tables 
5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 show that some control variables have insignificant values (i.e. AGE, 
CEODUAL, and GDP). Hence, the tests examining the role of internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing earnings persistence, predictability and validity of loan loss 
provisions are re-estimated excluding the insignificant variables. The results from these 
additional tests are reported in Tables 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17. The reported results show that the 
results for the main variables (board size, board independence, audit committee size, audit 
committee independence) remain unchanged after dropping insignificant control variables. 
Finally, to address the potential endogeneity problem between corporate governance variables 
and information value of earnings, Two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
and Three-stage least squares (3SLS) were utilised. Unreported results for both GMM and 
3SLS estimations show that the main findings presented earlier in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 




















Table 5.15: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Earnings Persistence Test – Third Sensitivity Test 
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant -0.0069 -0.0058 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0052 -0.0262 
 (-0.81) (-0.88) (-0.48) (-0.11) (-0.24) (-1.12) 
EBT 0.4226*** 0.1894*** 0.7425*** 0.6046*** 0.2135** 0.1813* 
 (3.45) (3.84) (15.60) (7.80) (2.01) (1.76) 
GOV 0.0003 -0.0105*** 0.0002 -0.0057** 0.0004 -0.0027 
 (1.26) (-4.30) (0.71) (-2.11) (0.75) (-1.43) 
GOV * EBT 0.5161** 0.5350*** 0.1150 0.2171* 1.6809*** 1.6981** 
 (2.17) (5.48) (1.58) (1.87) (2.85) (2.53) 
SIZE 0.0007 0.0011*** -0.0009 0.0003 0.0019 0.0039** 
 (1.48) (2.66) (-0.34) (0.10) (1.34) (2.34) 
BIG4 0.0041 0.0024 0.0049* 0.0043*** 0.0007 -0.0015 
 (1.63) (1.51) (1.82) (3.17) (0.22) (-0.40) 
CAP -0.0002** -0.0001*** -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0002*** -0.0002** 
 (-2.42) (-4.08) (-0.36) (-0.14) (-2.67) (-2.19) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0036** -0.0030** -0.0026** -0.0023** -0.0065** -0.0109*** 
 (-2.53) (-2.29) (-2.52) (-2.27) (-2.05) (-2.65) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 55.93% 55.91% 67.77% 66.78% 54.83% 51.17% 
Wald Chi2 198.47*** 561.94*** 187.93*** 745.78*** 255.72*** 354.34*** 
Observations 654 604 418 387 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the first model (i.e. earnings persistence), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing 
earnings persistence for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results 
for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 












Table 5.16: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Cash Flow Predictability Test – Third Sensitivity Test  
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant -0.0005 0.0021 0.0049 0.0102 0.0004 -0.0054 
 (-0.04) (0.25) (0.39) (0.89) (0.03) (-0.27) 
EBT 0.3069*** 0.2006** 0.5269*** 0.5328*** 0.2789*** 0.2262*** 
 (3.46) (2.22) (7.93) (8.09) (7.28) (5.33) 
GOV 0.0003 -0.0012** 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0007* -0.0004 
 (1.04) (-2.10) (0.24) (-0.05) (1.72) (-0.37) 
GOV * EBT 0.5294** 0.0430** 0.1242 0.1825 1.4075*** 1.4720*** 
 (2.10) (1.96) (1.10) (1.61) (3.66) (2.93) 
SIZE 0.0011 0.0012** 0.0007 0.0004 0.0016 0.0026* 
 (1.55) (2.24) (1.21) (0.66) (1.48) (1.94) 
BIG4 0.0018 0.0020 0.0013 0.0020 0.0052 0.0044 
 (0.75) (1.15) (0.32) (0.45) (1.50) (1.12) 
CAP -0.0008 -0.0006* -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0001*** -0.0001** 
 (-1.33) (-1.78) (-1.91) (-1.71) (-2.84) (-2.02) 
COUNTRY_GOV -0.0036** -0.0028* -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0060* -0.0109*** 
 (-2.05) (-1.72) (-1.12) (-1.17) (-1.88) (-2.79) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 51.38% 51.18% 59.79% 58.51% 53.06% 48.94% 
Wald Chi2 277.42*** 363.35*** 581.82*** 388.88*** 199.58*** 120.89*** 
Observations 653 601 417 414 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the second model (i.e. cash flow predictability), examining the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
enhancing the predictive power of earnings for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel C). Columns 1, 3, 
and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 











Table 5.17: Regression Results for the Corporate Governance and Future Loan Charge-Offs Test – Third Sensitivity Test  
Variables (A) Full Sample (B) Conventional Banks (C) Islamic Banks 
(1) GOV = BOD (2) GOV = AC (3) GOV = BOD (4) GOV = AC (5) GOV = BOD (6) GOV = AC 
Constant 0.0108** 0.0082*** 0.0244*** 0.0250*** -0.0040 -0.0013 
 (2.41) (2.85) (3.09) (3.25) (-0.95) (-0.31) 
LLP 0.2756*** 0.3025*** 0.1801*** 0.0889* 0.4497*** 0.5341*** 
 (7.41) (11.82) (3.77) (1.83) (6.03) (10.80) 
GOV -0.0129*** 0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0004 0.0003** 0.0008** 
 (-3.68) (1.30) (-1.95) (-0.85) (2.21) (2.46) 
GOV * LLP 1.5200*** 0.5235** 0.2073 0.5118 0.4728** 0.4624* 
 (4.72) (2.49) (0.33) (0.83) (2.55) (1.90) 
SIZE -0.0004 -0.0004** -0.0008* -0.0009** 0.0008 -0.0007 
 (-1.30) (-1.97) (-1.68) (-1.96) (0.32) (-0.27) 
BIG4 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0038 -0.0042 0.0019*** 0.0014 
 (-0.71) (-1.29) (-1.11) (-1.38) (2.67) (1.52) 
CAP -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0001 
 (-1.12) (-1.34) (-1.61) (-1.93) (-1.72) (-1.01) 
COUNTRY_GOV 0.0023** 0.0006 0.0031** 0.0033** -0.0007 -0.0009 
 (2.47) (1.09) (2.16) (2.35) (-0.90) (-0.10) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 26.65% 33.46% 17.49% 12.12% 50.44% 63.94% 
Wald Chi2 166.38*** 207.03*** 44.97*** 59.78*** 111.49*** 254.40*** 
Observations 713 601 417 414 236 187 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the third model (i.e. loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs), examining the role of internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the validity of loan loss provisions for the full sample (Panel A), conventional banks sample (Panel B), and Islamic banks sample (Panel 
C). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the results for board characteristics, while columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results for audit committee. 
Z-statistics are between parentheses.  
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 




The empirical research in this chapter has investigated whether effective corporate 
governance mechanisms can enhance the information value of banks earnings. This study is 
among the early attempts that examine the relation between corporate governance and 
financial reporting quality from an information perspective. 
The main findings suggest that conventional banks and Islamic banks report high quality 
earnings, measured from an information value perspective. The results presented in this 
chapter provide evidence for the influence of effective corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. 
large and independent boards of directors and audit committees) in enhancing the information 
value of earnings. However, the role of corporate governance is more evident under strict 
institutional environments, such as those of Islamic banks.  
This empirical research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the results 
extend prior research on the association between corporate governance and earnings quality to 
the banking industry. It identifies several internal governance characteristics that are 
associated with higher quality earnings in both conventional and Islamic banks. Second, it 
extends prior evidence by Quttainah et al., (2013), who compare the quality of earnings in 
Islamic banks with conventional banks. However, they examine earnings quality from an 
opportunistic earnings management perspective. This study utilises different measures of 
earnings quality such as earnings persistence, predictability of future cash flows, and future 
loan charge-offs to reflect the information enhancing role of earnings. Finally, this study tests 
for a comprehensive set of internal governance mechanisms employed in conventional and 
Islamic banks, including board of directors, audit committee and Shari’ah supervisory board.  
By providing evidence on the relation between internal governance mechanisms and earnings 
quality, the results highlight several implications for investors and regulators who seek 
enhanced quality earnings in both conventional and Islamic banks. The results will also help 









Chapter Six: Conclusion and Implications 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis that started in 2007 resulted in the collapse of many large firms including 
financial institutions and other banks around the world. The inadequacy of banks’ governance 
structures was believed to be a principal factor contributing to the crisis (Isaksson and 
Kirkpatrick, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012). Consequently, the financial crisis adversely 
affected the profitability and the stability of the banking sector, and hence threatening the 
overall economy (Bernanke, 2010). In addition to the renewed focus on the effectiveness of 
banks’ governance systems, the recent financial crisis has put exceptional emphasis on the 
quality of banks’ financial reporting, calling for stricter initiatives for corporate governance in 
banks, and additional regulations to ensure high quality financial reporting by banks and other 
financial institutions. The use of substandard accounting practices to hide excessive risk-
taking activities by well-known financial institutions, and the negative consequences of such 
practices have been documented and discussed (Jones and Norton, 2015). 
Furthermore, the dominant role of banking institutions in the economic realm, the 
ramifications of specific banking activities, and the overarching repercussions may provoke 
severe social criticism, especially in highly religious contexts, such as Islamic banks. 
Therefore, this thesis sought to investigate the role of different internal governance 
mechanisms in enhancing the financial reporting quality in conventional and Islamic banks, 
through constraining opportunistic earnings management practices and improving the 
information value of banks’ reported earnings. It examined the role of traditional internal 
governance mechanisms (i.e. boards of directors and audit committees) adopted by 
conventional banks, in addition to extended governance structures (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory 
boards) adopted uniquely by Islamic banks. 
The investigations were conducted on a sample of 61 conventional banks and 39 Islamic 
banks from 16 countries. This thesis included two empirical studies. The first empirical 
setting employed several alternative models to measure opportunistic earnings management 
practices across the two bank types, including (i) loss avoidance; (ii) income increasing 
discretionary accruals; and (iii) magnitude of discretionary accruals. While the second 
empirical setting employed three measures of earnings quality that reflect the information 
enhancing role of earnings. These measures are (i) earnings persistence; (ii) ability of current 
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earnings to predict future cash flows; and (iii) the relationship between loan loss provisions 
and future loan charge-offs. 
For the traditional internal governance mechanisms, the thesis examined both the size and 
independence of the board of directors and audit committee. Then the analysis was extended 
to examine the effect of Shari’ah supervisory board size, financial qualification, and multiple 
memberships held by the Shari’ah scholars. 
 
6.2 Summary of Results 
The thesis examined the role of internal governance mechanisms in enhancing the quality of 
financial reporting in conventional banks and Islamic banks. This examination was conducted 
through two empirical studies (Chapters 4 and 5).  
The main findings of the first empirical study (Chapter 4) demonstrate that effective corporate 
governance systems that employ large boards of directors and large audit committees are 
associated with lower levels of opportunistic earnings management practices. These findings 
support the resource dependence theory, which claims that larger boards and audit committees 
improve their effectiveness as the members benefit from the varied knowledge and expertise 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). These results provide support to 
both Hypothesis 𝑯𝟏𝒂 and 𝑯𝟐𝒂. Although these hypotheses provided non-directional 
expectations, these findings provided evidence for negative impact of board and audit 
committee size on earnings management. The findings also show that independent directors in 
the boards and in audit committees enhance the monitoring power and are able to restrain 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. These results are in line with the agency theory, which 
argues that independent directors are in a better position to monitor and control managerial 
behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Link et al., 2008; Pathan and Skully, 2010). These 
findings support both Hypothesis 𝑯𝟏𝒃 and 𝑯𝟐𝒃. However, the findings from the first 
empirical study failed to provide support to Hypothesis 𝑯𝟏𝒄, as no significant associations 
were found between the CEO duality and earnings management measures. 
The second empirical study (Chapter 5) investigated the role of corporate governance in 
enhancing earnings informativeness. With regard to the information value of banks’ earnings, 
the findings were consistent with that of the opportunistic earnings management. Specifically, 
the results provide evidence for a positive association between the size and independence of 
both, the boards of directors and audit committees and the earnings persistence. However, the 
results demonstrate that an effective audit committee, that is large and comprises of 
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independent members, is better able to improve the information value of earnings though 
enhancing their persistence. In addition, the results from the cash flow predictability tests 
provide evidence for positive association between the size and independence of both, board of 
directors and audit committee, and the predictive ability of earnings. These results provide 
support to the resource dependence theory and the agency theory, claiming that large and 
independent boards and audit committees can enhance the quality of financial reporting. 
With reference to the relationship between loan loss provisions and future loan charge-offs, 
the results show that effective boards and audit committees, that are large and more 
independent, can positively influence the financial reporting quality in banks, by enhancing 
the reliability of loan loss provisions. These findings are consistent with the predictions made 
under Hypotheses 𝑯𝟏 and 𝑯𝟐 in the second empirical study (Chapter 5). 
Moreover, the findings of the second empirical study show that the role of boards of directors 
and audit committees in enhancing the information value of earnings is more obvious under 
strict and stronger institutional environments (i.e. Islamic banks). 
The analysis was further extended to examine the role of additional governance mechanisms 
in Islamic banks (i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board) in enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting. The results provide evidence that large Shari’ah supervisory boards, with 
financially qualified and highly reputed Shari’ah scholars, play a significant role in 
constraining opportunistic earnings management practices in Islamic banks. These results 
provide evidence supporting Hypotheses 𝑯𝟑𝒂, 𝑯𝟑𝒃 and 𝑯𝟑𝒄 in Chapter 4. However, when the 
information value of earnings is considered, the results demonstrate a lack of evidence on the 
role of Shari’ah supervisory boards in enhancing the earnings persistence, cash flow 
predictability, and the reliability of loan loss provisions. This lack of evidence may be due to 
the limited direct role played by the Shari’ah supervisory board in monitoring the Islamic 
banks’ financial reporting process. In addition, the complexity of the Islamic banking 
activities and the sophistication of the financial reporting issues may impede the monitoring 
of the Shari’ah supervisory board over the financial reporting process. 
To summarise the main findings on the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
constraining opportunistic management practices, this thesis provides twofold evidence. First, 
within Islamic banks, banks with Shari’ah boards that are large in size and employ financially 
qualified Shari’ah scholars are less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management 
practices, relative to banks with small and less financially qualified Shari’ah boards. Second, 
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within conventional banks, banks with larger and more independent boards of directors and 
audit committees exhibit less opportunistic earnings management behaviour. 
 
6.3 Implications, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The investigation in this thesis responds to prior calls for comprehensive understanding of the 
relevance of bank type and internal governance mechanisms to financial reporting quality (He 
and Yang, 2014). The thesis provides valuable insights for regulators seeking to enhance the 
quality of financial reporting in banks. 
The empirical findings provide important implications for regulators, investors, external 
auditors, and other stakeholders engaging with both banking sectors (i.e. conventional and 
Islamic banks). Bank regulators and external auditors should consider the joint effect of 
different layers of internal governance mechanisms on mitigating managerial opportunism 
and improving the financial reporting quality. Such knowledge enables regulatory bodies to 
develop strict regulations to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance systems in 
banks. The findings also enable market regulators to identify weakness in financial reporting 
systems and in corporate governance structures, and therefore allow them to improve such 
weaknesses. 
The findings of this thesis also enable investors and other market participants to improve their 
decision-making process in relation to investment decisions. High-quality financial reports 
allow stockholders and potential investors to accurately evaluate the financial performance 
and position of banks, and hence facilitate efficient and effective resource allocation. This is 
achieved through avoiding inaccurate decisions made using inaccurate information.  
Finally, the findings raise a call to Islamic banks’ regulators to promote effective Shari’ah 
governance by employing qualified and highly-reputable Shari’ah scholars to raise the public 
confidence in the Islamic banking industry. This can also be achieved by establishing 
professional institutions specialised in providing training and development courses to Shari’ah 
scholars. 
The empirical results provide evidence that several characteristics of corporate governance are 
associated with enhanced financial reporting quality in banks. However, there are some 
research limitations within this thesis, and hence, there are several ways to extend it. First, the 
empirical research in this thesis has focused on the role of only three internal governance 
mechanisms (board of directors, audit committee, and Shari’ah supervisory board), thus, 
future research may consider the role of risk committees’ effectiveness in financial reporting 
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quality in conventional and Islamic banks. Second, future research may investigate the impact 
of other corporate governance characteristics that were not tested in this thesis, such as the 
characteristics of chief executive officers and other boards sub-committees. Third, as this 
thesis assesses the quality of financial reporting from an opportunistic earnings management 
and from an informational perspective, future research may consider other aspects of earnings 
quality, such as financial restatements, conservatism, and audit opinion. Fourth, the thesis 
compares Islamic banks with conventional banks in terms of the quality of their financial 
reporting, hence, future research may investigate financial stability within Islamic banks and 
compare it with conventional banks. Finally, the selection of the sample in this thesis is based 
on predetermined criterial. The final sample considers only Muslim countries. Future research 
may extend the examination by comparing Islamic banks with conventional banks in non-
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Appendix 1: Copies of Shari’ah Reports Issued by Shari’ah Supervisory Boards 
A) Al Salam Bank – Bahrain B.S.C 
FATWA AND SHARI’A SUPERVISORY 
BOARD REPORT TO THE 
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent and the Merciful 
 
Praise be to Allah; Prayers and peace be upon the most noble Messenger, our Prophet Muhammad and 
his Companions 
 
The Report of Shari’a Supervisory Board of Al Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C, (“the Board”) submitted to the 
General Assembly on the Bank’s activities during the financial year ending 31 December 2018: 
 
First: Memorandum & Articles of Association 
We confirm that the Memorandum & Articles of Association of the Bank are in conformity with the rules 
and principles of Shari’a. 
 
Second: Activities of the Bank and Board’s Guidance 
The Board supervised the activities and transactions of the Bank during the reporting year and 
instructed and guided various departments to comply with the rules and principles of Shari’a and 
fatwas of the Board while undertaking such activities and transactions. A number of meetings were held 
with the senior staff of the Bank for this purpose. 
 
Third: Contracts & Transactions 
The Board studied the structures of the transactions that were presented to it during the year, approved 
their contracts and documentation, and responded to the questions and inquiries that were raised in 
respect thereof and issued appropriate decisions and fatwas. These fatwas and decisions have been 
circulated to the concerned departments of the Bank for execution and implementation. Similarly, the 
Board, reviewed drafts of the contracts and agreements that were presented to it with respect to Sukuk 
(investment certificates) and syndicated financing transactions; commented upon them and approved 
them when its comments were complied with. 
 
Fourth: Access to Records 
The Board was provided with the required records of the Bank and obtained the information and data 
that it requested to enable it to perform the Sharia audit requirements. 
 
Fifth: Shari’a Audit 
The Sharia audit reports were submitted to the Board, and the Board issued its comments and 




The Board recommends that the Bank’s Management should conduct regular training programmes for 






Seventh: Balance Sheet 
The Board has reviewed the balance sheet, profit and loss accounts, accounting policies for the 
preparation of the financial statement and the basis of distributing profit to the shareholders and 
depositors and issued its observations in this regard; and the Bank’s Management has promised to 
comply with Board’s observations. 
The Board is of the opinion that the balance sheet, to the extent presented to it by the Bank’s 
Management, the information supplied to it and the Management’s undertaking to implement the 
observations thereon, represents the Bank’s assets and income. The accuracy of information and data 
is, however, the responsibility of the Bank’s Management. 
 
Eighth: Zakah 
Since the Articles of Association do not oblige the Bank to pay zakah on the Shareholder’s equity, the 
Board has calculated the zakah, as disclosed in the balance sheet, which is payable by the 
Shareholders and instructed the Bank to notify them accordingly. 
 
Ninth: Charity Fund 
With regard to the transactions that have not yet been converted to Shari’a compliant transactions, as 
a result of court proceedings or for any other reasons, including the assets and liabilities of Al Salam 
Bank, Seychelles which have been disclosed in the balance sheet, the Board has instructed the Bank’s 
Management to channel any resulting interests to the Bank’s  Charity Fund. 
 
Decision of the Board 
The Board would like to emphasize that compliance to the rules and principles of the Shari’a in respect 
of all the businesses and transactions of the Bank is the responsibility of the Bank’s Management. The 
Board would like to confirm that the transactions executed by the Bank during the year, to the extent of 
the information and data made available to it by the Bank’s Management, the observations of the 
Board and the response of the Bank’s Management for compliance with observations, do not conflict, 
in general, with the rules and principles of Shari’a. 
 
 
Fatwa & Shari’a Supervisory Board 
 
                                                                                                
 
Shaikh Adnan Abdulla AlQattan                                         Dr. Mohamed Abdulhakim Zoeir  




Dr. Fareed Yaqoob Almeftah                                            Dr. Azzeddine Ben Zaghiba 









B) Kuwait Finance House K.S.C.P. 
Annual Report 2018 – Fatwa & Shari’a Supervisory Board Report 
 
The Annual Report of Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board 
2018 
To the respected KFH shareholders, 
Assalamu alaykum warahmatu Allah wabarakatuh, 
Praise be to Allah the Almighty and Peace and Blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), his 
family and his companions. 
We have reviewed and endorsed the policies, products, services and the activities that KFH had 
carried out in 2018. We have also conducted the necessary review to provide our opinion on KFH 
compliance with Shari’a rules and principles through the fatwas, resolutions and recommendations 
that we have issued. 
To achieve this compliance assurance, the Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board held 46 meetings 
during the year 2018, in which it had reviewed and endorsed samples of the contracts and 
agreements after obtaining the necessary information to issue its opinion. The Shari’a Research and 
Advisory Department conducted its review on contracts, agreements and polices and procedures as 
per Fatwa & Shari’a Supervisory Board’s resolutions in addition to the Group Internal Shari’a Audit 
conducted audit exersises on randomly selected samples of all operations and transactions of KFH 
with the shareholders, investors and others in accordance with the Annual Shari’a Audit plan for all 
the Bank’s departments and its subsidiaries. The Shari’a Board has also received the periodic 
reports that the Group Internal Shari’a Audit Department has prepared on the Shari’a audit process 
and operations, site visits and the compliance status of the process and implementation of the 
fatwa and resolutions issued by KFH Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board. 
We have also obtained all necessary information and clarifications to give us sufficient evidence to 
provide reasonable confirmation that KFH and its subsidiaries had complied with Shari’a rules and 
principles in all its operations that have been presented to the Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board. 
Through the process and steps that we followed to ascertain the compliance of KFH to the Shari’a 
rules, we confirm the following: 
First: The contracts and transactions which KFH had entered into during the financial year ending on 
31 December 2018 as presented to us had complied with the Shari’a rules, principles and resolutions 
and recommendations of KFH Fatwa and Shari’a Supervisory Board. 





Second: The profit distribution and loss bearing on the investment accounts are in compliance with 
the terms of our approval in accordance with the rules and principles of Shari’a. 
Third: All income that has been received from non-Shari’a compliant sources or by means prohibited 
by Shari’a have been cleansed and channeled to charitable purposes. 
Fourth: The Zakat calculation has been made in accordance with the Company Zakat Manual issued 
by Kuwait Zakat House, and in accordance with the resolutions and recommendations of KFH Fatwa 
and Shari’a Supervisory Board. 
Peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family members and companions and praise be to Allah, 









                                                                                
                               
Sheikh/Dr. Anwar Shuaib Al-Abdulsalam                       Sheikh/Dr. Mubarak Jazza Al-Harbi 






Sheikh/Dr. Esam Abdulrahim Ghareeb                          Sheikh/Dr. Khaled Shujaa’ Al-Otaibi 






Appendix 2: Performance Comparison of both Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks 
During the Financial Crisis 
 
Bank Type  Financial crisis Post crisis 
LR- IBs Obs. 52 182 
 Mean  0.0756** 0.157*** 
 Mean Rank 43.26** 160.32*** 
 Sum of Ranks 2250 29179.5 
LR– CBs Obs. 52 182 
 Mean  0.2716 0.2874 
 Mean Rank 61.73 204.67 
 Sum of Ranks 3210 37250.5 
CR- IBs Obs. 52 182 
 Mean  -0.2451 0.0783 
 Mean Rank 49.08 174.13 
 Sum of Ranks 2552 31691 
CR- CBs Obs. 52 182 
 Mean  0.0597 0.273 
 Mean Rank 55.92 190.87 
 Sum of Ranks 2908 34739 
 
The table above presents the results of a study conducted by Hassan et al. (2019), using a 
comprehensive dataset of 52 Islamic banks and conventional banks for the period of 2007-
2015. The table shows that the mean value of liquidity risk (LR) for Islamic banks is 0.0756, 
which is lower than the conventional banks during the financial crisis period and the period of 
post financial crisis. These results support the argument that Islamic banks are better in 
managing their liquidity risk. With regard to credit risk, the results provide evidence for better 
credit risk management in Islamic banks having the value of CR -0.2451 and 0.0783 in 
financial crisis and post financial crisis period respectively, which is better relative to 
conventional banks.  
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Appendix 3: Statistics about Shari’ah Supervisory Boards Characteristics in Islamic 
Banks 
 
A) Shari’ah Supervisory Boards’ Multiple Memberships 
 
According to the Islamic Finance Development Report (2016), there were 1068 Shari’ah 
scholars around the world, serving Shari’ah supervisory boards across 46 countries. 65% of 
the scholars hold 1 membership, 27% hold 2-4 memberships, and 8% hold 5 or more 
memberships. 
 








B) List of Top 20 Shari’ah Scholars by Number of Memberships held and their 
Qualifications 
 
Shari’ah Scholar Qualification Number of 
Memberships Held 
Nizam Mohammed Yacoubi Ph.D. (University of Wales)  85 
Abdul Satar Abdul Karim Abu 
Ghuddah 
Ph.D. (Al-Azhar University) 85 
Mohammed Ali Elgari Ph.D. (University of Berkeley) 71 
Abdul Aziz Khalifa Al-Qassar Ph.D. (Al-Azhar University) 42 
Ali Mohuddin Al’Qurra Daghi Ph.D. (Al-Azhar University) 30 
Yusuf Bin Abdullah Al-Shubaili 
Ph.D. (Imam Mohammad Bin 
Saud Islamic University) 
29 
Mohammed Daud Bakar 
Ph.D. (University of St. 
Andrews) 
27 
Esam Khalaf Al-Enzi Ph.D. (University of Jordan) 25 
Issa Zaki Issa Chakra 
Ph.D. (Islamic University of 
Madinah Al-Munawwarah) 
23 
Esam Mohammed Ishaq 
Bachelor’s Degree (McGill 
University) 
22 
Mohammed Imran Ashraf 
Usmani 
Ph.D. (University of Karachi) 20 
Khaled Mathkour Al-Mathkour Ph.D. (Al-Azhar University) 18 
Abdullah Bin Mohammed Al-
Mutlaq 
Ph.D. (Imam Mohammad Bin 
Saud Islamic University) 
17 
Mohammed Abdul Rahim 
Sultan Al Olamaa 
Ph.D. (Umm Al Qura 
University) 
16 
Mohammed Taqi Usmani LL.B. (Karachi University) 16 
Mohammed Abdul Razaq Al-
Tabtabaei 
Ph.D. (Imam Mohammad Bin 
Saud Islamic University) 
13 
Mohammed Abdulhakim Zoeir Ph.D. (Al-Azhar University) 13 
Ajeel Jasem Al-Nashmi Ph.D. (Al-Azhar University) 11 
Ali Ibrahim Al-Rashid Ph.D. (Cairo University) 11 
Mohammed Amin Ali Qattan 


















Bahrain Saudi Arabia Kuwait Qatar UAE Egypt Jordan Lebanon
Murabaha & Deferred Sales Musharaka Mudaraba
Leasing & Hire Purchase Istisna Qard Hasan
Other
Appendix 4: Statistics about Distribution of Financing Modes and Lending Portfolio in 
Islamic Banks 
 
A) Composition of Financing Modes in Islamic Banking Sectors 
 
This chart shows the composition (in percentage) of various modes of financing across 
different countries for the year 2011. 
 












B) Islamic Banks Lending Distribution by Sector (%Total Facilities) – Bahrain 
 2017 2018 
Manufacturing 13.0 12.1 
Mining and quarrying 0.8 0.9 
Agriculture, fishing and 
forestry 
0.7 0.7 
Construction 4.8 3.7 
Financial 15.3 16.0 




Credit card 0.8 0.8 
Commercial real estate 
financing 
11.4 12.1 
Residential mortgage 7.8 10.4 




Transport 0.8 0.6 
Other sectors 7.1 5.9 
 
Source: Financial Stability Report – Central Bank of Bahrain (2018) 
